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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates how the natural environment is conceptualised in international 
law.  Environmental campaigners typically place great faith in the discipline’s ability to 
restrain the onset of growing ‘global’ problems: such as species extinctions, clearing of 
forests, pollution, and climate change.  Law has traditionally been a key domain for 
efforts to regulate, and curb, these problems.  While a vast body of existing literature 
assesses the effectiveness and adequacy of these initiatives, this dissertation takes a 
different approach.  It explores particular visions of the natural environment that inform 
such initiatives.  I will proceed from the premise that international law, rather than merely 
reflecting the natural environment, shapes how we perceive it.  With this in mind, I will 
investigate a selection of stories that international law tells about the natural environment, 
and consider the different, competing stories it deprivileges.  The key question is: what 
role has international law played in making certain ways of thinking about nature come 
to seem normal or intuitive, and how does this affect efforts to curb environmental 
harms?   
  
Adopting historical and philosophical approaches informed by critical approaches to law, 
I will show how dominant manifestations of nature are articulated—and sustained—with 
regard to ideas of mastery and resources, national economies and conservation, the 
(human) environment, sustainable development, the green economy, and natural 
capital.  I will use insights from radical ecological and postcolonial theory to highlight 
the ramifications of such conceptualisations.  My discussion will focus on a series of key 
episodes in the history of international environmental law, as well as on the work of 
prominent scholars and institutions in the field of international environmental law.   
 
I will argue that international law is constrained in its efforts to deal with environmental 
problems insofar as the discipline is itself complicit in the use, abuse, and subjugation of 
environments.  Furthermore, I will contend that the idea of the environment is continually 
reconstructed and repositioned, in ways that sustain a certain relationship, or form of 
global ordering.  As we shall observe, debates in international fora over the scope and 
meaning of the environment fostered anxieties about the degree to which it was being 
adequately protected.  Yet, I will suggest, these were neutralised—or co-opted—in ways 
that reinforced dominant logics.  Put simply, international law and institutions have 
 7 
sustained a narrow understanding—or framing—of the environment.  Ultimately, it has 
confined the outcomes of environmental policies to a set of largely predetermined 
outcomes.  This undermines international law’s contingency and potential dynamism.  
Added to this, is the implication that such framings are designed to preserve the power 
and privilege of a small minority of the world’s peoples.   
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PREFACE 
 
 
What is the global environment?  What are our duties with regard to it?  How must we 
balance those duties with competing priorities, which might include economic growth, 
development, equality, and human needs?  What types of struggles take place in relation 
to these issues?  And where does international law fit in?  How does the discipline shape 
our perceptions of the environment?  Whether we recognise it or not, these questions are 
some the world’s most pressing problems.  There are few issues—if any—that do not, in 
one way or another, touch upon these questions.  They affect potentially all life on the 
planet: from the ghostfish that live in the Mariana Trench’s deepest reaches, to the mosses 
growing atop Mount Everest.  These problems might also equally be applicable to a range 
of other perceived crises unfurling around us: financial crises, economic inequality, and 
perhaps even violent conflicts across the world.   
 
I began thinking about some of these issues many years ago, but never expected to see 
them expressed as more than a few inchoate notes saved in my computer, let alone in a 
doctoral thesis.  Indeed, this thesis appears 10 years after I left a comfortable private 
sector job, packed a small suitcase, and booked a one-way flight, in the hope of pursuing 
a passion for international environmental law and policy.  Ultimately, it was a journey 
that took me around the world.  From rural villages in Egypt and China, to Cambodian 
rainforests, to international conference centres in Turkey, Qatar, and Germany, and to the 
Korean Demilitarised Zone, I feel privileged to have worked with an extraordinarily 
talented and committed group of people for whom these questions always remained at the 
centre of their efforts.   
 
Over these years, I dedicated much of my energies working toward solutions to climate 
change and deforestation, preventing forced relocations, and helping peoples adapt to 
changing environmental problems.  My colleagues and I achieved some success in these 
areas, if only to reduce the rate at which they were worsening.  However, I eventually 
came to feel a sense of frustration and indignation from our efforts.  I had once seen 
international law as the solution, a panacea to preventing the planet from warming, cutting 
down old-growth forests, extinction of rare animals, and reducing plastics in our oceans.  
By the end of 2013, I held significant doubts about this.   
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These doubts emerged from a concern that we were forever trying to change problems 
only at their surface, without sufficiently contemplating the many factors at the heart of 
those predicaments.  Consequently, I often felt that these underlying factors were being 
sustained, at the expense of implementing a range of more adequate—and readily 
available—solutions.  It led to a desire to interrogate this suspicion, and to pursue, what 
was at first an intuition.  It was around this time that I was given an opportunity to pursue 
further academic research, possibly in the vain hope that I could find more adequate 
answers to the problems that I had previously worked to resolve, but had perhaps 
inadvertently made worse.   
 
This thesis is a modest attempt to explain these issues.  It is a project driven by pessimism, 
yet inspired by a lasting hope.  It journeys into the inner sanctum of our international law-
making processes and institutions, with a view to shedding light on how historical events 
have affected the lives of billions.  I feel that being a child of the Third World—yet 
formally educated in the First World—has been an amazingly privileged position from 
which to observe, and speak to, these events.   
 
I must admit that the process of writing this thesis has raised more questions and 
uncertainties, than revealing definitive answers.  I am deeply grateful to have had this 
opportunity, whilst working within a dominant culture that glorifies action, and belittles 
contemplation.  This is a culture that makes increasingly aggressive demands for 
immediate ‘action’, as if any action—however ineffective or damaging—is preferable to 
none.  Throughout this process, I have been mindful that opportunities like this are rare.  
With this in mind, I have endeavoured to make the most of this opportunity by seeking 
out unseen fissures, and sharpening our view of what lies beneath—or beyond—the 
realms of positive international law, all in an attempt to try to change it.  The outcome of 
this story, we shall see, is to show simply that—laden with historical baggage—our 
direction of travel is clear.  Yet, our destination is not.  It is with these insights that I hope 
my thesis may help equip others to strive for different visions of international law, the 
environment, and alternative forms of global ordering.   
 
— September 2018 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
‘Who shall have control over the story?  Who has, who should have, the power not only to tell 
the stories with which, and within which, we all lived, but also to say in what manner those stories 
may be told?’  
 
— Salman Rushdie, Joseph Anton: A Memoir (2012)1    
 
I.    Powers of Narrative  
 
In a dramatic sequence of the BBC’s debut Planet Earth II episode aired in 2016,2 a 
marine iguana hatchling sits on a beach on Fernandina Island, one of the volcanic 
Galapagos Islands off the coast of Ecuador.  A snake is poised ominously behind it.  
Seemingly hoping to elude detection, the iguana stays motionless at first.  As it notices 
the snake moving to strike, however, the iguana flees.  All of a sudden, dozens of snakes 
pour out of cracks in the rocks, and join in chasing the terrified baby iguana across the 
beach.  At one point, the iguana stumbles, allowing time for some snakes to catch and 
envelop it.  Born only a few minutes before, the iguana appears destined to become prey.  
Seemingly miraculously, however, it wriggles out of the tangled snakes’ grasp and 
hurriedly scampers up a rock face.  The iguana then makes one final dramatic leap, past 
a lunging snake—narrowly through its gaping jaws—to safety.   
 
This story—narrated by Sir David Attenborough—presents the animals as characters: a 
heroic iguana escaping from its villainous hunters.  Despite this framing, the snakes were 
not motivated by malice.  They simply needed to eat to survive.  As the episode’s producer 
explained, ‘the island has so little food’.  Expressing sympathy for their plight, she later 
clarified that many snakes were ‘going hungry most of the time’.3  By contrast, the marine 
                                                 
1 Salman Rushdie, Joseph Anton: A Memoir (London: Random House, 2012), p. 360. 
2 Mike Gunton, Tom Hugh-Jones, Justin Anderson, Ed Charles, Fredi Devas, Planet Earth II (London: 
BBC Earth, 2016), Episode 1. 
3 Christine Champagne, ‘Here’s The Story Behind That Terrifying Iguana Vs. Snakes “Planet Earth II” 
Scene, Fast Company (online), 17 February 2017, available at: 
<https://www.fastcompany.com/3068093/heres-the-story-behind-that-scary-iguana-vs-snakes-planet-
earth-ii-clip> (last accessed on 12 April 2018). 
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iguanas’ lives were comparatively easier because they were not exclusively reliant on 
food from the island.  They were able to feed on seaweed and algae in the ocean.  This 
vignette reveals a broader point.  Whereas, every day, some of the world’s snakes, 
iguanas, and a myriad of other animals will survive, many others will not.  Power to 
determine the story lies with the story-teller: what makes it to the screen, what we as 
audiences see, what we value, what is worth saving, and ultimately how human beings 
envisage the natural world.   
 
The manner in which we narrate—or frame—the ‘natural environment’4 is a determinant 
of how we understand it, engage with it, and of what we value within it.  In stories about 
what the ‘natural environment’ is—or ought to be—it is often envisioned as self-
contained, bounded, and explicitly definable.5  We are typically led toward interventions 
designed to maintain aspects of the environment in a certain state.  With this background 
in mind, it is perhaps a pertinent question to ask ourselves ‘whose violation and suffering 
we highlight and whose we ignore’6 in the stories we tell—as well as in the languages 
and discursive logics7 those stories promulgate—about the environment.  In other words, 
who benefits, who is affected, and on whom is power and privilege bestowed in these 
stories?  These questions—of how international law tells stories about the natural 
environment, along with how these stories have emerged historically—are, in a nutshell, 
what I address in this thesis.   
 
These questions have become all the more urgent, given the views of a majority of 
scientists—who themselves are framers of nature—telling us that humanity is drastically 
affecting the conditions for life on this planet.  The extent to which people, activities, or 
stories are responsible for these issues remains highly contested.  Alarming statistics 
                                                 
4 In this thesis, I use the terms ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’ interchangeably. As we shall see, however, 
they admittedly emerged at different historical moments and, at least initially, represented different ideas.  
5 See, for example, the legal principles of state responsibility with respect to the environment set out in 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case (Hungary v Slovakia), Judgment [1997] ICJ Reports 7, [140]; Nuclear Tests 
Examination Request (New Zealand v France) [1995] ICJ Reports 288, 306; Lake Lanoux Arbitration 
(France v Spain) (1957) 24 ILR 101; Trail Smelter (United States v Canada) Arbitration (1938-41) 3 
RIAA 1905; Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission on the River Oder [1929] PCIJ 23. 
6 This phrase is adapted from Upendra Baxi’s formulation in relation to human rights. Upendra Baxi, The 
Future of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2008), p. xxxviii (emphasis in the 
original).  
7 I use the term ‘logic’ in this thesis interchangeably with what Michel Foucault called ‘discourse’, 
namely a set of practices that produce knowledge and meaning. See Michel Foucault, Archaeology of 
Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (AM Sheridan Smith trans, New York: Pantheon, 1969), 
pp. 135-140.  
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abound about the scale of species extinctions, the destruction of forests, vanishing of coral 
reefs, melting of glaciers, and the drainage of wetlands, and climate-related disasters.   
 
For instance, we are told that annual global greenhouse gas emissions reached a historic 
peak in 2017, of 32.5 gigatonnes, an increase of 1.4 per cent from 2016 levels. 8  
Mass extinctions also appear to be escalating.  More than half of all species are thought 
to have been eradicated in the last 50 years.9  The latest Red List Index now classifies a 
quarter of the world’s mammals as under ‘imminent threat’.10  Added to this, more than 
30 per cent of marine fish populations have now been exploited beyond their rate of 
replenishment.  This represents a dramatic change from a rate of 10 per cent in 1974.11  
Moreover, the world’s coral reefs are in such serious decline that they are at threat of 
disappearing completely before 2050.  Amphibious species also face high risks of 
extinction, with 41 per cent already under threat. 12   The proportion of forested land 
worldwide fell from 31.6 per cent in 1990 to 30.6 per cent in 2015.13  Over 60 per cent of 
an estimated 8 billion tonnes of plastic produced since 1950 has found its way into 
landfills and oceans.14   
 
Many scholars predict that the above trends will continue to worsen.  The United Nations 
reports a three-fold increase in the consumption of natural resources over the last 40 
years.15  By 2050, the world’s people will likely consume 80 per cent more natural 
‘resources’ than the ability of the planet’s ecological processes to replenish them.  
On some projections, demand for food may rise by more than 50 per cent,16 while energy 
                                                 
8 International Energy Agency, Global Energy & CO2 Status Report 2017 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2018), 
available at: <https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GECO2017.pdf> (last 
accessed on 18 April 2018), p. 3.   
9 World Wildlife Fund, Living Planet Report: Risk and resilience in a new era (Gland: WWF, 2016), p. 3. 
10 Jean-Christophe Vié, Craig Hilton-Taylor and Simon N Stuart (eds), Wildlife in a Changing World: An 
analysis of the 2008 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (Gland: IUCN, 2009), pp. 15-41. 
11 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 2012 (Rome: FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, 2012), p. 11. 
12 United Nations, The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2017 (New York: UN, 2017), available at: 
<https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/report/2017/TheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsReport2017.pdf> (last 
accessed on 18 April 2018), p. 49. 
13 Ibid.  
14 ‘Don’t bin plastic. To solve the polymer problem look East’, The Economist (online), 1 March 2018, 
available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21737502-eight-out-top-ten-polluters-are-
developing-asia-dont-bin-plastic-solve-polymer> (last accessed on 20 April 2018). 
15 United Nations Environment Programme and International Resource Panel, Assessing Global Resource 
Use: A Systems Approach to Resource Efficiency and Pollution Reduction (Nairobi: UNESCO, 2017), 
available at: <http://www.resourcepanel.org/file/904/download?token=YvoiI2o6> (last accessed on 11 
July 2018), p. 28. 
16 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Outlook to 2050 (Paris: 
OECD, 2012), p. 19.  
 17 
use may increase by 30 per cent.17  This would increase greenhouse gas emissions by 
50 per cent on today’s levels before 2050,18 and cause temperature rises of between three 
to six degrees Celsius by 2100.  Meanwhile, by 2050, the world is predicted to lose 10 
per cent of all its species.  Primary forests are expected to shrink in area by 13 per cent.  
The availability of freshwater may become strained in many regions, with overall demand 
increasing by 55 per cent over the same period.19  By that time, approximately two-thirds 
of the world’s people will likely live in areas lacking adequate water supplies.20  Added to 
this is the fact that these most vulnerable people have contributed least to the problems 
we witness, but suffer most from them.  In one study, the richest 10 per cent of peoples 
are estimated to have been responsible for 45 per cent of all emissions between 1998 and 
2013.  The poorest 50 per cent may have, by contrast, contributed only 13 per cent of 
emissions during this period.21   
 
II.   Research Parameters 
 
Clearly, these problems are not exclusively the interest of scientists.  They are 
increasingly becoming the concerns of governments and lawyers, including international 
lawyers.  In a January 2018 report, the World Economic Forum identified that 
‘environmental challenges’ represent six of the top eight risks facing the world today.22  
Given the perceptively ‘global’ effects of these problems, interventions to address them 
have risen in prominence to the forefront of international legal and institutional agendas.  
For example, Antonio Guterres foreshadowed—during his inauguration ceremony as the 
incoming United Nations Secretary-General in October 2016—that increasing support for 
                                                 
17 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2017 (Paris: IEA, 2017), p. 125. 
18 OECD (2012), p. 22. 
19 Ibid 24. 
20 The Water Resources Group, Charting Our Water Future (McKinsey, 2009), p. 15; Robert Bailey, 
Growing a Better Future: Food Justice in a Resource-Constrained World (Oxford: Oxfam, 2011), p. 17. 
21 Thomas Piketty and Lucas Chancel, Carbon and Inequality: From Kyoto to Paris (November 2015). 
Paris School of Economics Report, available at <http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/ChancelPiketty2015.pdf> 
(last accessed on 24 May 2017), pp. 9-10. See also, Yinon M Bat-On, Rob Phillips, and Ron Milo, ‘The 
biomass distribution on Earth’ (2018) 115(25) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 6506, 
6509. See also, Damian Carrington, ‘Humans just 0.01% of all life but have destroyed 83% of wild 
mammals – study’, The Guardian (online), available at: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/may/21/human-race-just-001-of-all-life-but-has-
destroyed-over-80-of-wild-mammals-study?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other> (last accessed on 19 July 
2018). 
22 World Economic Forum, The Global Risk Report 2017: 12th Edition (Geneva: WEF, 2017). 
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tackling environmental problems would be one of three major strategic priorities during 
his term in office.23   
 
This growing environmental consciousness has brought with it a body of legal principles, 
doctrines, and institutions.  These international legal rules have, over time, become 
increasingly technical and complex.  As a result, there is now an immense body of 
literature on domestic and international laws pertaining to the environment.  We might 
see these works in terms of five main categories.  These include, firstly, works that focus 
on specific single-issue problems: like species extinctions,24 deforestation,25 air and water 
pollution,26 endangered animals,27 and climate change.28  Secondly, there are general 
treatises that seem to define international environmental law as a specific subdiscipline.29  
These might be regarded as part of a wider phenomenon on the fragmentation of 
international law.  A third category is that of works seeking to consider environmental 
issues in tandem with other legal regimes, such as trade30 or human rights.31  Fourth, are 
studies on key conceptual issues.  These include intergenerational equity, 32  the 
                                                 
23 Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General-designate Antonio Guterres’ remarks to the General Assembly on 
taking the oath of office (Delivered at New York, 12 December 2016) 
<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-12-12/secretary-general-designate-antónio-guterres-
oath-office-speech>. 
24 See generally, Simon Lyster, International Wildlife Law: An Analysis of International Treaties 
Concerned with the Conservation of Wildlife (Cambridge: Grotius, 1985). 
25 See generally, Lawrence C Christy, Charles E Di Leva, Jonathan M Lindsay, Patrice Talla Takoukam, 
Forest Law and Sustainable Development: Addressing Contemporary Challenges Through Legal Reform 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2007).  
26 See generally, Malgosia Fitzmaurice ‘International Responsibility and Liability’ in Daniel Bodansky, 
Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 1010-1035; Eyal Benvenisti, Sharing Transboundary Resources: 
International Law and Optimal Resource Use (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
27 See generally, Rosalind Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: The CITES Treaty 
and Compliance (London: Earthscan, 2002).  
28 See generally, Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
29 See generally, Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012); Patricia W Birnie, Alan E Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, 
International Law and the Environment (3rd ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
30 See generally, Fiona Macmillan, WTO and the Environment (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001).  
31 See generally, John H Knox and Ramin Pejan (eds), The Human Right to a Healthy Environment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).  
32 See generally, Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common 
Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1989); Catherine Redgwell, 
International Trusts and Environmental Protection (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).  
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precautionary principle,33 common but differentiated responsibilities,34 and the polluter 
pays principle.35   
 
We might observe a fifth, and final, category in works about specific legal techniques for 
addressing environmental problems, like litigation,36 transparency arrangements,37 and 
environmental impact assessments.38  This category is now the preoccupation of much of 
the recent work in the area, which Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel point out is 
concerned with improving ‘implementation and mechanisms for compliance’. 39  
The challenge, Sands and Peel observe, is now geared toward integrating these 
techniques—which include adjudication before international courts and tribunals—into a 
large body of rules devoted to international economic cooperation.  In all, international 
legal scholarship is typically focused upon the discipline’s role in remediating 
environmental harms.   
 
This work aside, critical legal studies observe these and other contemporary issues from 
yet a different angle.  It begins from the possibility that law is not only part of the solution, 
but is instead part of the problem.  Although highly important, mainstream work does not 
concern itself with how international law may actually resist our efforts to address these 
issues, or how law might even operate in ways that accentuate these problems.  Put in 
another way, critical legal scholars bear in mind that, for all its many contributions, 
international law is enmeshed in the problems it seeks to address.  As Susan Marks writes, 
international law often ignores the brute reality of its complicity in root causes, or 
‘planned misery’.40  This compels the need for greater work to understand why, and how, 
international law may prevent policies that could indeed serve us better.   
 
                                                 
33 See generally, David A Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and International 
Law: The Challenge of Implementation (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996). 
34 See generally, Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental 
Law (London: Ashgate, 2003).  
35 See generally, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Polluter-Pays 
Principle: OECD Analyses and Recommendations (Paris: OECD, 1992).  
36 See generally, Ellen Hey, Reflections on an International Environmental Court (The Hague: Kluwer, 
2000).  
37 See generally, Benjamin J Richardson and Stepan Wood, Environmental Law for Sustainability: 
A Reader (London: Hart, 2006).  
38 See generally, Christopher Wood, Environmental Impact Assessment: A Comparative Review 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2002).   
39 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 49. 
40 Susan Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’ (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 57, 74-77. 
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By contrast, ignoring international law’s role in bringing about the underlying conditions 
for these problems might simply sustain their proliferation.  Law, in other words, may not 
only be part of the solution.  It may indeed be an inextricable part of the problem.41  It is 
upon that body of work that this thesis seeks to build.  More specifically, perhaps the 
ways in which the discipline shapes understandings of the concept of nature may also 
indeed be an inextricable part of our contemporary (environmental) problems.  
Importantly, if this were indeed the case, international legal instruments might remain in 
some ways deficient, even if they were operating with, for instance, more widespread 
regulatory coverage, robust monitoring, and stronger enforcement provisions.   
 
Investigating this possibility requires us to investigate how law contributes to framing 
aspects of the world.  International law—like film-making and scientism—is a form of 
story-telling.  We—international lawyers—produce imaginative patterns and symbols 
through law to both reflect, and bring to life, particular perceptions of the world.  
In practice, we use narrative techniques—genres, tropes, modes of argumentation, and 
forms of emplotment—to craft legal arguments.  Our use of such techniques also produces 
knowledge insofar as they ‘suggest, create and legislate meanings’.42  Legal techniques, 
in other words, are central means through which meanings are imagined and brought into 
being.  International law is capable of initiating new categories, classifying things and 
people, determining their relative importance, and organising a respective hierarchy 
between them.  Similarly, one of the discipline’s primary functions is to mediate conflicts 
or disputes—between states, peoples, and other entities—about the control, allocation, 
and utilisation of things derived from nature.  So the stories we tell, or narrate, about the 
natural environment through international law play vital roles in determining how we 
respond to global problems.   
 
Working within this context, my thesis builds upon a small body of critically-informed 
literature on law and the natural environment.  Bettina Lange describes this body of 
scholarship as seeking to critique the foundations of liberal legal theory and some of the 
                                                 
41 For a seminal exposition of how this operates with regard to human rights, see David Kennedy, ‘The 
International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?’ (2001) European Human Rights Law 
Review 245. 
42 Maria Aristodemou, Law & Literature: Journeys From Her to Eternity (Oxford: Oxford University 
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‘key instrumentalist and ideological claims of environmental law’.43  More specifically, 
a number of scholars have raised tensions around terms such as ‘the environment’ and 
‘climate change’.  They have sought to respond to the observation that, for all of the 
disparate directions of mainstream work, a particular commonality is the fact that they 
tacitly appeal to an idea of nature which they treat as self-evident in the language of nature.  
In fact, some insightful recent works have illustrated that humanity remains the privileged 
subject or beneficiary of international law’s jurisprudential view towards the natural 
environment.44  Unlike in other fields of international law, historical and philosophical 
studies of the discipline’s engagement with the natural environment are rare.45  Even 
fewer international legal studies have, to date, sought to account for the historical 
emergence—or ‘genealogy’ 46 —of the natural environment as a separate category 
alienated from humanity.   
 
While we shall return to international law shortly, it is important at this juncture to reflect 
on what in fact we mean by the term ‘nature’.  This idea of nature is not a natural 
phenomenon.  It has no independent existence.  In view of this, some prominent social 
and ecological theorists have delved extensively into questions of how we perceive nature.  
As some have observed, the idea of nature is highly contested.  We might regard it as a 
fluid, essentially contestable concept.  As such, it is, Raymond Williams famously wrote, 
‘perhaps the most complex word’ in the English language.47  Historian William Cronon 
also observes that the concept of ‘“nature” is not as natural as it seems’.  It is, rather, a 
‘profoundly human construction’ that is ‘so entangled with our own values and 
                                                 
43 Bettina Lange, ‘Foucaultian-inspired discourse analysis: A contribution to critical environmental law 
scholarship’, in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (ed), Law and Ecology: New Critical Foundations 
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Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 76-100. 
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assumptions that the two can never be fully separated’.48  Emma Maris echoes a similar 
sentiment in her claim that nature was always ‘a human construction, forged for human 
purposes’.49   
 
In addition to this, some recognise that every social practice or event has an impact upon 
the natural environment.  After all, every activity appropriates energy and matter, before 
emitting these in different forms.50  As potentially all things impact upon the environment, 
the environment is, in principle, all-encompassing.  ‘Every attempt to suture, to fill in 
exhaustively and to colonise the meaning of Nature’, observes geographer Erik 
Swyngedouw, is ‘inherently political’, but is ‘not recognised as such’.51  Writing in this 
vein, some other radical theorists—among them Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, Terry 
Eagleton, Noel Castree, and David Harvey 52—have sought to demonstrate nature’s 
contingency by deconstructing oppositions between it and the idea of ‘society’ (or 
‘culture’).  Haraway, in particular, claims that humans are ‘cyborgs’, in the sense that we 
are ‘hybrids of machine and organism’.53  These cyborgs, Katherine Hayles argues, are 
both ‘living beings and narrative constructions’.54  Loosely aligned with these works is 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s well-recognised critical account, in which he argues that 
environmental crises—particularly those emanating from climate change—invite a role 
for the universal human agent, which he says ‘appear to have become one at the level of 
species’.55   
   
Writing in response to Chakrabarty’s view, however, Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg 
contend that such a universal human subject ‘blatantly ignores the realities of different 
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vulnerability on all scales of human society’.56  The ‘human’ is not, in other words, an 
all-encompassing category.  Rather, human vulnerabilities are differentially distributed.  
Malm and Hornborg’s critique highlights exclusions, and the existence of a patterned 
hierarchy, within humanity.  Investigating the transition to fossil fuel-based energy 
sources in nineteenth-century Britain, they argue that industrialisation was itself 
‘predicated on highly inequitable global processes’.57  Investments in steam engines were 
intended to exploit opportunities  provided by ‘Afro-American slavery’, labour in British 
factories and mines, in addition to the world’s demand for inexpensive cotton cloth.58   
 
These hierarchical patterns point toward what Jason Moore calls ‘the Capitalocene’.  
Moore’s 2015 book, Capitalism in the Web of Life, formulates a theory that focuses on 
investigating how capitalism perpetuates, and is yet dependent upon, the society-nature 
dichotomy.  In other words, Moore writes that ‘capitalism does not have an ecological 
regime; it is an ecological regime’.59  Moore understands this regime as implicated in 
conceptualising nature as a ‘cheap’ resource for generating profit, as well as divisions in 
class, gender, and race.  He writes of ‘cheap nature’ in a dual sense: firstly by making 
natural resources ‘cheap’ in price; and secondly, by ‘cheapening nature’ in the sense of 
degrading or making it ethico-politically inferior.60  Focusing on what he calls the four 
‘cheaps’—energy, food, raw materials, and human life—Moore argues that their 
exclusion from the idea of (civilised) society stymies attempts to reorganise reality.61   
 
Donna Haraway’s more recent work also gestures toward the existence of a hierarchical 
ordering within the category of ‘the human’.  She claims that it is not the entire human 
species that is culpable for the state of the world’s ecosystems, but ‘situated human beings 
in complicated histories’.  For this reason, Haraway has recently expressed concurrence 
with Moore’s contention that the term Capitalocene best captures the effects that the 
process of ‘building wealth’ through an unequally-distributed ‘exterminationist 
extraction’ has had on the planet.62  Despite their prolific insights, these scholars have not 
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yet considered the role of law—or specifically international law—in helping to enable 
particular ideas about nature and society to become global axiomatics.   
 
Nonetheless, there are clear convergences between Haraway, Moore, Malm and 
Hornborg’s broadly postcolonial critiques and accounts told by some critical legal 
scholars—particularly those inspired by Third World Approaches to International Law 
(‘TWAIL’)—which argue that the international legal order was forged by an identifiable 
and highly selective group of peoples.  The term TWAIL broadly denotes a style of 
engagement—or perhaps, loosely a method—that draws attention to the work of 
international legal categorisation, and its effects in imperial and post-imperial contexts, 
with reference to the ‘West’ as a (defining) category.  More specifically, it typically draws 
attention to the ways in which ‘European or Western identity is constituted in opposition 
to an alterity that it has itself constructed’.63   
 
Significantly, for my purposes, this applies not merely to identity in a narrow sense, but 
also to ‘the sets of values of which the West claims to be both exemplar and guardian’.  
It extends, writes Sundhya Pahuja, ‘beyond the West as a geographical entity or ‘racial’ 
category to institutions and people grounded in Western structures of knowledge.  To this 
other and his values are attributed characteristics the West both rejects and ostensibly 
lacks – the other is crucially what the West is not’.64  This self-constitution of Western 
identity thus tends to form in a ‘defining exclusion of certain existent peoples (or things) 
accorded characteristics ostensibly opposed to that identity’.65  Elements of the West or 
non-West that betray this dichotomy are often treated in ways that sustain the 
characterisation and hierarchy of knowledge that the dichotomy creates.   
 
Working largely within this legal tradition, Shawkat Alam, Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen 
Gonzalez, and Jona Razzaque’s edited collection International Environmental Law and 
the Global South66 aims to unveil some of the diverse priorities of Third World countries 
in international environmental law.  The book departs from traditional approaches to the 
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discipline, which treat the environment as a series of isolated issues requiring technical 
solutions, while disregarding the commonality of their root causes.  The book’s 
contributors draw out these manifestations of exclusion in a range of issues from climate 
change, to food justice, indigenous rights, land grabs, extractive industries, and hazardous 
pollutants.  The authors argue that colonialism and industrialisation by First World 
countries conferred disproportionate wealth and benefits upon some peoples, while 
causing the very problems that Third World countries are now being asked to collaborate 
in addressing.  Ignoring this context, the authors contend, tends to re-inscribe global 
inequalities—felt by vulnerable peoples and countries—under the guise of 
environmentalism.67   
 
Building upon this work, more recent literature by critical legal scholars explores the role 
of nature in the general discipline of international law, rather than merely the traditional 
approach of considering environmental issues only within the specialised field of 
international environmental law.  Owing some of its methodological lineage to TWAIL 
scholarship, these scholars investigate how control of the environment is entwined with 
questions about the allocation of resources and the problems of poverty, inequality, and 
underdevelopment.  Some inspiring work by international lawyers—such as Karin 
Mickelson, Andreas Kotsakis, Usha Natarajan, and Stephen Humphreys—have identified 
this is an issue, they have only studied it in limited ways.   
 
For example, Karin Mickelson is a scholar who engages with the broader histories and 
ideological contexts of international law.  She argues that the discipline is intertwined 
with legacies of colonialism and natural resource exploitation in Third World states.  This 
has allowed First World states to receive a ‘disproportionate share of the benefits of 
centuries of environmentally unsustainable development’, she observes, while affecting 
Third World peoples, which ‘have borne many of its costs’.68  Andreas Kotsakis takes 
this historical turn a step further, tracing the emergence of environmental norms relating 
to biodiversity.  In particular, he demonstrates how the idea of biodiversity, in particular, 
has become transformed into what he calls ‘genetic gold’.  Kotsakis’ central claim is that 
certain (micro-political) practices explain how international environmental law has lost 
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the capacity to describe itself, and the ability to exert the normative influence needed to 
ameliorate environmental problems.69   
 
Other scholars argue that international law’s treatment of nature is itself a constitutive 
feature of the discipline.  Stephen Humphreys, for instance, draws our attention to the 
ideological and historical formation of law as an impediment to achieving the necessary 
scale of climate change mitigation required to avoid catastrophic effects.70  He contends 
that the ‘peripheral, soft and fundamentally ambiguous constraints of “environmental law” 
(“sustainable development”, the “precautionary principle”)’ are not primarily designed to 
prevent, rather to ‘secure, nature’s continued (sustainable) despoliation in the service of 
the economy’.71   
 
Following this theme, Usha Natarajan and Kishnan Khoday contend that international 
law’s treatment of nature is central to the formation of international law as a discipline.  
They argue that international law systematically emphasises its ‘protective potential’, 
while concealing its own ‘destructive role’.72  They suggest that law’s impoverished view 
of nature is incapable of adequately responding to ecological crises.  In making this 
argument, Natarajan and Khoday explore the cultural emergence of international 
environmental law, explaining that it has produced an impoverished view of nature that 
is incapable of adequately responding to ecological crises.  Because humanity’s 
relationship with nature has been central to the creation of international law itself, the 
authors contend, environmental issues should not be confined to specialised regimes such 
as international environmental law.73   
 
I am highly indebted to the novel and enlightening insights offered by these initial 
exploratory studies.  Yet, none of this literature attempts a sustained enquiry—or 
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explanation—of how some of our contemporary predicaments may have emerged 
through the way international law frames the idea of nature.  More specifically, there has 
been no scholarship to date that strives to address the gap between the legal and non-legal 
literatures that I have foreshadowed earlier in this section.  The aim of this thesis is to 
offer this inquiry.  It is a more comprehensive addition to the existing body of legal work 
described in the foregoing.   
 
III.  Research Question 
 
In posing the question, ‘[w]ho shall have control over the story?’,74 Salman Rushdie 
insinuates that all stories are inevitably told only from particular perspectives.  
This insight is salient to our understanding of international law.  After all, international 
political actors routinely mount challenges against one another by invoking rules and 
principles on which they have projected stories that support their individual preferences, 
while counteracting those of their opponents.  Martti Koskenniemi calls this process 
‘hegemonic contestation’.75  It is the struggle to make their partial views and idiosyncratic 
preferences appear universal.  These struggles reside at the heart of every international 
legal doctrine and dispute.  In attempting to make arguments appear influential and 
persuasive, however, lawyers often position their particular stories as unifying theories, 
or grand historical narratives. 76  Critical legal scholars have long suggested that this 
phenomenon legitimates particular laws and legal-institutional structures.77  In light of 
this background, could it be that international legal rules and the practices of its 
institutions are continually re-telling a particular story about nature?  What if there were 
also other, different, competing stories at play?  How do we explain the fact that certain 
stories have seemingly become dominant, and universally accepted, while others have 
become excluded and subjugated?   
 
This thesis sets out to explore those questions.  More specifically, it examines how key 
political actors have sought to deploy international legal thought, techniques, and 
institutional practices, in order to construct and sustain particular stories—or 
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knowledge—about the natural environment.  I use the verb ‘sustain’ in its Oxford English 
Dictionary sense to describe the continuation—or preservation—of a certain state of 
affairs ‘for an extended period’, and seemingly ‘without interruption’.78  Similarly, some 
scholars have described the notion of sustainability as the ‘capacity of any given system 
to exist and reproduce on a long-term basis’.79  We might regard such a system—or state 
of affairs—as a particular formation of ‘ordering’.  It is a means of establishing a 
hierarchy of preferences and ‘different priorities’. 80   In fundamental terms, Michel 
Foucault describes this ordering process as enabling entities in the world to be ‘arranged’, 
‘divided into classes’, and ‘grouped’.  He argues that this takes place with reference to an 
‘inner law’, which determines the way in which entities ‘confront one another’ and the 
hierarchy between them.81  One particular manifestation of this, using Richard Falk’s 
characterisation, is in ‘the distribution of power and authority’ among various actors on 
the ‘global stage’.82  Importantly, this order—and ordering—serves both a political, and 
a legal, function. 
 
Part of the process of sustaining any individual form of ordering is the obscuration from 
view—or erasure—of competing arrangements and stories.  It is evident from the current 
literatures that this question of how opposing stories about nature are ostracised, and the 
modes of their subjugation, have received scant attention thus far.  My thesis focuses on 
highlighting these exclusionary logics and practices in the construction of international 
law.  This work begins from the work of some classical international legal theorists, 
before moving to explore the questions that I have foreshadowed above in the context of 
international legal conferences and global summits.  Some have described these summits 
as ‘yawning chasm[s] of irrelevance’.83  Against these views, I prefer to think of such 
summits as key sites in which exclusion and injustice tend to proliferate.   
 
This investigation has relevance for our understanding of the significance of international 
law in global affairs at a number of levels.  This is because how we conceptualise nature 
                                                 
78 ‘Sustain’, Oxford English Dictionary (online), available at: 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/195209?rskey=74li7e&result=2#eid> (last accessed on 16 June 2018). 
79 Judith C Enders and Moritz Remig, Theories of Sustainable Development (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2014), p. 156. 
80 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 397. 
81 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Abingdon: Routledge, 
1991), p. xxi.  
82 Richard Falk, ‘World Orders, Old and New’ (1999) 98(624) Current History 29, 29. 
83 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Transform UN entities from hierarchies into hubs’, Financial Times (online), 
17 September 2018, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/e236a712-ba51-11e8-8dfd-2f1cbc7ee27c> 
(last accessed on 18 September 2018).  
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is inextricably intertwined with such problems as poverty, inequality, climate change, 
release of harmful pollutants, and species extinctions.  The issue’s enduring relevance 
was recognised by the famed evolutionary biologist Thomas Henry Huxley, for example, 
who considered the question of ‘the place which Man occupies in nature’ as 
‘underpinning all others’. 84   As a consequence, this thesis intervenes in a broader 
conversation that challenges the idea of international law as an unquestionable force for 
virtue.  This is not merely a matter of idle curiosity.  In fact, my study arises from a sense 
of severe doubt about whether the remedial paths to which we have committed ourselves 
are indeed adequate for resolving a range of pressing problems.  If that doubt is well-
founded, then what is needed is clearly not to go further along these paths but, rather, to 
divert from them.  In particular, I investigate how governments, and other actors, have 
marshalled international law for the purposes of reconfiguring—while continuing to 
preserve—familiar stories about nature.  Pursuing this objective, my original contribution 
to scholarship is to enrich present discussions by bringing a more granular historical 
focus, as well as a wider-ranging periodisation, than that achieved by other scholars to 
date.   
 
IV.  Argument Overview 
 
Intrinsically, this thesis argues that international law both sustains, and is also sustained 
by, particular stories about nature.  Its postcolonial genealogy focuses attention on how 
the differential boundaries of what we tend to think of as nature are hewn by a Euro-
American understanding of international law from an infinitely complex, irreducible 
plurality of possible orderings.  In presenting my story through a series of successive 
episodes in international legal thought and institutional practices, I demonstrate the work 
that law does to sustain a global order,85 and to keep its relations of power and production 
functioning in a particular way.   
 
The focus of my story is deliberately schematic.  This is made in an attempt to gain an 
understanding of how the overarching system—or global order—operates.  In the 
chapters that follow, my thesis aims to offer a glimpse of this forest in the midst of a 
confusing multitude of trees.  In doing so, I present a story in which international legal 
                                                 
84 Thomas Henry Huxley, Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature (Mineola: Dover, 2003), p. 71.  
85 Jason W Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital (London: 
Verso, 2015), p. 141. 
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interventions are unlikely to restrain what we have come to observe as an interrelated set 
of heightening global crises: increasing environmental degradation, enduring poverty, 
and expansions in income inequality.  This is because these laws are themselves 
constituted by a particular understanding of nature, which subjects it to continual control, 
abuse, and transformation at the hands of a minority of the world’s peoples, to whose 
interests the global order accords preference.   
 
In making this claim, I do not argue that such arrangements have remained wholly static 
or unchangeable.  Rather, in my reading, I observe that any changes have unfolded within 
the context of certain ‘systematic constraints and pressures’.86  To put it simply, at various 
moments—as we shall see—persistent anxieties about nature’s dominant stories, 
languages, and logics gave rise to oppositional struggles by marginalised groups, peoples, 
and governments.  Yet, I argue that international law has reconfigured itself in ways that 
sought to systematically contain and ostracise this dissent, while fundamentally retaining 
a dominant, hegemonic vision of nature.  While appearing, in other words, as an open 
concept in which different understandings of nature are capable of being inscribed, 
international law’s openness remains reliant upon specific visions of nature that do not 
seriously challenge a reigning orthodoxy.   
 
The outcome is a vision of nature that affirms the perpetual growth of globalised trade 
and market-friendly, industrialised national economies.  This tends to undermine—or set 
limits upon—the contingency of both law and nature.  I argue that this operation of ‘false 
contingency’87 hinders efforts to relinquish the overwhelming force of historical baggage 
attached to the idea of nature, and its future possibilities.  Therefore, in the following 
chapters, I offer an attempt to demonstrate a re-reading that is attentive to how 
international law’s vision of nature shapes, and limits, the conditions of political 
possibility.  This reduction has significant social implications.  In a practical sense, such 
a delimitation operates to hinder the process of creating a more pluralistic, conceptually 
open, and just set of responses to contemporary environmental problems.  Perhaps, it is 
in my story’s confrontation between the past and the present that other possibilities—long 
dispensed with—might be revived, and new alternatives revealed.  In its attentiveness to 
the possibilities and neutralisation of dissent, the analytical and normative impulses of 
this thesis combine.   
                                                 
86 Susan Marks, ‘False Contingency’ (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems 1. 
87 Ibid. 
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V.   Chapter Summary 
 
My argument is organised around a series of key moments.  It tracks a historico-
philosophical shift in how international law has shaped ideas about nature.  In a nutshell, 
there have been perceptible shifts in the stories that law has told about nature: namely, 
those about natural resources, conservation, the (human) environment, sustainable 
development, natural capital, and the green economy.  Yet, these are not supersessions of 
each another.  Instead, these stories have successively built upon each other in ways that 
account for the international legal rules and regimes that we have in the present.  In all of 
the episodes I investigate, there have been clear continuities.  Each new configuration, 
however, has brought with it a different set of optics and reference points.  These have, 
in turn, invoked different anxieties, which have then been domesticated or neutralised in 
particular ways.  Stated alternatively, we shall see continuously shifting meanings and 
contexts.  Yet, these shifts have tended to operate in a manner that has sustained a 
particular form of global ordering.   
 
I begin this story by investigating how a number of classical international jurists 
constructed nature as a category distinct from that of what we might call ‘civilisation’.  
With regard to this, I will suggest in Chapter Two that these works and several 
international legal instruments—written during a long period between 1539 and 1910—
imagined the earth’s surface as a warehouse of raw material resources.  As we shall 
observe, this legal construction of nature eventually became regarded as fundamental to 
a ‘civilised’ (European) identity tied to the consumption of natural resources.  I offer 
some thoughts as to how this construction of nature became encoded into law’s 
characterisation of the nation-state.  I further argue that these ideas about nature helped 
to offer a legal justification for colonising, extracting resources from, and harnessing the 
labour of non-European peoples and lands.  Following this, I demonstrate how these 
prerogatives gradually led—by the late-nineteenth century—to the development of 
international legal-institutional innovations aimed at conserving, and managing, natural 
resource use.  Yet, far from destabilising the aforementioned ideas about nature, I argue 
that the resulting legal instruments sought to further entrench them.   
 
In Chapter Three, I examine how international law governed relations between nature and 
civilisation during the post-Second World War era.  Nature, I argue, became central to 
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the emergence of what we now call ‘the economy’.  Following this, the chapter 
demonstrates how a task of the newly-formed United Nations was to conserve the supply 
of—and access of First World countries to—key natural resources.  With this, 
international law and its post-war international institutions reproduced a conservationist 
logic first instituted during the colonial era.  As we will see, this logic was, in a sense, 
‘ratified’ in the constitutions of several post-Second World War international institutions.  
I also examine how this logic spurred the establishment, through international law, of 
African national wildlife parks and mega-dams as springboards for newly-decolonised 
nations’ claims to greater independence and recognition in global affairs.  Simultaneously, 
my story explains some actors’ competing visions and efforts to resist these logics.  Yet, it 
also reveals how others sought to occlude these visions as means to preserve the logics 
and techniques of natural resource conservation.   
 
Chapter Four offers a portrayal of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (‘the Stockholm Conference’) as a watershed moment in the emergence of 
nature protection as a discrete realm, or field, in international law.  More than this, 
however, I will suggest that struggles over the newly-constituted field—called ‘the 
environment’—were resolved in ways that subjected it to interpretation by a narrow range 
of supposedly developed, techno-scientific referents.  My story provides an account of 
how this sense of the environment was shaped through strategic alliances between a range 
of state and non-state actors, and also how those political actors sought to collectively 
pacify—or erase—competing visions.  As such, I will engage with the question of how 
the environment—as a nascent international legal-institutional realm—was subjugated 
and governed with reference to an idea of the national economy.  I will investigate how 
the Stockholm Conference imagined and ratified the natural environment’s position as 
hierarchically inferior, or subservient, to economic priorities.  To that end, my re-
description will observe how our understanding of the environment in international law 
was contained and systematically debilitated at a foundational moment of its own 
juridification.   
 
In Chapter Five, I engage with the construction of sustainable development as an 
international legal concept.  More specifically, I explore debates and discussions of two 
international bodies—the World Commission on Environment and Development (known 
as the ‘Brundtland Commission’), as well as the subsequent 1992 Rio Convention—that 
sought to conceptually meld economic development with heightening environmental 
 33 
concerns.  Rather than radically reconfiguring nature’s meaning, I contend that the 
resulting marriage merely concretised it.  Put simply, the logic reframed the environment 
in a way that made it coterminous with the objective of sustaining the global order.  
It required all the poor, underdeveloped, non-European, unsustainable societies and 
natures to progress, or reform—through technological, scientific, and industrial means—
for the purpose of contributing toward the task of ensuring nature’s ‘sustainability’.  
In this story, sustainable development venerated the techniques and affluent lifestyles of 
the world’s wealthy peoples as universal pathways to salvation.  Meanwhile, the concept 
helped to open new opportunities for global monitoring, enrichment, and control by 
financiers, industrialists, as well as the techno-scientific experts needed to support those 
groups of people.   
 
Finally, in Chapter Six, I investigate how the years following the Rio Earth Conference 
were marked by an expansion of international environmental regulations, while 
narrowing perceptions toward the environment itself.  On one hand, my story recognises 
that an expansion of actors involved in the codification of laws regulating the 
environment brought within it a more diverse range of perspectives.  Some of these sought 
to destabilise what were, by now, persistently familiar views toward the environment.  
The question to which I will turn in this chapter, therefore, is how international laws and 
institutions absorbed these competing, counter-hegemonic logics.  I will explore how the 
emancipatory potential of this dissensus became co-opted and neutralised, being 
strategically redeployed into serving modified hegemonic forms.  Importantly, these re-
established consent in retaining a pre-existing global order, promoting new fields of 
economic activity and the enlargement of a supposedly self-regulating market.  In a 
simultaneous move, international legal-institutional instruments also transformed the 
conditions under which many opponents manifested themselves.  This both reified 
particular conceptions of the environment—as perfectly designed to aid the expansion of 
markets, and for opening new avenues for moving capital—in international law, as well 
as defusing resistance to them.   
 
In all, while my opening vignette offered a useful focal point, this story is not simply 
about particular species, or even about particular environmental issues.  Rather, it is about 
international law’s effects upon all life on this planet.  My account invites us to consider 
a different type of story about the work international law does in the world, and to reflect 
on how we understand our role as international lawyers.  In offering such a story, my 
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purpose is not to dictate any particular normative outcome or reconstructive project.  
By contrast, I merely seek to identify how legal-institutional factors and historical 
contexts may have foreclosed the contestability of different normative visions.  
As Friedrich Engels asserted, ‘the author does not have to serve the reader on a platter the 
future historical resolution of the social conflicts which he describes’.88  Asserting such 
universal ‘solutions’ would defeat the diagnostic purpose of my story.  By contrast, this 
thesis endeavours to provide both a ‘faithful portrayal of the real conditions’, and a critical 
analysis, to ‘instil doubts as to the eternal validity’ of the stories we have become 
accustomed to accept as unchallengeable notions of truth or reality. 89  Pursuing this 
understanding about our discipline is the necessary first step to bringing any change 
within it.   
 
My ultimate hope is, in some modest way, to open imaginative spaces in which to 
reconceptualise international law and the natural environment.  As novelist Ben Okri has 
proposed, every story-teller’s ‘primary responsibility’ is to strive to bear witness to a 
fuller range of ‘what it means to be human’.90  This responsibility, I would add, extends 
to what it means to be ‘natural’.  Following this impulse, my story endeavours to nourish 
the imaginary matrix of truths we tell about ourselves, open up our mental canvas, and 
unleash a greater authenticity upon what it means to be one of the many interrelated 
beings on this planet.   
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89 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER TWO   
 
PATTERNS OF ETERNITY: CIVILISING NATURE, NATURALISING CIVILISATION 
 
 
‘Some See Nature all Ridicule & Deformity […] and Some Scarce see Nature at all.  But to the 
Eyes of the Man of Imagination, Nature is Imagination itself.’ 
 
— William Blake, The Letters  
of William Blake (1956)91 
 
Introduction 
 
In December 2016, an exhibition—called Making Nature: How We See Animals—opened 
at the Wellcome Collection in London.  One of its featured exhibits was a fish collected 
by Swedish physician and botanist Carl Linnaeus.  Dried, pressed, and preserved in a 
1758 book, the fish became the definitive example of a species known as ‘John Dory’.92  
By classifying the animal based on its physical characteristics, Linnaeus fixed particular 
meanings upon it.  More specifically, with this act of naming, he positioned the fish within 
a system of biological classification, or scala naturae (‘natural order’), for all plants, 
animals, and minerals. 93   Linnaeus located humanity at the peak of this hierarchy.  
He believed that understanding nature required the organisation and classification of all 
organisms using this system.  This human act of creation, he argued, could bring order to 
nature’s seemingly chaotic complexity.   
 
As with many of his enlightenment contemporaries, Linnaeus’ ideas had a profound effect 
on other disciplines, including law.  His classification of peoples, according to physiology 
and skin colour—with Europaeus Albus (white) at the top, and Afer Niger (black) firmly 
at the bottom—gave racial hierarchy a basis in anatomy.94  It merged with the logic of 
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‘civilisation’, which became a cornerstone of the colonial project and criterion for 
regulating differential relations between states.95  Given these connections, it is perhaps 
surprising that legal scholars have not afforded more attention to the role of classical 
international law in ordering nature.  In particular, I explore in this chapter how early 
international legal theorists perceived, and projected ideas upon, nature.  Moreover, I also 
interrogate how these classical jurists constructed the discipline in ways that relied on 
specific ideas about nature.  This relates to my overall thesis by demonstrating how 
treatment of the natural world under classical international law helped to establish a 
hierarchy—or order—in which an external nature became subordinate to (civilised) 
man’s interests and desires.   
 
The present chapter’s scope—in considering these questions—is deliberately panoramic.  
It is, however, grounded upon an analysis of particular sources: namely, a selection of 
works by classical jurists, and influential figures in international legal theory, over a (long) 
period between 1539 and 1910.  Section I revisits a selection of these works in an attempt 
to disinter international law’s role in the discursive formation of an external nature.  
In this section, I interrogate the manner in which civilisation and nature are mutually-
constitutive categories formed through the operation of international law.  Following this, 
the second section identifies a moment in which the stability of these perceptions about 
nature may have become threatened, if only momentarily.  It examines how some 
competing ideas about nature surfaced through international law, spurred by a 
heightening awareness of European imperialism’s effects—particularly its widespread 
industrial and technological manipulation of the natural world—in transforming colonial 
landscapes, particularly on secluded tropical islands.  The third, and final, section of this 
chapter will then investigate how European Powers turned to ‘physiocratic’ theories as a 
means to address these anxieties.  In it, I examine how these theories inspired early nature 
protection policies, and treaties, aimed at conserving the supply of those plants and 
animals deemed useful to humanity.   
 
                                                 
95 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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I.    Civilising the ‘State of Nature’ 
 
As we have seen, Linnaeus’ ordering system classified plants and animals as external to, 
and independent from, humanity.  It treated European peoples, in turn, as superior to other 
races.  This became associated with the colonial project known as the ‘standard of 
civilisation’, which had a complex history of its own.96  With this understanding, the first 
subsection explores how a certain framing of nature—as a warehouse of exploitable raw 
materials—became embedded within, and a constituent basis of, the international law 
through its foundational concept of sovereignty.  This leads, in the second subsection, to 
a focus on how classical jurists sought to subsume an external nature into an international 
law claiming applicability to all nations, peoples, and species.   
 
1.1.  Divide et Impera 
 
The language of ‘civilisation’ entered the European lexicon as an attribute, and predicate, 
of the Latin word civis (meaning ‘citizen’).  This citizen—along with the civitas (or ‘city’) 
in which he resided—was classified as distinct and separate from all that lay beyond his 
walls.  For Cicero, only persons who conformed to ‘certain standards’ were deemed 
civilised—fully meriting the status of a citizen—as opposed to animals or barbarians.97  
Writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a number of influential European 
jurists sought to devise a new law of nations that justified, in their own ways, a similar 
division between civilised peoples and nature.  This division was based on the logic of 
‘commerce’.  Influenced by geopolitical factors—including the New World encounter, 
competition between the European powers, as well as technological innovations in 
seafaring and warfare98—these jurists imbued commerce with a Providential function—
one supposedly ordained by God—to distribute nature’s gifts among civilised peoples.   
 
                                                 
96 A number of insightful works have summarised the features of the ‘standard of civilization’. See, for 
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One such figure, Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546), has become a particularly relevant 
figure in critical histories of international law.99  His lecture, ‘De Indis’—which he is 
believed to have delivered at the University of Salamanca between 1537-1539—has been 
infamously interpreted as offering a justification for the Spanish dispossession of lands, 
resources, and peoples of the New World.100  At the time, much of Central and South 
America, as well as the Caribbean, were under Spanish control.  The resulting flows of 
human labour and mineral resources—particularly gold, silver, cotton—from these 
distant colonies vastly enriched the Spanish Empire.  Vitoria’s lecture opened with his 
assessment that all peoples, including the indigenous Indians, were capable—as humans 
made in the image of God—of owning property.  He considered that the Indians retained 
such ownership until lawfully dispossessed of such a right.101  This understanding of what 
was became known as ‘dominium rerum’—signifying a particular form of private 
ownership over the use of land—elided other diverse and complex ways in which the 
Indians may have understood or envisioned nature.102   
 
In a section referring to ‘natural partnership and communication’, Vitoria invoked a 
universal ‘duty to behave hospitably to strangers’ under the law of nations.  He conjoined 
this duty with a right to freely ‘travel and dwell’ in other countries.103  Importantly, 
Vitoria thought that seas and rivers were things ‘held in common’ by both the Indians and 
strangers.  Vitoria explained: ‘if travelers are allowed to dig for gold in common land or 
in rivers or to fish for pearls in the sea or in rivers, the barbarians may not prohibit 
Spaniards from doing so’.104  Having established these premises, Vitoria derived a right 
to engage in trade and commerce from the right to free movement and hospitality.  
He emphasised that the Spaniards had equal privileges to ‘lawfully trade among the 
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barbarians’, who enjoyed an abundance of commodities—specifically, ‘gold, silver, or 
other things’—that the Spaniards could import to offset their ‘lack’.105   
 
Moreover, Vitoria also conferred upon the Spanish conquerors identical rights—
specifically, to exploit the natural world’s resources—as those of other strangers, so long 
as it caused no ‘harm and detriment to others’.106  He also spoke of resources taken from 
commonly-held rivers as capable of being freely appropriated by their ‘first taker’.  In all, 
Vitoria’s law of nations envisioned a New World ripe with plentiful resources.  
He recalled the Christian miracle of abundance in his allusion to ‘little fishes of the 
sea’.107  With this, Vitoria’s legal innovations represented nature as a set of ‘things’ (or 
commodities).  It portrayed the natural world as property: exchangeable and capable of 
being traded.  Vitoria claimed that any interference with this right to engage in trade and 
commerce could serve as a valid justification for war.   
 
Vitoria’s logic was later echoed in a number of works by prominent European jurists.  
These jurists, like Vitoria, affirmed a view of nature as a world ripe for ownership and 
commercial exploitation.  One such work, Alberico Gentili’s (1552-1608) De Jure Belli 
emphasised that inequality—or unequal distribution of the world’s various natural 
resources—created ‘the strongest bond’ of human ‘friendship’.  The ‘gifts’ of nature had 
been divinely allocated, in both abundance and scarcity, across the world.  Peoples and 
nations would therefore need to search for, and acquire, those they needed, but lacked, 
through trade with each other.  The ‘wonderful’ rivers and winds brought together all 
nations and races ‘separated in location’.  From this, Gentili derived a natural right to 
commerce (or reciprocal exchange). 108   Those gifted with plenitude were then duty-
bound to engage in commercial relations, to fulfil the needs of those lacking such 
resources.  Gentili deemed that any person seeking to ‘take away such privileges’ would 
inflict a ‘wound on human society’.109   
 
Similarly, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) argued that humanity would remain 
‘wild and savage’ if deprived of the right to commerce.  If dutifully observed, however, 
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commerce might ‘sustain and cultivate civilisation’.110  Grotius deployed this logic in 
arguing for the Dutch East India Company’s right to forcibly seize and plunder a 
Portuguese carrack, the Santa Caterina.111  In his view, the Portuguese claim to having 
exclusive use of certain naval transport routes undermined a natural freedom of all to 
utilise the high seas.  Grotius contended these were a ‘global common’ (or res communis 
omnium), unfettered access to which was of vital importance to trade and commerce.  
From Grotius’ perspective, the idea of the freedom of the seas expressed this fundamental 
natural law right to travel to, and to engage in trade with, other nations.  Those denying, 
or seeking to interfere with, this law threatened ‘the highly prized fellowship in which 
humanity is united’.  Such an action, Grotius argued in Mare Liberum, was equivalent—
under natural law—to inflicting ‘violence to nature herself’.112  A person could then resist, 
even by violence, any violation of this fundamental right.  Attacking the Santa Caterina, 
Grotius famously concluded, was thus a rational act in defence of divine Providence.   
 
Echoing these views, Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) emphasised that ‘mankind stands in 
need of each other’s assistance’.  The ‘bounteous gifts of nature’—be it corn, cattle, 
timber or metals—were not discoverable in a single locale, he opined, ‘to produce 
everything necessary for the use of one man’.  Trading with foreigners, Vattel wrote, 
enabled nations to procure these ‘things as neither nature nor art can furnish in the country 
it occupies’.113  Nations were thus ‘obliged to trade together for the common benefit of 
the human race’.114  Like Grotius, however, Vattel also precluded nations from asserting 
‘sole proprietorship’ over ‘inexhaustible’ resources.115  In his view, only the possibility 
of exhausting resources triggered rights to exclusive ownership over them.   
 
With these classical works of international legal thought, Vitoria, Gentili, Grotius, and 
Vattel helped to universalise a vision of an external world that we call nature.  The idea 
of nature became visible to these early architects of international law as a set of ‘things’ 
capable of accumulation, exploitation, and trade.  To put it more precisely, classical 
jurists transmogrified nature into a warehouse of inert matter and energy, which was 
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divisible into property.  Thus understood, nature’s function was to deliver necessities 
intended for peoples’ discovery and use.  It became understood as a domain of utility—
what philosopher Vassos Agyrou calls a ‘standing reserve of resources’116—capable of 
rational control and deployment to satisfy human desires.   
 
These leading European jurists thus installed an unwavering commitment to the control, 
harnessing, and intensive exploitation of natural resources as a prerogative of all civilised 
nations.  They validated a thirst for wealth and desires to exploit new lands expressed, for 
example, in the popular myth of El Dorado: a ‘golden king’ presiding over a lost city of 
riches, awaiting plunder by enterprising conquerors.117  With this, the law of nations 
separated nature from civilisation, and consolidated the dominance of the latter over the 
former.  Added to this, law installed settings designed to safeguard the supplies of raw 
materials necessary to develop and sustain European commodity production and 
accumulation.  We are thus able to observe nature’s emergence as an important thread in 
the nascent legal-institutional fabric of imperialism.   
 
1.2.  The ‘Struggle with Nature’ 
 
Following this logic, many jurists considered the boundary between civilisation and 
nature as a continuum, rather than as a strictly rigid frontier.  They identified all legal and 
social systems as being positioned along a fixed evolutionary trajectory, on which some 
nations could be classified as civilised, others as ‘semi-civilised’, and others still as 
barbaric.118  An indicator of a civilisation’s status—physically and behaviourally—was 
its ‘progressive and cumulative’ ability to modify, improve, or utilise, the ‘state of nature’.  
This was, in Thomas Hobbes’ famous view, a place of continual conflict, struggle, and 
fear in which ‘the life of man, [was] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. 119  
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Hobbes invoked fear and anxiety by imagining nature as a place plagued by incessant 
warfare, engulfed by biblical floods, and replete with human misery.  This nature was a 
place of ‘otherness’—located in the New World ‘beyond the law’ and outside the 
boundaries of European nation-states—where ‘man confronts other men as a wild 
animal’.120  Some sixteenth century Spanish conquerors even referred to these indigenous 
peoples as naturales (or ‘children of nature).121  Put simply, peoples living ‘beyond the 
line’ were regarded as savages existing within, and indistinguishable from, the ‘state of 
nature’.122   
 
In a famous passage, Vattel outlined—in The Law of Nations—the importance of specific 
governance practices over nature to the identity of nation-states.  He regarded ‘cultivation 
of the soil’ as an ‘obligation imposed upon man by nature’.  Peoples who ‘disdain[ed] 
cultivation’, and preferred to ‘live by plunder’, would then ‘injure their neighbors and 
deserve to be exterminated like wild beats of prey’.  Vattel considered that such peoples 
‘roamed over’, rather than ‘inhabited’, the ‘vast tracts of land’ in which they lived.123  
Improving the Earth by ‘cultivation of the soil’, Vattel proposed, was ‘the most solid fund 
of riches and commerce’.124  Importantly, the existence of common land did not allow for 
this.  Those failing to ‘enclose and cultivate’125—or otherwise exploit—nature that had 
‘fallen to its share’ 126  through settled farming and agricultural techniques—such as 
nomadic peoples—were then identified as lacking a requisite degree of ‘reason’ 
demanded of civilised societies.  In Vattel’s view, this could justify the establishment of 
colonies by force—as a first step in the modernist project of controlling nature—if this 
were ‘done within just limits’.127   
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With this, Vattel’s logic revealed striking similarities with those of other influential 
classical jurists and philosophers.  John Locke, for example, also believed that nature’s 
value derived only from its utility to satisfy ‘human needs and ends’.128  He considered 
that land ‘left wholly to Nature’—without the benefit of ‘improvement of Pasturage, 
Tillage, or Planting’—was merely ‘wast’ [sic].129  This logic was also reflected in Adam 
Smith’s claim, in The Wealth of Nations, that only ‘inferior ranks of people’ were limited 
by the ‘scantiness of subsistence’.130  Following this, Comte de Buffon opined—in his 
1778 book Epochs of Nature—that European peoples’ ‘civilised nature’ derived from 
their ability to cultivate new crops, plants, and animals.  He juxtaposed these practices to 
the ‘raw’ and hostile natures left abandoned by, for instance, the ‘savage little nations of 
America’.  Yet, he wrote, ‘[t]he most contemptible condition of the human species [was] 
not that of the savage, but that of those nations, a quarter civilized’.  In ravaging the 
land—namely, by ‘starv[ing] it without making it fertile, destroy[ing] without building, 
us[ing] everything up without renewing anything’, Buffon told, these peoples ‘have 
always been the real plagues of nature’.131  In response, Buffon envisioned a utopia in 
which humanity could judiciously ‘modify’ the nature ‘to the point that suits it’.132   
 
Similarly, the definition of human freedom devised by John Stuart Mill was conceived in 
opposition to nature, being synonymous with ‘a high degree of success’ in the ‘struggle 
with Nature’.133  The idea of liberty, to Mill, became predicated upon the extent to which 
people could exercise control over, or otherwise extricate themselves from, nature’s 
boundaries.  In a letter written in 1848, he opined that British colonies were ‘hardly to be 
looked upon as countries’.  Instead, they were more akin to ‘outlying agricultural or 
manufacturing estates belonging to a larger community’.  These colonies were not 
properly ‘countries with a productive capital of their own’, he wrote, but instead simply 
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places where the empire found it ‘convenient to carry on the production of sugar, coffee 
and a few other tropical commodities’.134   
 
Other major European thinkers of the era—such Auguste Comte and Charles de 
Montesquieu—also believed that societies would progress from being at the mercy of 
natural forces, toward civilised nations freed of these ‘external’ environmental 
influences.135  Montesquieu, in particular, opined in his Persian Letters that progress 
relied upon peoples working together towards common interests.  By contrast, he wrote 
that prehistoric humans—called the ‘Troglodytes’—lived unrestrained, according to their 
‘wild nature’.  This led to the breakdown of irrigation systems, which resulted in famine 
and violent conflict. 136   Therefore, Montesquieu thought that overcoming this wild 
nature—and compensating for its ‘deficiencies’—became a precondition of civilisation.  
The importance here is on civilised man’s need to liberate himself from the whims of a 
savage nature.  ‘Primitive societies’, anthropologist Edward Hoebel recalled, had to 
‘retrace the course of social development to become civilized, modern, European so to 
speak’. 137   One could feel emboldened in this interminable struggle, according to 
historian Jules Michelet, by the fact that:  
 
‘Nature remains the same, whereas every day man gains some advantage over her. 
The Alps have not grown taller, while we have driven a road across the Simplon pass; the 
waves and winds are no less capricious, but the steamship breaks the waves heedless of 
the caprice of wind and sea.’138   
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Through man’s mastery and direction, therefore, nature could be made to acquire some 
semblance of purpose and order.  Until such time that peoples learned to exercise this 
mastery, they were considered uncivilised, excluded from enjoying sovereignty, and 
debarred from membership in the ‘family of nations’.  Instead, such peoples were forcibly 
resettled—at least, conceptually—into the state of nature.  The historian Henry Thomas 
Buckle captured this sentiment in his History of Civilization in England.  ‘If a river is 
difficult to navigate, or a country difficult to traverse’, he first wrote in 1857, European 
engineers could ‘correct the error, and remedy the evil’.  This led to Buckle’s claim, more 
generally, that the ‘primary cause’ of European superiority over other peoples of the 
world was ‘the encroachment of the mind’ upon the ‘organic and inorganic forces of 
nature’.  He argued that the ‘traces of this glorious and successful struggle’ were 
observable from the fact that the ‘most cruel diseases’ had entirely disappeared from the 
‘civilized parts of Europe’.  ‘Wild beasts and birds of prey’ had also been extirpated, 
Buckle wrote, and were no longer able ‘to infest the haunts of civilized men’.139  Two 
decades later, in 1871, anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor put this with immense 
clarity in his observation that:  
 
‘Acquaintance with the physical laws of the world, and the accompanying power of 
adapting nature to man’s own ends are, on the whole, lowest among savages, mean among 
barbarians, and highest among modern educated nations’.140   
 
This attitude was also palpable, for example, in the disappointment of British officials 
that ‘immense tracts of forest still remain[ed] untilled’ in India years after its colonisation.  
That untilled land, due to its ‘inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of 
Mankind’ by consenting to its use, simply ‘lie waste’.141  Viewed from this perspective, 
the mere existence of wilderness areas and wastelands in the non-European world 
justified European colonisation.  In 1922, Sir Frederick Lugard’s ‘authoritative 
justification’ of Britain’s ‘annexation’ of its African colonies was grounded on such a 
rationale:  
 
                                                 
139 Henry T Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. 1 (New York: D Appleton and Company, 
1878), pp. 153-156. 
140 Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Cultures: Researches Into the Development of Mythology (London: 
John Murray, 1871), p. 24. 
141 John Butler, Travels and Adventures in the Province of Assam (Delhi, Vivek Publishing Co, 1978), p. 
250. 
 46 
‘For the civilised nations have at last recognised that while on the one hand the abounding 
wealth of the tropical regions of the earth must be developed and used for the benefit of 
mankind, on the other hand an obligation rests on the controlling Powers not only to 
safeguard the material rights of the natives, but to promote their moral and educational 
progress.’142   
 
Wilderness areas were thus pejoratively framed.  These unexplored, unexploited regions 
were characterised as savage, and obstacles to progress.  ‘Wilderness was a place one 
came to only against one’s will’, William Cronon observes, ‘and always in fear and 
trembling’.143  Its localised spaces became regarded as places of irrepressible violence 
and suffering, beyond the beckoning walls of the Occident.  Following this logic, 
‘civilising missions’ transformed otherwise wasted spaces—including the abject, 
uncivilised inhabitants living within them—into ‘productive’ colonies of European states.  
Hence, the Euro-American ‘scramble’ to acquire colonial territories.144  In the process, 
imperial powers also appropriated vast mineral reserves—for example, of copper, 
diamonds, gold, and tin—and land on which to cultivate valuable agricultural 
monocultures, destined for export to European metropoles.  All the while, as work by Eric 
Wolff and Alfred Crosby has revealed, colonial laws and governance regimes—imposed 
upon the native peoples—left devastating famines across vast continents.145   
 
Yet, regardless of this, the meaning of ‘civilisation’ was deliberately left ambiguous, at 
least in part.  Martti Koskenniemi claims that this ambiguity had an instrumental function.  
It allowed the idea of civilisation to become ‘a shorthand for the qualities that 
international lawyers valued in their own societies, playing upon its opposites: the 
uncivilized, barbarian, and the savage’.  This offered a language for legitimating ‘attitudes 
about social difference’, as well as for ‘constructing one’s own identity’.  It is what 
historian Hayden White called an ‘ostensive self-definition by negation’.146  Koskenniemi 
sees this phenomenon as ‘a reflexive action’ identifying the practices of others in order 
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to affirm that ‘whatever we as Europeans are, at least we are not like that’. 147  
More recently, Peter Fitzpatrick has described this phenomenon in terms of what he calls 
a ‘negative universal reference’.148 
 
Building upon these insights, we have seen how it was through a negative teleology—the 
rejection of savagery and animality—that a stable civilised identity was produced, and 
sustained, as a universal subject.  It classified, and unified, itself in opposition to a static 
and unchanging state of nature.  Consequently, nature offered a coruscating focal point.  
For instance, Giambattista Vico regarded civilised peoples as those who created and 
guarded these ‘confines’ to halt the ‘infinite porosity of things in the bestial state’.149  
Nature’s fixed meaning became a ‘constitutive outside’150 against which the civilised 
mind could define and unify itself.  This, clearly, served the goals of European 
colonisation.  The disentanglement of nature from civilisation, and their mutually-
constitutive relationship, was a pivotal strategy by which all species—and (modern) 
global relations more broadly—could become classified and ordered along the lines of 
race and class.  When transmitted through international legal techniques, it defended a 
particular ethnocentrism under the discipline’s cover.   
 
The logic merged with Antony Anghie’s understanding of a ‘dynamic of cultural 
difference’.151  This embedded a civilisational logic relying on competition for territory, 
wealth, and resources—thought of as being ‘there for the taking’—that others sought to 
replicate, in their attempts to ‘sift out the savage from within’.152  Through the work of 
international legal scholars, nature was transformed from an infinitely complex set of 
interdependent relationships into a substrate of civilisation’s identity.  These radical 
transformations displaced indigenous peoples’ ‘regime of nature’ with a nascent one, 
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predicated on dominance, mastery, utilisation, and exploitation.  Great swathes of 
previously indigenous land was opened to European settlers and their environmental 
practices.  In all, I have suggested in this section, international legal theorists inscribed 
the practices of managing, producing, and delivering nature as a core function of the 
modern, territorially-defined nation-state.  Conceived as such, this idea of nature became 
a foundational logic of sovereignty itself.  Subsequently, nature’s dissociation from, and 
re-entanglement with, civilisation became embedded into the disciplinary heart of 
international law.  Ultimately, it made nature seminal to the emergence of international 
law, just as international law was an instrument for reproducing (and sustaining) the logic 
of external nature itself.   
 
II.   Witnessing Eden’s Contradictions  
 
So, as we have seen, nature had a pivotal role in the formation of identity under classical 
international law.  Transformation of the natural world became a criterion of ‘civilisation’ 
and recognition of statehood under international law.  The law of nations compelled the 
application of human ‘reason’ to nature, as expressed in the need to use land 
‘productively’.  Within this logic, the physical world remained largely ‘passive’.  
Its externality and subjugated positioning made it an object of sustained exploitation, 
rather than an object of regulation—or worthy of protection—in its own right.  Moving 
from this, the present section highlights a contradiction.  It examines how opposing 
European tensions—between a desire for progressively more industrialisation, modernity, 
and civilisation, and competing desires to rediscover natural paradises—resonate with the 
emergence of the natural world as an object of international legal protection in its own 
right.   
 
European acquisition of ‘new lands’ became indispensable safety-values for domestic 
‘social problems’.153  For instance, the British Empire—arguably the most prosperous 
European power during the late-colonial era—relied upon copper from the Andes and 
Congolese forests for electricity transmission.  The British appetite also demanded 
Malaysian tin ore and palm oils for food processing, as well as rubber for mechanical 
parts and motor vehicles.  Demand for Peruvian guano and Tunisian phosphates were also 
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needed to maintain the soil fertility necessary to feed British populations at low cost.154  
Linnaeus’ taxonomical system—which made the identification and classification of 
foreign substitutes for key crops and commodities possible—helped make British 
resource inventories more self-sufficient.155   
 
Nonetheless, the rapacious extraction and use of resources led to alternative problems.  In 
some colonies, for instance, threats of relapsing into the state of nature remained ever-
present.  To that end, colonist William Bradford recounted how New World settlers 
perceived themselves as having to reform their new environments from ‘a hideous and 
desolate wilderness full of wild beasts and wild men’ into productive labour and 
capital.156  Timothy Dwight also wrote of the fears—held by civilised peoples living on 
the frontier—that they would gradually lose their civilised characteristics, because ‘their 
course of life seduce[d] them to prodigality [and] thoughtlessness of future wants’.157  
In recalling his journeys through the United States in the early-nineteenth century, 
Edward Kendall also recalled that many settlers degenerated into savages, wandering 
through the forests and neglecting the ‘wealth of nature’.158   
 
Their sentiments coincided with wider European anxieties about the trajectory of civilised 
societies.  Some European peoples were becoming acutely aware of how the logic of 
extraction was affecting natural spaces and landscapes across the world.  Arguably, in 
European minds, the rapid desolation of seemingly pristine landscapes—through human 
activities—appeared to threaten Europeans’ self-professed superiority over nature.  
These transformations conjured, in many minds, Judeo-Christian images of a 
declensionist fall from Eden: a state of purity and innocence existing at the world’s 
beginning, followed by an inexorable drive toward catastrophe.159  In this story, the world 
before Adam’s sin was thought to be a perfectly static order, established through God’s 
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act of creation.  It was a peaceful garden of abundance, where man and nature lived in 
harmonious coexistence.  However, the act of sin upset this completeness and perfection.  
Order was lost.  Nature became hostile to man, whose priority then became that of 
forcefully dominating nature to ensure his survival.  It was only through this wilful 
determination to subdue nature that man could re-establish the original order that he 
possessed before the fall, and recover his privileged position in the world.160 
 
These perceptions gave rise to the emergence of powerful counter-movements.  
Importantly, these challenges emanated from within European polities.  They reflected 
views held by certain prominent European thinkers, rather than those of uncivilised native 
peoples, who were summarily dismissed as savage or otherwise inferior.  Finding support 
in works such as English poet John Milton’s Paradise Lost,161 such anxieties spawned 
more romantic (or, what Donald Worster calls ‘Arcadian’) 162  desires to reclaim, or 
rediscover, paradise.  Fundamentally, the imagery of unspoiled tropical paradises as 
symbolic locations for the biblical Garden of Eden captured these idealised European 
aspirations. 163   It offered possibilities for redemption by rediscovering the mythical 
Garden of Eden.  By the end of the seventeenth century, therefore, wilderness areas were 
becoming perceived—at least in some quarters—as sublime places where man could 
potentially encounter the divine.   
 
Dante Aligheri’s Purgatorio located one such ‘earthly paradise’ on an ‘island in the 
Southern Ocean’ or Atlantic.164  These Judeo-Christian myths about Eden’s existence—
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potentially inspired by desires to discover more temperate regions, places resembling Dante’s Garden of 
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as a physical site, awaiting discovery beyond European civilisation’s control or 
dominion—may have inspired, at least in part, Christopher Columbus’ transatlantic 
voyages.  Arriving on the island of Trinidad, for example, Columbus wrote that he had 
reached the ‘outer approaches of the Garden of Eden’.165  Driven by this imagery, he 
reportedly warned—according to his son Ferdinand—about the dangers of clearing 
forests on this, and other West Indian islands, drawing particular attention to their effects 
in reducing rainfall. 166   Following this, a distinct understanding of external nature 
emerged.  It was of nature as a sublime, accessible portion of divinity, in an otherwise 
fallen world.  Idealised portraits of ‘noble savages’ living in the colonial peripheries167—
uncorrupted by civilisation’s destructive forces—reinforced these views.  
European peoples—engaged in devastating wars of conquest and religion—may have 
been amenable to the type of ‘romantic primitivism’168 inspired by these noble savages.   
 
By the late-eighteenth Century, European colonisers were witnessing industrialisation’s 
transformative effects on a large scale.  Many colonisers shared anxieties about the rapid 
destructive changes unleashed by imperial conquest and trade in distant locales.  
The intrinsic fear was of an Eden corrupted by human activity, especially from large-
scale industrial crop plantations on tropical island colonies.169  Recovering lost paradises 
appeared, after all, incompatible with continually exploiting colonised territories and 
resources.  The colonies—particularly those located on tropical islands—served as 
symbolic Edenic reflections.  Yet, they were also where European botanists and scientists 
recognised most acutely the rapacious onslaught of colonial logic, enthroned by law, in 
transfiguring vast wilderness into desolate wastelands.  For example, Richard Grove 
details how eighteenth-century island colonies—particularly those of the (Dutch) Cape 
Colony, (British) St Helena and St Vincent, (French) Mauritius, and the (British) Eastern 
Caribbean—gave insights into the effects of European colonists’ activities on the natural 
world.  In these colonies, Grove argues, Europeans realised for the first time the 
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destructive effects of their interventions on fragile ecosystems.  Such understanding, 
Grove demonstrates, also led to early European concerns about the longevity of their 
resource-use patterns.170   
 
In another instance, while travelling through the Aru Islands in 1857—in what is now 
Indonesia—the celebrated naturalist explorer Alfred Russel Wallace captured a live King 
Bird of Paradise (Paradisea regia).  Immediately overjoyed at this achievement, he later 
recounted—in his book The Malay Archipelago—that this ‘perfect little organism’ 
needed ‘the poetic faculty fully to express them’.  However, this feeling soon gave way 
to doubts, even apprehension.  ‘It seems sad’, Wallace wrote, that ‘such exquisite 
creatures should live out their lives and exhibit their charms only in these wild 
inhospitable regions’, which were ‘doomed for ages yet to come to hopeless 
barbarism’.171  Yet, in recognition of the destructive effects of colonialism, he wrote:  
 
‘should civilised man ever reach these distant lands, and bring moral, intellectual, and 
physical light into the recesses of these virgin forests, we may be sure that he will so 
disturb the nicely-balanced relations of organic and inorganic nature to cause the 
disappearance, and finally the extinction, of these very beings whose wonderful structure 
and beauty he alone is fitted to appreciate and enjoy.’172 
 
George Perkins Marsh also recognised the effects of rapid ecological changes, wrought 
by industrial settlements, as imminent threats to the internal stability and prosperity of 
sovereign states more generally.  Marsh observed, in 1864, that ‘[t]he Earth [was] fast 
becoming an unfit home for its noblest inhabitant’.  He, and others, recognised that 
industrialisation endangered the continued existence of established political-economic 
entities—such as commercial and military institutions—by disrupting supplies to 
essential raw materials sourced from nature.  The consequence, said Marsh, was ‘another 
era of equal human crime and human improvidence’, which would reduce civilised 
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societies to a ‘condition of impoverished productiveness, of shattered surface, of climatic 
excess’.173   
 
In a similar vein, Joseph Fourier observed that ‘climatic disorders’ were vices ‘inherent 
to civilized culture’.  Nonetheless, he was cognisant that attempts to dispense with 
mercantilism and individualism—traits he enjoined with the idea of civilisation itself—
were condemned to failure.  It was ‘completely ridiculous’, Fourier observed, to change 
industrial civilisation’s ‘devastating nature’ or ‘stifle its rapacious spirit’.  He claimed 
that any such attempt ‘might as well decree that tigers should become docile and turn 
away from blood’.174  Industrialism was incapable, Fourier lamented, of sustaining itself 
in any alternate way than through the rapacious extraction of natural resources.  
Elaborating upon this theme, Max Weber later noted that modernity’s rapacious demand 
for natural resources was akin to an ‘iron cage’ that prefigured ‘with an irresistible force 
the style of life of all individuals’.175  He believed that new methods were needed to 
ensure the longevity of modern industries, and to improving civilisation.   
 
As an example, Grove’s wide-ranging study of environmental history in European 
colonial empires between 1400 to 1940 reveals that the Venetian Empire’s failure to 
sustainably replenish its timber supplies contributed, by the late-eighteenth century, to its 
decline.  More specifically, resource shortages led to Venice’s ‘trading and military 
displacement’ by other European maritime powers that enjoyed ‘easier access to 
relatively undepleted forests’.176  Grove identifies deforestation, too, as a primary cause 
of devastating Indian famines in 1838 and 1839.  These sparked severe social instabilities, 
leading to insurrections against British colonisers, who were keen not to repeat its 
underlying causes. 177   Threatened by the ‘spectre of famine’ and ‘gross agrarian 
failure’,178 European states created legal regimes and institutions aimed at protecting the 
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external, natural world: particularly the forests, soils and water needed to supply essential 
resources.   
 
Cognisant of this, European states also enacted legislation to establish exclusive state 
monopolies over forests in colonised territories—such as West Bengal—as means to 
protect them from seemingly ‘barbaric’ native communities, who had lived within those 
forests—and managed them sustainably—for centuries.  These laws typically outlawed 
pre-existing indigenous systems of resource management.179  In their place, the new laws 
installed policies that sought to manage land and natural resources with reference to 
scientific principles.  It was through such methods of colonial integration that these, and 
other competing knowledges, were forgotten—or disregarded—amidst an onslaught of 
Euro-American values and interests clothed in law’s supposed universality.  
Yet, proponents of this logic failed to recognise that the native peoples’ contribution to 
the degradation of nature was, at the time, negligible.180   
 
Concomitantly, law reproduced a form of systemic violence.  It concentrated power in 
European states, while habitually excluding—or denying the subjectivity of—colonised 
peoples.  Resource-rich lands were classified as targets of financial gain.  
Colonised native peoples supplied not only the raw materials, but also pliant and low-cost 
workforces.  They also offered convenient locales in which to dump hazardous wastes.  
All the while, these peoples received disproportionately few benefits—in terms of 
resources, infrastructure, or money—in return.  To illustrate, Chinese workers—escaping 
from the Opium War and Taiping Rebellion—seeking work in mines, plantations, and 
railways across the world, lived in conditions akin to that of slaves.181  Together, these 
factors—of outward orientation, specialisation, and economic dependence—installed 
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what some scholars describe as an ‘unequal exchange’,182 both between the Occident and 
the Orient, and within those categories themselves.   
 
These inequities were not ignored.  They often became catalysts for significant—and 
sometimes violent—political upheavals, and rallying cries for many—often powerful—
anti-imperialist resistance movements.  For example, some critical lawyers, like 
Mohandas Gandhi—working as an activist from the late-nineteenth century—sought to 
bring attention to these structural inequalities.  He had spent twenty-one years living in 
Southern Africa, where he was influenced by a social ethic practised by the Nguni peoples, 
known as Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantuu (or simply, ‘ubuntu’).  Valuing mutual 
interactions between human individuals and other species, ubuntu understood that when 
‘one suffers, all suffer’.183  Gandhi drew heavily upon ubuntu in formulating the idea of 
sarvodaya, a set of social principles that encompassed individual freedoms, self-
sufficiency, dignity of labour, and equity in the distribution of wealth. 184   Gandhi’s 
statement, that ‘[i]f I diminish you, I diminish myself’, perfectly reflected ubuntu’s 
underlying themes.185  In essence, this ‘holistic’—as opposed to individual—approach to 
socio-cultural understanding sought to challenge dominant conceptions of civilisation and 
nature, as well as the socio-ecological order constituted from their logics.   
 
Gandhi denounced any idea of civilisation in which hordes of peoples were obliged to 
work in dangerous factories or mines—putting their own lives at risk—merely to sustain 
the lifestyles of the world’s industrial elite.  Subverting the logics of civilisation, and 
Linnaean-inspired natural hierarchies, he emphasised the working conditions of these 
peoples as ‘worse than that of beasts’.186  Gandhi’s critique linked British imperialism 
with planetary degradation.  ‘The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom 
(England) is today keeping the world in chains’, Gandhi wrote.  Then, fearing its effects, 
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he stated: ‘[i]f an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it 
would strip the world bare like locusts’.187  With these statements, Gandhi distanced 
himself from modernising nationalists—such as his former protégé and India’s first Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—who sought to emulate British models of ‘progress’.188   
 
In all of this, we have observed struggles over nature’s meaning, and how it was to be 
treated as a specific regulatory object.  On one hand, this was inspired by an Arcadian 
objective to rediscover—or revive—unsullied earthly paradises.  On the other hand, many 
believed that preserving civilisation compelled the need to sustain a flow of natural 
resources to European nations.  Put simply, these dual—and duelling—impulses, 
formalised through law, attempted to recreate Eden, while simultaneously providing the 
means to transform, utilise, and ravage it.  In fundamental terms, the episode reveals a 
period in which a dominant perception of nature—and a Linnaean hierarchy of natural 
beings—that paraded under international law’s banner of universal propriety and altruism, 
became threatened.  It injected an unprecedented degree of concern for preserving nature 
into prevailing exploitative visions.    
 
III.  Triumph of the Physiocrats 
 
In the foregoing section, we observed a set of struggles—taking place across Europe and 
its colonies—about how to understand, and regulate, the natural world.  By the time that 
these struggles had taken flight, however, a number of movements had already concocted 
theories devoting attention to neutralising the very anxieties that inspired those counter-
hegemonic struggles.  One such movement, in the mid-eighteenth century, was the group 
that came to be known as the ‘physiocrats’.  The word derived from the title François 
Quesnay gave to his collection of writings: Physiocratie.  To some, physiocracy (literally, 
the ‘rule of nature’) was fundamentally a theory of wealth.  Quesnay’s 1758 Tableau 
économique is often regarded as exhibiting a fused framework for understanding natural 
law and the laws of nature, in which the wealth of nations derived exclusively from 
agriculture.189  He argued that the sovereign state was a ‘direct manifestation of the 
natural order’, and that farming was its soul.  Quesnay thought that only agriculture 
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created surplus products: that is to say, only farmers could produce more goods than they 
consumed, which left a surplus for use by the rest of society.  In Quesnay’s opinion, other 
workers—such as those in manufacturing industries—merely moved matter around as 
part of their work.  They consumed food in the process, which caused a net loss to 
society.190 
 
Physiocracy’s rejection of manufacturing as a source of surplus value led to it being 
widely disavowed as simplistic.  In the discussion that follows, I acknowledge these 
critiques, but argue that physiocracy’s methodological approach has endured.  
A physician by training, Quesnay sought to apply scientific and mathematical insights—
particularly from Francis Bacon, John Locke, and Isaac Newton—to political economy.  
He also corresponded with—and was influenced by—Linnaeus.191  Quesnay’s marriage 
of the natural sciences with political economy significantly influenced how nature 
became understood.  Manipulating nature—and its relation to civilisation—through 
elegant mathematical formulas,192 the physiocrats believed that they had solved Eden’s 
contradictions.  Civilised peoples, they thought, could deploy carefully-devised 
methodologies and calculative techniques to sustain their natural resource supplies.193   
 
Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours—a prominent follower—described physiocracy as a 
marker of ‘civilized societies’.  ‘It is the science of constitutions’, he continued, which 
teaches ‘what governments ought to do for their own interest and for that of their nations 
and of their wealth’.194  In Quesnay’s view, this involved the ‘perpetual reproduction’ of 
goods necessary for the ‘subsistence, the conservation, and the convenience of (civilised) 
men’.195  Yet, in his view, any inequalities were inevitable and just—an ‘essential order 
of justice’—because they derived from each individual’s struggle, and mastery, over the 
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land.  On this basis, physiocrats advocated for the ‘enclosure’ of forests and pastures over 
which native peoples and peasants had traditionally been stewards.196   
 
These physiocratic voices found sympathetic ears in the French, and later German, Dutch, 
and British governments.197  For example, along with Quesnay’s other followers—such 
as France’s Finance Minister Anne Turgot, and businessman Jean-Baptiste Say—Du Pont 
became an influential statesman and high-ranking official.  Du Pont designed policies 
favouring farmers, who he thought behaved like ‘true human being[s]’ in their quest to 
understand ‘Nature’s assets and turning them to [their] own advantage’.198  These policies 
influenced early American agrarianism, with Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin 
expressing admiration for Du Pont’s work.  Furthermore, Adam Smith consulted Quesnay 
during a 1766 visit to France, at which time he began writing his Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  The meeting left such a deep impression on Smith 
that he almost dedicated his book—which he completed a decade later—to Quesnay.199  
In it, Smith acknowledged the physiocrats’ contribution—and particularly their scientific 
methods—to political economy.  He wrote that the physiocrats had correctly represented 
that ‘the wealth of nations’ consisted of, not the ‘consumable riches of money’, but the 
‘consumable goods annually reproduced by the labour of the society’.200  Consequently, 
Smith called physiocracy ‘the nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been 
published upon the subject of political oeconomy’.201   
 
Physiocracy’s popularity—particularly amongst Euro-American governments 202 —
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conferred its disciples with unprecedented influence, power, and prestige.  They devised 
policies to manage non-arable land.  They developed land-use management and 
improvement programmes, which were implemented by the Dutch, British, and French 
East India Companies in their island colonies.  These so-called ‘conservation’ practices 
also found inspiration in a German variant of physiocracy, founded by Hans Carl von 
Carlowitz.  In his famous treatise, Sylvicultura oeconomica, Carlowitz called for the 
‘conservation and cultivation’ of resources, particularly wood.  ‘We must aim for a 
continuous, resilient, and sustainable use’, he stated, ‘because [forests] are an 
indispensable thing, without which the country and its forges could not exist’.203  
 
These conservationist policies ensured the means to manage supplies of resources to 
Europe from the colonies, as well as to control unruly marginal subjects in the colonies.  
For instance, Ramachandra Guha observes that European forestry practices in the colonial 
state of Kumaon Himalaya were instituted by colonial authorities in the late-nineteenth 
century in an attempt to ensure continuing stocks of pine for use in British ‘railway 
sleepers’ and ‘turpentine’.204  The logic of sourcing essential raw materials from the 
colonies was encapsulated in a statement by John Evelyn—an early English advocate of 
conservation—that it was ‘better’ to source all of Britain’s resources from the colonies, 
than to ‘exhaust all [their] woods at home’.205  It led the colonial authorities to adopt 
increasingly punitive measures that were designed to comprehensively manage forests.206  
Arun Agrawal reveals that these measures prevented local villagers’ from grazing their 
livestock, chopping and collecting firewood, felling timber, and harvesting fodder.  
Instead, the new measures criminalised these everyday practices, which had been 
carefully refined over centuries to ensure that they would have sufficient supplies for their 
subsistence.  It made illegal what the villagers themselves called their ‘customary use of 
forests’.207   
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While the physiocrats’ influence appeared to decline after the onset of factory production, 
their techniques were still taught in German and French forestry academies, such as the 
L’Ecole Nationale Forestière.  These techniques included ‘scientific forestry’ practices, 
which sought to valorise, optimise, adjust, standardise, and sustain the supply of raw 
materials over long-term periods.  Elaborating upon these techniques, British 
mathematician William Jevons suggested, in 1865, that a distinguishing characteristic of 
statehood was an ability of its government to manage inventories of key natural resources.  
Jevons was referring to coal, in particular, when he wrote that ‘[c]ivilization is the 
economy of power’, and that ‘power is coal’.  He observed that it was ‘the very economy 
of the use of coal’ that sustained British industries.  If managed in a manner that was 
‘efficient and economical’, Jevons wrote, ‘the more will [British] industry thrive, and [its] 
works of civilization grow’.208   
 
American politician Gifford Pinchot studied some of these natural resource conservation 
techniques at the L’Ecole Nationale Forestière in 1889.  He was inspired, in particular, 
by physiocratic ‘sustainable yield’ and crop transfer techniques.209  Upon returning to the 
United States, his efforts to reform the country’s forest management practices were 
principally concerned with maximising their material outputs and financial benefits.  
He was appointed, by President Theodore Roosevelt, as the first Chief of the United 
States Forest Service.  ‘Wise use’ of nature, Pinchot claimed, was fundamental to 
maintaining political stability.  He, along with other self-styled ‘conservationists’, 
opposed attempts to withdraw industry’s access to needed resources.  His emphasis on 
ensuring the long-term use of resources aligned with corporate objectives of profitability.  
Pinchot thought any displacement of this ‘gospel of efficiency’ unwarranted and 
unfeasible. 210   The following passage—from his 1910 book, The Fight for 
Conservation—capture Pinchot’s tenets of resource conservation:  
 
‘The first great fact about conservation is that it stands for development […] (not merely 
the) husbanding of resources for future generations […] but the use of natural resources 
now existing on this continent for the benefit of the people who live here now […] In the 
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second place, conservation stands for the prevention of waste […] The third principle is 
this: the natural resources must be developed and preserved for the benefit of the many, 
and not merely for the few […] Conservation means the greatest good for the greatest 
number for the longest time.’211 
 
At the time, other movements—promoted by Sierra Club in the United States, and 
national parks founders Edmund Perrier and Paul Sarasin in Europe—were recognised as 
representing more Arcadian streams of thought.  Clashing with Pinchot, John Muir—the 
Sierra Club’s first president—subsequently founded a movement calling itself ‘the 
preservationists’.  As its name suggested, the movement’s objective was to preserve 
natural areas and wildlife from human activities. 212   Specifically, the two former 
collaborators fought over the expansion of livestock grazing.  They also came to bitter 
disagreements over government proposals to dam the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite 
National Park.213   
 
Alongside this, an early form of ‘eco-socialism’—represented in the British and French 
naturiens movement—called for a ‘return to a state of nature’, a desire to be happy with 
‘natural means alone’.214  French activist Henri Beylie, for example, called in 1901 for ‘a 
rapid return to a better regime, anti-civilization, to the natural state’.  He continued, ‘we 
have vowed hatred against everything that makes for human suffering, everything that 
takes from Man a fragment of his liberty’, in which they included ‘Science, Progress, the 
new religion’.215  Yet, conservationist approaches eventually won United States President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s support.  He thought them less liable to ‘fundamental social 
objections’. 216   Roosevelt also favoured conservation for its ability to support white 
farming communities, which he considered an ‘exemplar of American racial 
character’.217   
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In some respects, international law and institutions replicated this physiocratic-
conservationist logic.  From 1867, for example, European colonial powers signed a 
number of bilateral nature protection treaties focused on sustaining wildlife populations, 
watercourses, and other aspects of nature considered ‘useful’ to agriculture and 
forestry.218  These early instruments established protected areas for game preservation.  
By contrast, non-game species were not hunted at the time.  Therefore, they were 
presumed to remain unthreatened.219  Significantly, many European governments thought 
that excessive extraction and use of nature threatened to undermine their long-term 
security.  These governments agreed that conserving supplies of these resources should 
displace the shorter-term interests of private and proto-corporate actors to transform—
and exploit—wild places, beasts, and peoples without restriction.   
 
Similar factors temporarily brought together the divided European Powers, in 1900, to 
discuss the preservation of African fauna and flora.  The resulting Convention for the 
Preservation of Animals, Birds, and Fish in Africa—signed by seven states in May 1900, 
but never brought into force—had, as its objective, the protection of animals or plants, 
but only those which by ‘general admission’ were either ‘useful to man or of special 
scientific interest’ (including giraffes, zebras, and hippopotami). 220   It established a 
selective mechanism for protecting these species, while endorsing the ‘[d]estruction’ of 
‘harmful species’ (such as lions, leopards, and pythons).221  Put alternatively, only species 
useful to agriculture—and other activities indicative of civilised human progress—were 
subject to protection under this convention.  Its underlying logic was reinforced by 
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provisions conferring ‘complete freedom’ to each party regarding the actual 
administrative measures that they could apply.  These provisions were designed to ensure 
that only the ‘smallest possible interference with legitimate commerce’ should occur as a 
result of the agreement.   
 
This logic was replicated in the 1902 Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to 
Agriculture.  Ratified by ten European states, the treaty, as its title suggested, protected 
only those birds deemed ‘useful’—specifically ‘insect-eaters’ (like pygmy owls and 
woodpeckers)—rather than those ‘noxious’ to agriculture or sport (such as bearded 
vultures, ospreys, and pelicans). 222   Following this, eleven parties—comprising both 
former colonies and colonisers—agreed the 1933 Convention on the Preservation of Flora 
and Fauna in Their Natural State.223  Its objective was to ‘preserve’ supplies of species, 
which were economically valuable and popular with ‘trophy’ hunters.  Alongside these 
instruments, the 1929 International Plant Protection Convention—like its predecessor, 
the 1878 Phylloxera Convention—concerned itself exclusively with sustaining outputs of 
cultivated crops.224 
 
Other multilateral treaties incorporated innovative mechanisms to calculate—and thereby 
sustain—desired population numbers of wild species.  For instance, the 1911 Treaty for 
the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals225—agreed between the United States, Great 
Britain, Japan, and Russia—aimed to maintain supplies of seal skins from the North 
Pacific Ocean.  Parties calculated quantitative limits on seal hunting, as well as 
compensation for a specified value of seal skins between them.  Similarly, the 1937 
Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling was ratified by eight parties, with the intention 
‘to secure the prosperity of the whaling industry and, for that purpose, to maintain the 
stock of whales’.226  Stated in simpler terms, its objective was to manage resources for 
continued commercial use.  Relatedly, the ‘sustainable’ management of forests made 
possible the redefinition of forests as property, and to regulate their exploitation.  As we 
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observed in Agrawal’s work on colonial forestry institutions in the Kumaon Himalaya,227 
this logic of conservation also served as a means for exercising governance over local 
populations, their social arrangements, and how their peoples conceptualised the idea of 
nature.   
 
In hindsight, it appears that the physiocrat-conservationists succeeded in valorising 
particular biases associated with nature.  In so doing, they buttressed a global order 
founded on unequal resource flows to certain Euro-American states and peoples who 
referred to themselves as ‘civilised’.  Ultimately, this instilled civilised peoples’ with 
particular knowledge about their relationship to the natural world.  More specifically, 
physiocratic-conservationist logic envisioned those peoples as the masters of a static and 
inert nature, which was potentially limitless as long as it was appropriately managed.  
Spurred by these influences, the parties to these treaties attempted to translate their 
concerns into new intergovernmental institutions.  Pinchot—believing that the resources 
of a civilised world, hungry for more industrialisation, needed global management—
urged Roosevelt to convene an International Conservation Conference in 1909.  
With Roosevelt’s backing, Pinchot took significant steps to organise it.  When Roosevelt 
left office, however, his successor—William Howard Taft—abandoned any ideas about 
holding such a conference.  This led Pinchot into a number of to ill-timed political battles, 
which forced him to resign from his post within the administration.228   
 
Regardless, inspired by Pinchot’s efforts, delegates from seventeen European countries 
later collectively agreed—and signed—an Act of Foundation of a Consultative 
Committee for the International Protection of Nature in 1913. 229   It was formally 
constituted by 14 of those countries in 1914.  However, the institution’s mandate was 
stalled by the outbreak of the First World War.  Yet, it created—like the instruments that 
preceded it—a broad-reaching forum—through the idea of an international conservation 
body—in which some (European) peoples’ perceptions of nature could achieve the 
illusion of universality.   
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Conclusion 
 
We have now come a long way since Linnaeus’ preserved fish.  Yet, it has had an 
enduring effect.  Preserved in its present state, the fish appears fossilised.  The fish could 
be millions of years old.  Nevertheless, it swam in eighteenth-century seas.  In studying 
it, as well as other species, Linnaeus was driven by a desire to understand how nature 
could be best exploited for food, medicines, and trade.  His studies were intended to both 
engage with, and to make sense of, nature: believing that they could reveal the divine 
order of God’s creation.  Yet, through his work, Linnaeus imposed a rigid human 
construct upon an infinitely complex and variable world.  Proceeding from this insight, 
I tracked the emergence of the bifurcation and categorisation of nature-civilisation—
through a selection of works by key classical jurists—in order to probe how international 
legal thought has featured in the construction of ideas about nature.  Epiphenomenally, 
my story has also begun to unearth how such understandings of nature feature in 
international law’s construction.   
 
As I have shown, the question of how we perceive nature is an inescapable part of what 
we think of as civilisation.  So, these categories of civilisation and nature were artifices 
integral to one another, but inextricably reliant upon international law.  
Classical international jurists told stories about civilised humanity’s transcendence of its 
primordial origins, its growing mastery over a ‘nature’ to which it no longer belongs, and 
a glorious future of plenty and prosperity which will follow when this mastery is complete.  
My story has told of how sovereignty—as identified with reference to the ‘standard of 
civilisation’—depended upon the usage of nature, as conceptualised as a warehouse of 
inert and static natural resources.  In this framing of nature as an immense ‘reservoir of 
resources’ available for generating wealth,230 the physical world became both estranged 
from—but also a precondition of—civilised societies.  More specifically, these fossilised 
ideas about an unchanging and immutable nature became antithetical reflections against 
which civilised peoples could identify themselves.  Put simply, the idea of an external 
nature was a constitutive feature of the sovereign state itself.  In light of this, I have argued 
that concepts of nature have shaped the idea of civilisation, and thus the emergence of 
classical international law.   
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Furthermore, I have argued that the legal-institutional structures that sustained these 
perceptions of an external nature led to large-scale transformations and trade of raw 
material commodities.  They also fostered conditions for the establishment—and 
continued operation—of unequal relations with—and colonial subjugation of—
uncivilised peoples living within what we have become accustomed to call nature.  
Subsequently, my story told of how a recognition of these effects gradually came to the 
attentions of European peoples, especially those who had travelled to tropical island 
colonies.  This gave rise to dissent, and opposing desires, in some quarters from those 
wishing to pursue the Arcadian task of rediscovering—or preserving—natural paradises.  
It included Muir’s preservationist movement, Mohandas Gandhi’s sarvodaya, and what 
the Nguni peoples called ubuntu.  In their own ways, these ideas threatened to destabilise 
the legally-engineered order between civilisation and nature.   
 
Ultimately, however, any apparent paradox—between these and dominant logics—
seemed to find resolution through a turn to physiocratic philosophies and techniques.  
These sought to amalgamate political economy with the natural sciences.  
The physiocratic movement, in turn, encoded a series of assumptions about the operation 
of political economy—as a discipline focused on managing calculable raw materials—
into international law.  The assumptions had an effect of depoliticising, and conferring 
fixity upon, very confined ideas about nature in its relationship to civilisation.  
Fundamentally, international law’s mutually-constitutive framing of nature and 
civilisation was an inextricable part of how the global order was both governed and 
sustained.  As we shall observe in subsequent chapters, its reverberations can still be felt 
at the heart of contemporary international law.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
EPIDEMICS OF THE ECONOMY’S NATURE 
 
 
‘The tsetse fly is the real ruler of Africa’. 
 
— Old Akan proverb231 
 
Introduction 
 
The tsetse fly (Glossina morsitans) is unique to sub-Saharan Africa.  Measuring only 
eight to 17 millimetres in length, it feeds on the blood of humans and animals.  
Upon feeding, the fly transmits an incurable sleeping sickness, called ‘trypanosomiasis’.  
Trypanosomes spend part of their lifecycle in the bloodstream of host animals: mainly 
buffalo, warthogs, and antelope.  These parasites cause confusion, disorientation, and 
sensory disturbances in humans; fever and anaemia in some domesticated animals.  
Interestingly, trypanosomes affect only humans and livestock, to which the tsetse fly’s 
bite is often fatal.  Wild animals are either resistant, or immune, to its effects.232   
 
Tsetse thrives in humid areas from the Kalahari to the Sahara.  It limits farmers’ ability 
to produce food or generate income.  The fly’s presence impedes use of ox-drawn ploughs 
for commercial farming.  Infected animals also struggle to breed.  As a result, 
trypanosomiasis-carrying tsetse flies have long devastated draught animal populations 
across the African mainland.  For instance, only two of the 500 cattle sent in 1928 to the 
Zambian town of Luanshya—located within tsetse-infected lands—were still alive in 
1930.233  Communities that dared to live within tsetse-infested areas typically survived 
by foraging, rather than through settled farming.234  Those communities thus found it 
difficult to produce surplus agriculture.  They were also less inclined to be politically 
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centralised, as their rulers often struggled to exercise control over vastly scattered 
populations.  For these reasons, tsetse was seen by successive colonial governments as 
‘Africa’s scourge’.235  African peoples also recognised tsetse’s ability to change entire 
ecosystems, an idea captured in the proverb that tsetse was ‘the real ruler of Africa’.236   
 
Controlling tsetse became a major objective of African governments and the new 
international institutions established after the Second World War.  They believed that 
tsetse eradication could expand arable land available for food cultivation, as well as for 
extracting energy and crucial raw materials. 237   Miners, for example, relied upon 
consuming high-calorific foods, increasingly farmed from tsetse-infested lands, to extract 
other essential raw materials, like fossil fuels.  Steady supplies of fossil fuels were also 
needed to transport other commodities—like precious metals—across long geographical 
distances.238  As I argued in the previous chapter, governments regarded such activities 
as identifiers of civilised peoples, and thus, statehood under international law.  Civilised 
statehood depended, in turn, upon the ability to harness ever-increasing tracts of tsetse-
free lands.  Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that the tsetse fly became a recurrent 
trope during the two decades following the Second World War.   
 
With this in mind, the present chapter explores international law’s role in subduing the 
tsetse fly and, more broadly, sustaining a socio-ecological order.  Tsetse, in this story, 
was not only an object of eradication, but also a symbol for the operation of international 
law.  The story in this chapter relates to my central thesis by investigating how 
international law’s framing of nature became a vital means by which powerful states and 
actors sought to impose a new geopolitics, and inaugurate a new global order.  In Section 
I, I explore the emergence of a legal object called ‘the national economy’.  I investigate 
how its creation as a separate object—or regulatory realm—depended upon the idea that 
natural resource supplies were limitless, and incapable of exhaustion.  Following this, 
Section II enquires into how the newly-formed United Nations—pushed by the United 
States government—made one of its first priorities conserving essential raw material 
supplies for the purposes of expanding economic growth in wealthy First World countries.  
With this, my story reveals strategies by which some countries sought to ratify a logic of 
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‘conservation’.  Finally, Section III examines how international institutions led activities 
to modernise newly-decolonised nations, such as by establishing national wildlife parks 
and building mega-dams.  I observe how these activities further occluded competing 
(‘preservationist’) approaches to understanding nature by co-opting them in ways that 
reaffirmed conservationist logics, and reified the idea of the national economy.  
Paradoxically, they also gave rise to conditions that enabled the tsetse fly to thrive.   
 
I.    Inaugurating the ‘National Economy’  
 
This section explores two phenomena.  In the first subsection, I investigate how the 
concept of the national economy was legally constructed.  Its significance for my thesis 
is to demonstrate how the economy both relied upon, and reiterated, an understanding of 
nature as a calculable, extractable, and abundantly consumable resource.  Calculations of 
GNP—as a dominant measure of the national economy—also helped project perceptions 
that individual economies were closed circuits, ostracised from any political, social, or 
material moorings.  Put simply, this disembedded the idea of the economy from any 
natural constraints.  Subsequently, the second subsection examines how key actors strived 
to install purpose-built international institutions and legal innovations, which were 
designed to regulate the price and quantity of global commodities.  Fundamentally, 
these measures sought to ensure the continued availability of resources for use in wealthy 
states.   
 
1.1.  The Great Monetisation 
 
Karl Polanyi’s seminal study, The Great Transformation—published in 1944—argued 
that the economy emerged as a separate institutional sphere, ‘disembedded’ from wider 
political or social relations, during the nineteenth century.239  Polanyi’s epic account, 
however, remains controversial.  The subsequent consensus arising from Polanyi’s 
profound insight—of the economy as having arisen a distinct sphere of governmental 
practice and intellectual thought in the late-eighteenth or early nineteenth century—
ignores a glaring fact.  No political economist of that period referred to any object called 
‘the economy’.240  Indeed, contemporary usage of the word—as a self-contained structure 
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of production, exchange, and consumption of goods within a sovereign state’s 
geographical boundaries—first appeared only during the 1930s and 1940s.241   
 
Prior to that, political economists made no reference to the economy as a distinct object 
of study.  The term referred to a process, rather than a self-contained structure.  
Adam Smith’s usage, for example, carried a more traditional meaning associated with the 
thrift—or wise use—of resources.  In this older definition, ‘the oeconomy’—a composite 
of the Greek words for ‘house’ (oikeos) and ‘management’ (nemein)—referred to the 
sovereign’s role in managing the internal affairs of his household: the nation-state.  
One such role, Smith thought, was to ensure the ‘abundance’—or lack of ‘scarcity’—of 
resources available to the sovereign’s peoples.242  Smith emphasised his definition of the 
term ‘economy’—as a process of frugally or prudently managing resources—when he 
wrote that:  
 
‘Capital has been silently and gradually accumulated by the private frugality and good 
conduct of individuals [...] It is the highest impertinence and presumption [...] in kings 
and ministers, to pretend to watch over the oeconomy of private people.’243   
 
In its contemporary sense, the idea of the ‘economy’—as a distinct object—appeared in 
John Maynard Keynes’ 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money.  In this work—generally recognised as the origin of macroeconomics244—Keynes 
was chiefly concerned about ‘the behaviour of the economic system’ as a whole.  
He focused on ‘incomes, profits, output, employment, investment, and saving’ in the 
aggregate, rather than those of any ‘particular industries, firms or individuals’. 245  
Keynes’ approach was profoundly influenced by a book he read at the time, which was 
authored by British mathematician William Stanley Jevons, calculating the rate at which 
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Britain’s coal mines were being depleted.246  In particular, Keynes became fascinated 
with Jevons’ approach to measuring the concentrated movements of materials, money, 
and resources, in ways that could then be tabularised and tracked across time.   
 
Jevons’ calculations were themselves influenced by Richard Cantillon, whose theories 
had subsequently inspired François Quesnay and Anne Turgot’s physiocratic writings.247  
As such, it is possible to surmise a direct line of influence from the physiocrats to Keynes’ 
work.  Building upon these influences, Keynes’ believed that ‘much unnecessary 
perplexity’ could be avoided if the study of the ‘behaviour of the economic system as a 
whole’ were strictly limited to two units: labour and money.248  Proceeding from this 
insight, Keynes’ major innovation was to use the idea of money circulation as a basis for 
formulating the concept of a ‘national economy’.   
 
With this innovation, Keynes departed from earlier theories—including those of his 
Cambridge colleagues Arthur Pigou and Alfred Marshall—that treated systems of money 
exchanges as akin to barter systems.  These theories, Keynes argued—in an early draft of 
The General Theory in 1932 or 1933—regarded money as ‘a convenient means of 
effecting exchanges, as an instrument of great convenience, but transitory and neutral in 
its effect’.  In his view, these theories used money as merely a ‘neutral link’ between 
‘between transactions in real things and real assets’.249  Keynes elaborated this point 
further, explaining that classical perceptions about money—‘as a mere link between cloth 
and wheat, or between the day's labour spent on building the canoe and the day's labour 
spent on harvesting the crop’—did not actually modify the ‘motives and decisions’ of 
parties to the transactions.250   
 
Departing from his predecessors, Keynes referred to a new totality that he initially called 
the ‘monetary economy’.  He conceived it as representing the sum of all moments in 
which money was traded, or exchanged, within a nation-state’s geographical boundaries.  
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It sought to calculate only a nation’s income, rather than a nation’s aggregate wealth.251  
In this early draft of The General Theory, Keynes first devised ‘the economy’ in its 
contemporary sense.  Clearly, Keynes’ national economy functioned with reference to the 
nation-state.  Sovereignty demarcated the boundaries within which the circulation of 
money could be measured.  Thus, Keynes imagined the world as a collection of separate 
sovereign states, each representing a discrete national economy.  Through this vision, 
Keynes inscribed the nation-state—and consequently, international legal thought—into 
the structure of what was to become the discipline of macroeconomics.  Subsequently, its 
logic relied upon the work of international legal rules and principles to delimit national 
boundaries, and regulate interactions between individual national economies.   
 
Yet, significantly, Keynes’ economy elided any overt role for nature—or material 
resources—in its construction.  Defining the economy as a circulation of money enabled 
growth without any actual physical expansion.  When measured in this way, money or 
resources could be counted multiple times.  Therefore, national economies were not 
restrained by the availability of resources.  They relied on natural resources, yet did not 
account for their usage.  Put simply, national economies had no obvious limits.  It is 
telling that, in less than 10 years after The General Theory’s publication, Britain’s coal 
reserves levels were no longer considered in severe crisis.  By this time, the country’s 
coal reserves—along with those of other resources—had been replaced with reserves of 
currency.252  Following The General Theory’s logic, the supply of available resources no 
longer presented practical limits to economic possibilities.  By unburdening itself from 
nature in this way, national economies naturalised the idea that infinite—or limitless—
growth was possible.  
 
Systematising these logics, Simon Kuznets devised—while working in the United States 
National Bureau of Economic Research—a set of scientific methods with which to 
calculate national economies.  These techniques became profoundly influential within the 
United States: its government began publishing national economic figures in 1942, and 
President Roosevelt referred to Gross National Product (‘GNP’) in his 1944 budget 
speech. 253   Thereafter, GNP rapidly became a popular metric among governments 
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worldwide.  Importantly, the idea surfaced at a time during which European empires were 
dissolving, and a reconfiguration of the global order was taking place.  Importantly, GNP 
played into the hands of this global reconfiguration.  It made possible the quantification 
of each nation’s size and growth.  GNP also offered a common language with which all 
nations could imagine themselves as sovereign, geopolitically bounded, and capable of 
effective self-governance.  GNP also allowed for the classification, and reordering, of 
nations with reference to it as an ostensibly objective measure.  Opposing this, however, 
Kuznets keenly expressed awareness of its dangers.  He feared that calculating ‘a national 
total’ could facilitate ‘the ascription of independent significance to that vague entity 
called the national economy’.254   
 
Following this, in 1949, an intriguing debate—involving Kuznets and other scholars—
took place. 255   According to these key scholars—who had collectively developed 
calculations for GNP—the concept was only narrowly applicable to military expenditures.  
GNP’s use was not appropriate during peacetime.  Added to this, many participants 
concurred that GNP could not be used in less developed countries, where non-market—
or political—factors played highly significant roles.  It was also thought that any such 
attempt at international comparison would lead to false results.  Furthermore, the scholars 
agreed that GNP calculations had to be reduced by the ‘costs of civilization’.  
These costs included pollution caused from producing commodities.  Yet, under current 
approaches, these costs were not calculated as deductions from GNP.  By contrast, 
expenditures incurred for rectifying such damage were treated as additions to national 
wealth.256  Finally, many scholars thought that mining activities had to be counted as 
deductions against a country’s GNP, given that resource depletion would impoverish the 
nation.  Ultimately, none of the discussed proposals were adopted.  Because GNP did not 
account for the discovery of new resources to replace those depleted, detractors argued 
that the extraction of resources should also not be counted against national economies.257  
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This decision would provoke unending future discussions about formulating new 
indicators of national wealth and human wellbeing.   
 
In all, calculating GNP reified the idea of the national economy as a closed circuit, 
alienated from any political, social, or material moorings.  Subsequently, GNP’s framing 
of nature as an apparently infinite supply of resources—incapable of exhaustion—helped 
project the economy as a central organising principle of mid-twentieth century global 
affairs.  The progress of states became increasingly defined and measured in terms of 
GNP, the growth of which newly-decolonised Third World states strived to replicate.  
In other words, GNP became the dominant measure of national success, a ranking system 
for wealth, and proxy for wellbeing.  It helped rank countries, set divisions between them, 
and define the objectives for national economies.258  By the late-1950s and early-1960s, 
this vision of the economy—as measured by GNP—had captured the attentions of 
nationalist leaders worldwide, as well as international institutions, who instituted policies 
aimed at generating rapid national economic growth.259  As such, measures to improve 
economies became subject to determination through ‘technical’ expertise, rather than 
through public contestation.   
 
Yet, for that vision to be realised, wild natures—such as the African tsetse fly—had to be 
tamed, or disciplined.  Where successful, the fly’s eradication enabled the clearance, 
cultivation, and farming of previously fly-infested wilderness areas.  This opened vast 
new areas of land for human use, allowing for the integration of livestock with crop 
production,260 enabling societies to feed growing populations.  This ensured sustained 
flows of money and resources, particularly to wealthy, techno-scientifically advanced, 
industrialised nations.  With the control of tsetse populations, therefore, African 
economies—as well as of those in the Euro-American world—could finally function as 
if there were no limits.  Those infant nations could finally take their rightful place in 
solidifying the logic of money circulation.  This finally secured the ‘scientific’ measure 
of GNP as a key yardstick of the twentieth century.  With this, tsetse symbolised what 
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had to be controlled for newly-decolonised states to achieve greater recognition in the 
post-war international system.   
 
1.2.  Ratifying Spheres 
 
International law had a further effect in systematising GNP’s logics.  Following the 
Second World War, its victors forged a new international legal architecture.  A key feature 
of this architecture was its formal separation of institutional responsibilities for ‘economic’ 
issues, from those of ‘political’ issues. 261   It envisioned that the United Nations 
institutions would exercise governance over ‘political’ affairs.  Although the United 
Nations was also intended to have some general role in economic matters, for the most 
part, it was expected these would merely ‘reinforce the broad principles’ set out by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions.262  Indeed, by the time the United Nations Charter was signed 
in June 1945, the United States and United Kingdom had already committed themselves 
to the Bretton Woods Institutions as a separate regulatory system over economic 
affairs.263  Meanwhile, the United Nations remained deferential to the Bretton Woods 
Institutions over economic matters.  Meanwhile, the United Nations retained sole 
authority over political matters.264  
 
Evidently, this formal separation was logically untenable.  As Sundhya Pahuja acutely 
observes, ‘what is defined as economic or political is itself a political question’.265  Ha-
Joon Chang also writes that ‘economics is about economic policy, whose making is 
political’.266  Yet, ignoring these contradictions, all major sides of politics eventually 
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accepted law’s abstraction of the economic from the political sphere.  For instance, Ellen 
Meiksins Wood observed that economists from the Bank and Fund, along with historical 
materialists, tended to align in their adoption of:  
 
‘modes of analysis which, explicitly or implicitly, treat the economic “base” and the legal, 
political, and ideological “superstructures” which “reflect” or “correspond” to it as 
qualitatively different, more or less enclosed and “regionally” separated spheres’.267   
 
Keynes was a major figure at the Bretton Woods Conference.  In conjunction with other 
participants, he agreed to designate the United States dollar as the world’s sole reserve 
currency.  To bolster confidence in the dollar, the United States government pledged to 
convert dollars into gold at a fixed rate of US$35 per ounce.  The United States had, by 
this time, already accumulated over 80 per cent of the world’s gold.  Other countries 
agreed to tie their own currencies to the dollar.  Indirectly, it also tied them to the United 
States’ overwhelming monopoly on the world’s gold reserves.  In the years following the 
Bretton Woods Conference, however, the rate at which the United States stockpiled 
gold—which was sourced predominantly from South Africa—was eclipsed by a growth 
in the circulation of dollars.  Given this disparity, Barry Eichengreen claims, a growing 
trade in natural resources sustained the dollar’s value.  This is because dollars were 
needed to purchase essential raw materials.268  In other words, the dollar’s status in global 
finance depended on a continual flow of natural resources, particularly from the former 
colonies in the ‘periphery’ of the global South—such as African and South American 
nations—to a ‘core’ comprised of Anglo-American industrial economies in the global 
North.269   
 
The Bretton Woods Institutions’ primary architects—including Keynes—appeared aware 
of these connections.  It was at this time that Keynes came to understand that The General 
Theory had failed to take into account the availability of natural resources.  After all, 
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money circulation depended on steady supplies of energy, food, and other raw materials.  
Aligning himself with a senior delegate from the United States—Harry Dexter White—
Keynes proposed that a third institution—existing alongside the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank—be tasked with managing the storage and exchange of important 
commodities.  More specifically, White argued for the establishment of an ‘international 
essential raw material development corporation’.  The institution’s function would be to 
ensure adequate raw material supplies for countries unable to secure those resources 
themselves.  White believed that such a function would increase both ‘world supply’, and 
price regulation, of those resources.270   
 
He also joined with Keynes to propose an ‘International Commodity Stabilisation 
Corporation’, whose task it would be to stockpile key commodities: such as oil, rubber, 
and sugar.  Its intention was to stabilise supply and demand for these commodities, 
preventing speculative trading and attempts by individual governments to introduce 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies.271  This proposal was widely supported.  Even some 
proponents of greater liberalisation and deregulation—such as Friedrich Hayek—
accepted the need to link currency reserves with primary commodities.  Hayek argued for 
replacing the gold standard with an ‘international commodity standard’.  This could allow 
currency to be issued in exchange for ‘a fixed combination of warehouse warrants for a 
number of storable raw commodities’.272   
 
Added to this, immediately after the Bretton Woods Conference, officials from the United 
Kingdom and the United States met in Washington DC in order to discuss plans to 
establish an ‘International Petroleum Council’.  They envisaged a form of trusteeship 
over what was predominantly Middle Eastern oil.  Through this Council, Anglo-
American officials intended to disqualify claims by oil-producing states, and international 
corporations, from controlling global oil supplies.273  As a United States Department of 
State report suggested at the time, the need to ensure adequate oil supplies—alongside 
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other key strategic resources—trumped the ‘sovereign rights’ of those resource-rich 
countries.  Instead, the United States government favoured establishing a ‘trusteeship of 
the big Powers’ over the world’s resources.274  While these proposals fell away, their 
underlying strategy led the United States and United Kingdom to remove references that 
other countries had inserted about nature—or natural resources—from the text of the 
United Nations Charter.275  These Anglo-American powers believed that such provisions 
in the Charter could have allowed other United Nations member states to fetter their 
power to unilaterally control the supplies of these resources.276   
 
Nonetheless, State Department officials sought to deflect attention away this objective.  
They argued—during negotiations over the United Nations Charter—that including any 
explicit mandate for the institution to engage in activities to ‘conserve’ natural resources 
would cause the United Nations to encroach upon other planned international institutions: 
particularly, that of the Food and Agriculture Organization (‘FAO’), United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’), and the proposed World Trade 
Conference.277  The United States’ delegates also opined that it was unlikely that member 
states would ever agree upon collaborative efforts to conserve natural resources until 
‘larger problems of trade and commodity arrangements’ had been resolved. 278  
Consequently, the Charter did not include any specific provisions about nature, or natural 
resources.   
 
In opposition to the United States government’s wishes, however, other United Nations 
member states immediately began interpreting the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (‘UNESCO’) and FAO’s constituent instruments in ways that 
extended to these activities.279  Furthermore, in a move aligned with the United States 
government’s desire to retain power over natural resource supplies in the economic realm, 
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) was drafted to permit some 
autonomy for its members—at least in theory, if not in practice—to implement policies 
relating to ‘the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’.  This was a major 
exception to the GATT’s rules obligating its members to take progressively greater steps 
toward trade liberalisation.280  The definition of the word ‘conservation’, in that context, 
remains largely undeliberated.  Also, the degree to which this exception allows countries 
to impose trade restrictions to protect natural resources remains highly questionable.  
Regardless, I simply raise this provision in support of my contention that the United States 
government, and some of its strategic allies, initially regarded natural resource issues as 
intrinsically belonging within international law’s economic realm.  
 
Ultimately, Keynes’ efforts to buttress the idea of the economy as an object, through 
purpose-built institutions designed to regulate global commodities, failed.  Yet, a number 
of other factors seemed to affirm that the Keynesian economy—now ratified as a separate 
object through international law—need not account for the supply, or depletion, of 
resources.  For example, global commodity prices declined significantly after the Second 
World War.  Adjusted for inflation, the real price of beef and hides in 1953 was 72 per 
cent lower than it was in 1944.  Between 1944 and 1970, oil prices declined by 17 per 
cent.  Over the same period, corn prices fell by 63 per cent, sugar by 50 per cent, 
aluminium by 25 per cent, and gold by 10 per cent.  Average metal prices—namely those 
of bauxite, iron ore, steel, nickel, tin, and zinc—also trended downwards, as did the price 
of phosphate.281  The availability of these raw materials at relatively low prices—even in 
spite of increasing consumption of them—allayed concerns about the possibility of their 
eventual exhaustion.   
 
Moreover, a perception that new technologies—devised by scientific experts—could 
synthesise new substitutes, ensured that resource stocks would not limit the growth of 
national economies.  For instance, the production of plastics, chemicals, and fertilisers—
synthesised from oil—served as substitutes for potash and coal, which suffered from often 
highly volatile changes in price.  This affirmed Robert Solow’s view that nature was 
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simply a production factor, which could be substituted by an increase in either capital, or 
by technological innovation.  According to Solow, if it were simple to substitute ‘other 
factors’ for natural resources, then the world could, in effect, ‘get along without natural 
resources’.282  This perceived abundance of essential resources, meant that they could 
continue to be consumed, with no discernible need to account for their depletion.   
 
‘Civilization’, Keynes wrote in 1938, is ‘a thin and precarious crust, erected by the 
personality and will of a very few, and only maintained by rules and conventions skillfully 
put across and guilefully preserved’.283  In hindsight, Keynes may have inadvertently 
referred to himself, and his role in constructing the idea of the national economy.  
His model of a new global order—based on this idea—continues to capture the 
imaginations of governments all over the world.  It is perhaps interesting to note, however, 
that Keynes may have been opposed the pursuit of endless growth.  He wrote—in an 
essay entitled Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren—that ‘a point may soon be 
reached’ when peoples’ will no longer need to consume ever-increasing amounts of 
resources, but will ‘prefer to devote further energies to non-economic purposes’.284   
 
II.   Preserving Logics, Conserving Hegemonies 
 
Envisioning the economy as a separate object paved a path for additional plans to ensure 
access to, and conserve stocks of, the natural resources on which the economy was 
dependent.  These plans emphasised conservation techniques as preconditions to 
economic prosperity.  Many governments recognised the role of international law and 
institutions in promulgating these techniques.  In what follows, the first subsection 
investigates how governments—led by the United States—sought to enhance their access 
to vital natural resources through international law.  Pursuing this objective, governments 
convened a United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilisation of 
Resources (‘UNSCCUR’), with a view to preserving continued supplies of resources vital 
to growth of their national economies.  Subsequently, the second subsection explores a 
range of competing efforts—led by UNESCO and one of its subsidiary organisations, the 
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International Union for the Protection of Nature (‘IUPN’)—to assert alternative logics.  
In the third section, I observe some of the international legal and institutional means by 
which these logics were made subordinate to the goal of preserving an idea of nature as 
an exploitable resource.   
 
2.1.  UNSCCUR’s Conservationism 
 
After the Second World, the new international institutions rapidly internalised logics of 
the economy and nature.  Post-war reconstruction efforts required ever-expanding 
supplies of natural resources to grow national economies.  Operating through the newly-
formed United Nations, member states attempted to promote a range of strategies and 
techniques to achieve this objective.  Through a 1947 United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (‘ECOSOC’) resolution, representatives from 49 countries agreed to hold 
a conference in August 1949 at the United Nations’ temporary Lake Success headquarters 
for the purpose of discussing these issues.285  This resolution affirmed the United Nations’ 
competence to engage in activities to conserve natural resources.  With it, the 
conference—designated the UNSCCUR—was the first multilateral summit for almost 40 
years in which country representatives convened to explicitly discuss issues about natural 
resources.  So, the conference reveals much about how nature was perceived, and ordered, 
through international law.  In saying this, it is the structure of arguments raised in these 
conferences—rather than their outcomes—that is of interest to me here.   
 
Behind the scenes, the UNSCCUR’s main catalyst was Gifford Pinchot.  By now serving 
as the Governor of Pennsylvania, Pinchot’s ideas became enormously influential with 
United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as well as his successor, President 
Truman.  Both presidents were receptive and willing advocates for Pinchot’s attempts to 
convene a world conference on conservation.  Mindful of his past mistakes, particularly 
in ignoring links between natural resources and armed conflicts—an oversight that led to 
the stalling of his earlier proposal to establish an ‘International Conservation 
Conference’—Pinchot now sought to leverage the American public’s sentiments, and 
priorities, especially that of securing peace.  With this in mind, Pinchot began 
                                                 
285 United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘Scientific Conference on Resource Conservation and 
Utilization’, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-1947 (New York, 1947), pp. 491-492. See also, 
Conservation and Utilisation of Resources, ECOSOC Res 32 (IV), UN ECOSOCOR, 4th sess, UN Doc 
E/Res/32(IV) (28 March 1947), Preamble. 
 82 
emphasising a role for ‘Conservation as a Foundation of Permanent Peace’.  He published 
an article under this title in the August 1940 issue of Nature.  In it, Pinchot intimated that 
‘conservation of natural resources is the key to the future’.  It was the ‘greatest material 
question of all’, he said.286  Moreover, he later added: 
 
The very existence of our Nation, and of all the rest, depends on conserving the resources 
which are the foundation of its life […] International cooperation in conserving, utilizing, 
and distributing natural resources to the mutual advantage of all nations might well 
remove one of the most dangerous of all obstacles to a just and permanent world 
peace.’287 
 
Pinchot died in 1946, three years before the UNSCCUR.  Nonetheless, his idea—to frame 
nature conservation as a precondition for securing peaceful relations—became one of the 
conference’s underlying themes.  This theme became a drawcard for many reticent 
governments to engage in the process.  Aside from this aim, however, Truman also saw 
the proposed conference as an opportunity to help configure the new global order around 
the United States.  The UNSCCUR was organised at Truman’s instigation.  A large 
proportion of the conference’s agenda was devoted to discussing how to implement 
Truman’s ‘Point Four Programme’.  The programme took its name from the fact that it 
was the fourth foreign policy initiative outlined in Truman’s famous January 1949 
inaugural speech.  One of Truman’s claims in that speech was to make ‘[g]reater 
production’ an essential facet of enduring ‘prosperity and peace’.  In the same speech, he 
also proclaimed an era of scarcity.  Truman described this as one in which ‘material 
resources’ were ‘limited’.  He announced that the world’s available resources were 
destined—under the Marshall Plan—for use in post-war reconstruction, to revive 
Europe’s economy.288   
 
Consequently, Truman forewarned in his speech, the United States would not be able to 
share those resources or capital with the world’s ‘underdeveloped areas’.  Rather, the 
United States could share its ‘imponderable resources in technical knowledge’.  These 
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were ‘constantly growing’ and ‘inexhaustible’, Truman declared.  This technical 
knowledge could enable underdeveloped countries to better exploit natural resources for 
expanding production of clothing, food, and industrial goods.  Following this logic, 
Truman further proposed that all countries could benefit from ‘a constructive program’ 
designed to make ‘better use of the world’s human and natural resources’.289  One specific 
resource at the forefront of Truman’s mind was oil.   
 
Even before the Second World War, many countries regarded oil as a crucial strategic 
commodity.  In the United States, Roosevelt issued a statement in 1939 calling for 
stronger policies to conserve energy resources.  The Atlantic Charter, which Roosevelt 
signed with Winston Churchill two years later, reflected this objective.  In it, the parties 
called for more open access to raw materials, explicitly mentioning oil.290  By 1955, oil 
had become such a large a proportion of global trade that a United Kingdom government 
report—on the treatment of oil in the country’s trade accounts—suggested that ‘the 
international ramifications of the oil industry […] are so large and so complex as almost 
to constitute oil a currency in itself’.291  With this, however, fears grew about possible 
shortages.  ‘The law of diminishing returns is becoming operative’, argued the Director 
of Reserves for the United States Petroleum Administration for War in 1943.  He claimed 
that, ‘[a]s new oil fields are not being formed and as the number is ultimately finite, the 
time will come sooner or later when the supply is exhausted’.  The ‘bonanza days of oil 
discovery’, he added, ‘belong to history’.292   
 
This pessimism gave rise to what the United States government called its ‘conservation 
theory’.  Its aim was to secure adequate supplies of natural resources—such as oil—in 
order to foster growth of the country’s national economy.  This typically meant acquiring 
control over ‘extraterritorial’ oil reserves.293  The Point Four Programme was forged in 
this context.  It was designed to expand, not only the United States’ exports of 
manufactured goods, but also supplies of Third World natural resources: of which oil was 
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but one of them.294  Given manufactured goods’ higher monetary value in proportion to 
natural resources—the prices of which tended to fall relative to those of manufactured 
goods—the United States’ GNP—along with that of its major allies—would then be 
expected to grow at a rate higher than that of countries relying predominantly upon 
commodity and raw material exports, including many former colonies.   
 
The rationale for Truman’s Point Four Programme has thus been described as one of 
‘enlightened self-interest’. 295   It sought to manage a world—transitioning from 
colonialism to post-colonialism—in ways that enhanced the United States’ status—now 
largely measured in terms of GNP—within the new post-war global order.  In doing so, 
the programme reasserted the superiority of Euro-American states over their former 
colonies.  These newly-decolonised—but now economically ‘backward’ states—were 
recognised as equal parties, in a formal political sense, with equal voting rights in the 
United Nations.296  I will canvass the issue of development in more detail in Chapter Four.  
Yet what is important to recognise at this juncture is that Truman’s Point Four 
Programme—and its embedding of asymmetrical trade patterns—ensured that the infant 
proto-Third World states would remain substantively unequal to First World states in 
world affairs.  This was partially achieved by the vesting of majority voting power over 
the Bretton Woods Institutions—and thereby, over issues of the global economy—in only 
two countries: the United States and the United Kingdom.297   
 
With these strategic movements, Truman sold the merits of a technologically-advanced, 
industrialised, and commercial lifestyle to proto-Third World states.  In exchange, the 
United States would collect payment in the form of coveted natural resources.  A United 
Nations report, published shortly after Truman’s inaugural speech, underscored this 
lopsided relationship.  Technical assistance for Third World countries meant not only 
improving living standards, the report claimed, but also ‘support for producing steady 
food and resources for the world economy’. 298   Moreover, Truman’s strategy of 
convincing these newly-decolonised countries to emulate Euro-American lifestyles—and 
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industrial pathways—sought to weaken the Soviet Union’s rising influence over these 
countries.  Truman believed that the use and ‘scientific conservation of natural resources’ 
would be a ‘deciding factor’ in the security of First World countries.  It was, he stated, 
the last ‘protective shield’ against an impeding Soviet threat.299   
 
For the Truman Administration, the UNSCCUR was a key (political) forum through 
which to promote this vision of a global order.  Held over three weeks—from 17 August 
to 6 September 1949—at the temporary headquarters of the United Nations on Long 
Island, the summit was attended by over 706 participants from 52 countries.  UNSCCUR 
was intended as a forum for exchanging ideas and experiences on resource conservation 
techniques.  It was envisioned as a meeting of technical experts—rather than political 
negotiators—focused on comparing the ‘economic advantages of different methods’.300  
In this way, countries would not be bound by any of the conference’s outcomes.  
Truman identified the conference’s objective as that of ‘safeguarding peace’, as well as 
providing utility to ‘economically underdeveloped regions’.301  By addressing fears of 
‘resource shortages and declining standards of living’, Truman wrote in a letter to his 
representative on ECOSOC, ‘conservation can become a major basis of peace’. 302  
Following this logic, a senior official from the United States Department of Agriculture 
spoke of the need to ‘arrest and reverse’ threats to nature, lest they imperil ‘the very 
existence of civilization’.303   
 
The conference participants agreed to address these looming threats.  The UNSCCUR 
agenda’s scope was influenced by fears of impending resource shortages, and the 
possibility of declining standards of living.  All the while, most participants appeared 
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fiercely attached to preserving the very social-economic models that brought those threats 
into existence in the first place.  Unwilling to destabilise these models, UNSCCUR 
participants sought to confine their discussions only to techniques for conserving supplies 
of the resources necessary to feed industrial economies.  Many opening speeches reflected 
fears about volatile prices and prolonged supply disruptions.  More explicitly, conference 
participants not only discussed the availability of fuels and energy, but also that of 
‘minerals’, ‘forests’, ‘soils’, ‘fish’, and ‘wildlife’ resources.304  Global demand for these 
resources was increasing, participants concurred.  It was, therefore, ‘high time’ for a new 
era ‘consecrated’ to the ‘wise use’ of available resources, argued United States Secretary 
of the Interior Julius Krug. 305   ECOSOC President James Thorp summarised the 
conference’s main objective as seeking to ‘secure a larger return’ from the earth’s natural 
resources.306   
 
Following this logic, conference attendees focused on applying scientific techniques to 
sustain stronger national economies, and to pursue global peace.  Most shared the belief, 
which had been promulgated by the Truman Administration, that ‘the earth’s resources 
and the ingenuity of man’ could provide ‘almost unlimited potential for improved living 
standards for the world’s population’.307  So, for each resource, most participants believed 
that there were readily-available technical solutions with which to expand the availability 
of supply.  Through these, Krug and others argued, it was possible to reconcile 
conservation with the growth of national economies: or what a senior United Nations 
official labelled ‘the future and the present’.308  This claim—shared by the bulk of the 
UNSCCUR’s participants—altered the position of natural scientists in the post-war order, 
particularly those with knowledge of biology, chemistry, or geology.  No longer were 
they considered as ‘benevolent outsiders’, who were occasionally called upon to offer 
apolitical advice on state affairs.  With the UNSCCUR, they became recognised in 
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international law as valuable insiders, endowed with the knowledge and wisdom 
necessary for the new global order to function.   
 
One proposed solution discussed at the conference was to harness resources from new, 
and previously unexploited, geographical locations.  Participants agreed, for example, 
that harvesting ‘underfished’ tropical waters could—alongside expanded farming—solve 
the issue of declining fish stocks.  With regard to oil, many participants spoke of ‘ample 
evidence’ of the existence of abundant, undiscovered reserves.  ‘Any failure of world 
supply to meet world demand’, a prominent Stanford geologist argued, would not be ‘due 
to a lack of undiscovered reserves but rather a failure of the discovery effort’.  He then 
claimed that any such failure would be the result of societies not organising themselves 
as a ‘free enterprise—profit-incentive—system’, such as the United States. 309  
Most UNSCCUR participants concurred that this type of economically-inspired 
territorial expansion offered the primary means to sustain perpetual resource use.  
However, Roger Heim—French botanist and IUPN President—later pointed out that 
‘taking advantage of all the regions that are still relatively sparsely populated or 
unpopulated implies conceding that there will soon no longer be any natural 
environment’.  He warned that such an approach implied policies ‘favoring even more 
intensive later development’.  In other words, Heim thought that these proposals would 
merely ‘aggravate’ the problems they sought to resolve.310   
 
Ignoring similar critiques, however, ECOSOC representatives agreed that the ‘only 
criterion applicable’ to assess the efficacy of potential solutions was that of ‘economic 
efficiency’.311  Their priority was, in other words, to ensure supplies of the raw materials 
necessary to fulfil the ever-increasing demands of growing national economies.  
Ultimately, the representatives of forty-nine countries agreed to call for heightened efforts 
to compile inventories, and ‘wisely use’, the planet’s natural resources. 312  
These resources were, in the participants’ view, unexplored or underutilised for lack of 
adequate technologies.  In rare cases, the representatives thought, these resources were 
overexploited for want of scientific knowledge.313   
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In addition, the conference participants made repeated references to the tsetse fly.  Some 
commentators observed that its presence could stymie attempts to expand these 
‘commodity frontiers’.314  For example, a prominent soil scientist spoke of how the fly’s 
presence in vast areas of Nyasaland impeded the expansion of agriculture.  ‘Cattle are 
confined to a few limited localities’, he explained, ‘due mainly to the distribution of the 
tsetse fly which, as in other African territories, seriously interferes with the livestock 
industry’.315  Yet, these problems were seen as rectifiable by ‘scientists and engineers’.  
It was believed that they could use universal techniques and instruments to not only 
control tsetse populations, but also to extend the ‘economic, technological and energetic 
limits’ of the world’s available resources.  The United States, and its allies, thus attempted 
to promote themselves as masters of the world’s resources, and guardians of their ‘rational 
exploitation’.316   
 
2.2.  UNESCO and IUPN’s Opposition 
 
Those aiming to protect African wildlife considered the tsetse fly a blessing.  
The presence of tsetse was, as British explorer Sir Henry Stanley put it, the invariable 
sign of ‘an extensive habitat of game’.  Biologist and statesman Sir Julian Huxley also 
praised the fly for preserving what he called ‘the wonderful hierarchy of the original wild 
creatures’.317  ‘Thanks to the tsetse fly’, Huxley observed, extensive swathes of land were 
put ‘out of bounds’, and ‘devoted to preserving nature’.  It led him to propose that ‘a 
monument should be erected to that insect, as the saviour of Africa and its unique 
fauna’.318  European game hunters also apparently greeted the fly’s ability to preserve 
‘large parts of wet, tropical Africa’ with great satisfaction.319  By impeding agriculture, 
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Huxley and other ‘preservationists’ regarded the fly’s presence as protecting wild nature 
from human activities.  Stated in another way, the tsetse fly repeatedly foiled endeavours 
to transform nature into a source of commodifiable resources.   
 
As the first Director-General of UNESCO, Huxley spearheaded voices opposing the 
UNSCCUR’s logic of technocracy, scientism, resource exploitation, and its orientation 
toward sustaining the growth of national economies.  UNESCO had, originally, been 
invited to support UNSCCUR’s planning and administration.  Yet, some of its prominent 
supporters expressed significant concerns.  They feared that Truman’s UNSCCUR 
promoted, under an altruistic cloak, hidden biases toward a particular vision of nature: 
one that was synonymous with resource extraction and utilisation.320  UNESCO’s senior 
leadership also suspected that the conference’s preoccupation with devising techniques 
for the ‘wise use’ of resources—and the ‘industrial aspects of conservation’—could 
undermine UNESCO’s emerging role in nature protection.  Huxley insisted, for example, 
that the narrow agenda of agreed topics proposed for discussion—such as hydropower 
projects—could overwhelm UNESCO’s priorities.  These included wildlife preservation, 
and other similar concerns, which offered little opportunity for economic gain. 321  
Responding to UNSCCUR’s draft agenda, Huxley argued for the need to include a work 
programme on the influence of ‘natural resources on civilization’, and ‘forms of 
civilization on the use of natural resources’.322   
 
When the UNSCCUR organisers ignored Huxley’s pleas, UNESCO’s leadership body 
concluded that a separate conference was needed for the organisation to adequately 
aspirate its views.  While this proposal faced strong opposition by the United States 
government, Huxley put the case strongly enough to receive approval—at UNESCO’s 
Second General Conference—to hold a separate meeting.323  Joined by famed American 
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biologist William Vogt, and five United States government officials, Huxley chaired a 
December 1947 meeting to plan UNESCO’s conference.  In a daring move, they planned 
it to both coincide with, and counterpoise, the UNSCCUR.  They enlisted the UNESCO’s 
subsidiary—the ‘IUPN’—to co-sponsor the meeting.  The IUPN had been founded, 
several years earlier, at a 1946 international conference in Brunnen, between the Swiss 
Nature Society and British Society for the Protection of the Fauna of the Empire (in which 
Huxley was a prominent figure).  The IUPN’s Constitutive Act—signed by 65 members 
on 5 October 1948—expressed its purpose as that of supplementing UNESCO’s 
protection of world heritage sites.   
 
More specifically, the IUPN’s objective was to raise awareness of the ‘destructive 
economic methods’, which threatened ‘preservation of the entire world biotic community, 
or man’s natural environment’.  This included the earth’s ‘renewable natural resources of 
which it is composed, and on which rests the foundation of human civilization’. 324  
While seeking to destabilise fixed ideas about nature’s role in promoting the economy, 
the IUPN’s Congress nonetheless continued to affirm nature’s role as a container of raw 
materials awaiting utilisation—and ‘exploitation’—by wealthy peoples. 325  
Ongoing depletion of natural resources could lower standards of living, the IUPN’s 
members feared.  Yet, this was reversible, they concurred, if people could be:  
 
‘awakened in time to a full realisation of their dependence upon exhaustible natural 
resources and [recognised] the need for their protection and restoration as well as for their 
wise and informed administration in order that the future peace, progress, and prosperity 
of mankind may be assured.’326   
 
The resulting UNESCO-IUPN conference—designated the International Technical 
Conference on the Protection of Nature (‘ITCPN’)—focused much of its attentions upon 
preserving African wilderness areas.  It took place at a time during which decolonisation 
and independence movements were well underway across the world.  With the end of 
colonialism approaching, saving Africa’s nature from African peoples became a hotly 
debated issue.  The ITCPN’s participants ‘stressed the urgency of directing attention 
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towards Africa’.  They thought that European governments had made a ‘grave error’ by 
deluding themselves about the ubiquity of African resources.  To some participants, it 
was a delusion that would ‘bring destruction to the continent’.327  For example, IUPN’s 
first Secretary-General—Jean Paul Harroy—projected an image of African governments 
as incapable of protecting what he considered humanity’s common legacy, because it 
lacked the necessary technical resources:  
 
‘Africa is perhaps the more greatly menaced when its biological equilibrium is disrupted 
[…] Elsewhere the situation is different; the U.S.A has been able to contend with its 
problems to a great extent because it possesses the necessary brain-power and material 
means. In Africa, however, available material is at a minimum, and there is not yet a 
sufficient body of public opinion to protect the common heritage of natural resources’.328   
 
The IUPN’s and UNESCO’s leaders expressed concerns that the newly-independent 
African nations would replace their national parks and game reserves—which had been 
established by former colonial authorities—with industrial farms, mines, and factories.  
The institutions aimed to ensure these parks would remain protected.  Underpinning their 
activities was the logic of preservation: its objective was to ensure the protection of 
certain natural areas from destruction.  Put alternatively, it sought to resist the 
transformation of pristine wilderness areas into raw material resources.329  At the ITCPN, 
participants discussed regulatory initiatives and activities aimed at furthering this cause.  
When pressed about their rationale for holding a separate conference, a UNESCO 
spokesperson claimed that it reflected the organisers’ growing concerns that expanding 
multinational power stultified attempts to hold multinational corporations accountable for 
defiling natural environments.  His intimation was that other planned initiatives—such as 
the UNSCCUR’s focus on finding scientific and technical fixes—would almost 
inevitably achieve little to protect, and preserve, natural spaces.  The UNESCO 
spokesperson explained:   
 
‘Today the balance has been upset […] Technical power has become disquieting. 
Demands are increasing. An unruffled decision made at a gathering of members of a 
Board or by group of officials is enough to determine the felling of a large forest 
                                                 
327 United Nations, Proceedings of the UNSCCUR (1950), p. 157. 
328 Ibid 95. 
329 For an elaboration of the history of ‘conservation’ and ‘preservation’, see Richard White, ‘American 
Environmental History: The Development of a New Historical Field’ (1985) 54(3) Pacific Historical 
Review 297.  
 92 
thousands of miles away, or the killing of the wild fauna of a whole area on the pretext 
of a campaign against the tsetse fly.’330   
 
His reference to the tsetse fly reflected an important point: it had become a global symbol 
of what parts of nature had to be eradicated as a price for achieving economic growth.  
Stated simply, the fly represented a wild and untamed nature, which impeded a nation’s 
ability to prosper.  With this, tsetse focused the attentions of nations and peoples striving 
for inclusion and status in the new global order.  Some newly-formed international 
institutions—chiefly, the FAO and World Bank—pursued this conservationist vision.  
They funded programmes to eradicate the fly, largely through the extensive use of a 
highly-toxic chemical pesticide called ‘Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane’ (more 
commonly known as ‘DDT’).  Drawing attention to the chemical’s effects on peoples and 
wildlife, the American biologist Henry Fairfield Osborn urged the UNSCCUR’s 
participants—in his opening address—to take steps to preserve pristine natural 
environments, even at the cost of impeding the growth of national economies.  Osborn 
was, at the time, President of the New York Zoological Society—and a former Wall Street 
banker—who had written a popular book a year earlier, in 1948, called Our Plundered 
Planet.331  His views also broadly reflected those of UNESCO and IUPN, whose leaders 
had successfully lobbied for Osborn to represent them at the UNSCCUR.332   
 
Osborn’s opening statement also drew attention to UNESCO’s larger aim of seeking ‘a 
clear concept regarding man’s relationship to his environment’.  Humanity’s last 
remaining hope, he said, was to evaluate its own actions against their effects upon 
nature.333  Osborn elaborated on this theme at the ITCPN’s opening session, held only 
days later.  Over 250 participants from 58 countries—meeting in Lake Success alongside 
the UNSCCUR—heard Osborn’s admonition.  He argued that unbridled destruction of 
the earth’s ‘natural living resources’ could cause ‘incalculable loss of human life’.  
Osborn also claimed that it could instigate a collapse of the ‘entire structure of 
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civilisation’.334  With this, Osborn’s remarks reflected several arguments that he had 
made in Our Plundered Planet, warning of the ‘mounting destruction’ industrial activities 
were ‘inflicting on [its] life sources’.335  Osborn highlighted how the use of ‘forests, 
grasslands, wildlife and water sources’ during the twentieth century was by far the ‘most 
violent and the most destructive of any written in the long history of civilization’.336  
Following this, he called for safeguarding ‘the continuation of […] civilization’, by 
tempering demand for use of the earth’s natural resources.  Ultimately, Osborn hoped for 
a ‘reawakening’ of the ‘inestimable values that nature [was] capable of providing for 
us’.337  This reflected views held by UNESCO and IUPN.   
 
The ITCPN discussed a range of topics, in which the tsetse fly repeatedly appeared.  
During a session on the benefits of organic agriculture, for example, interlocutors 
cautioned against introducing synthetic chemicals into biotic ecosystems.  
Several representatives warned that using DDT as an insecticide—particularly against the 
tsetse fly—caused significant harm to livestock, wildlife, and people.  Meanwhile, others 
observed that the pesticide had cleared ‘entire areas of the pollinating insects, honey bees, 
and fish, along with other beneficial fauna’.338   
 
These discussions appeared to have some influence on the UNSCCUR’s deliberations.  
In one meeting, Alfredo Gil—a Nicaraguan representative—alleged that chemical 
fertilisers tended to ‘kill and paralyze’ essential micro-organisms that were essential to 
‘healthy’ biotic functions.  He urged the United States to cease its aggressive promotion 
of artificial chemicals and agricultural monocultures in his country.  The result, Gil 
warned—citing failed programmes such as the Tanganyikan Groundnut Scheme—was 
not only to ‘impoverish the soil’, but also to impoverish ‘human beings, who derive their 
sustenance from the land’.339  Some UNSCCUR participants also feared that relying upon 
these techniques could ‘increase the peasant’s bondage to his merchant’, over and above 
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the value of any benefits derived from the crop’s increased yield.340  Speaking at the 
session, American ecologist William Vogt observed, for example, that power imbalances 
were caused when farmers bore the social and financial costs of these industrial 
agriculture programmes, while the ‘manufacturer[s] cashe[d] in’.341   
 
2.3.  Institutionalising Supply and Demand 
 
In all, both the UNSCCUR and ITCPN deliberations revealed familiar attitudes toward 
nature.  Participants directed their attentions toward either of two objectives: firstly, 
discussing techno-scientific and industrial means for expanding the supply of natural 
resources (as favoured by most of UNSCCUR’s attendees); or secondly, promoting ways 
to preserve nature’s gifts by reducing demand for them (as favoured by many ITCPN 
attendees).  The heart of this debate—between supply and demand—was about whether 
countries should focus on growing their national economies, or seek to protect the 
resources on which their societies seemed to depend.  Either way, their concerns 
converged on a familiar set of logics and purposes.  None sought to fundamentally oppose 
a vision of nature as an exploitable set of resources.  Even those participants calling for 
radical new approaches to nature protection sought to retain this fundamental hierarchy.  
For example, Ollie Fink—Executive Secretary of Friends of the Land—called for a ‘new 
culture’ guided by ‘ecological conscience’.  He explained at the ITCPN that such a 
conscience depended upon revering pristine natural environments, which had value only 
insofar as they enriched human enjoyment. 342   With this, Fink aligned with other 
participants in reifying nature as an object that had to be preserved for the enjoyment of 
a minority of the world’s peoples.   
 
These similarities aside, the UNSCCUR’s conservationist attendees opposed any 
suggestions that the world’s resources were becoming increasingly scarce.  Responding 
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to this claim, the United States’ Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug—denied that 
reserves of resources ‘essential to our way of living’ were ‘decreasing’ in any way.343  
He dismissed ideas that resource exhaustion could destabilise the concept of GNP.  
The ITCPN’s organisers remained taciturn on this point.  When some participants 
suggested, for example, that the conference discuss ‘the almost inevitable antagonism’ 
between nature protection and economic interests, the organising committee responded 
only by agreeing that a single sentence ‘be added at the end of the programme’.  The 
resulting sentence invoked merely a preference for discussing this issue, a tactic that was 
intended not to insult or unsettle their UNSCCUR colleagues.344   
 
These decisions—while seemingly trivial at the time—ensured that views about nature’s 
abundance, and its value for building stronger national economies, remained dominant.  
They neutralised fears about possible future resource shortages.  Following the 
UNSCCUR and ITCPN conferences, for instance, New York’s National City Bank 
advertised the commercial opportunities of investing in a number of Third World 
countries.  One advertisement, published a year after the conferences, sought to entice 
investors to replicate Francisco Pizarro’s 1532 conquest of Peru.  It stated that, ‘[t]oday, 
minerals unknown to the Conquistadores are a source of much greater revenue’ than those 
plundered in the past.  While Peru’s chief exports to the United States were copper and 
lead, the advertisement assured, ‘[s]he has the largest bismuth and vanadium mines in the 
world’.  Peru’s other ‘strategic materials’ included zinc, tungsten, antimony, cadmium, 
indium.  The advertisement also alluded to potential opportunities from Peru’s trade 
imbalance with the United States, stating that American manufacturers accounted for 
‘nearly two-thirds’ of goods imported by Peru.345  Another advertisement declared India’s 
eagerness to ‘modernize her agriculture, to develop her natural resources, and to expand 
and re-equip her industries’.  The advertisement also assured that India would need to 
purchase many advanced techno-scientific and industrial products in the future.346   
 
                                                 
343 ‘Introductory and Plenary Sessions’, in United Nations, Proceedings of the United Nations Scientific 
Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources, Volume I: Land Resources (Lake Success: 
UN, 1951), p. 7. On agreement with Julius A Krug, see George Barrett, ‘U.N. Calls Parley on 
Conservation’, New York Times, 12 March 1949, p. 5; ‘Addresses by Secretary Krug and Fairfield Osborn 
at U.N. Conference on Conservation’, New York Times, 18 August 1949, p. 14; Fred Mallery Packard, 
‘International Technical Conference on the Protection of Nature’ (1949) 47 Journal of Forestry 875, 888. 
344 UNESCO, Preparatory Documents to the ITCPN (1949), pp. 79-80. 
345 National City Bank of New York (Peru Branches), Advertisement, Business Week, 9 September 1950, 
p. 133. 
346 National City Bank of New York (India Branches), Advertisement, Business Week, 7 October 1950, 
p. 12. 
 96 
The FAO shared this logic.  It was established during an October 1945 conference in 
Quebec.  The organisation’s priority was to address food shortages, in addition to securing 
global long-term food supplies.  Article 1 of the FAO’s constitution identified ‘the 
conservation of natural resources’, and adopted ‘improved’ agricultural production 
methods, as central functions of the organisation. 347   Its representatives continually 
reproached both the IUPN and UNESCO for ‘protecting nature from man instead 
of conserving nature and its resources for man’.348  UNESCO gradually came to favour 
more conservationist activities after the end of Huxley’s tenure as Director-General in 
1948.  Combined with the FAO’s ongoing opposition, this change in UNESCO’s 
leadership factors had implications for its affiliate, the IUPN.  The change diminished the 
IUPN’s influence in global affairs.  It also left the IUPN with severe financial problems.349   
 
Added to this, Heim recognised that the IUPN’s funding relied upon its members 
recognising the ‘practical interests’ of the Union’s work, as measured by the ‘human 
significance of its recommendations’.  Rural populations—particularly those in Third 
World countries—were also becoming increasingly resistant to the Union’s activities in 
regulating land and forest use.  As such, Heim feared that the word ‘preservation’ in the 
Union’s name appeared too regressive.350  In all, the IUPN was ‘faced with a dilemma’, 
emphasised Heim.  Its available choices were either to reduce its programme and 
activities, or immediately ‘find new financial means’. 351   Facing pressures from its 
members—particularly those from the United States, who contributed half of its 
US$300,000 annual operating budget—the Union was forced, in 1956, to rename itself 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (‘IUCN’).  Proponents suggested 
this rebadging would make the Union’s work more relevant to peoples across the 
world.352   
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The newly-rebadged Union launched two joint investigations, in 1960, by British 
biologist and the Nature Conservancy’s Scientific Director Edgar Worthington and Julian 
Huxley.  Their reports testified to a crisis in the ‘mission of the white man’ in Africa.  
To rectify this, Huxley and Worthington proposed establishment of a ‘rational’ model for 
land use, which would transform wildlife into an economic resource and local peoples 
into managers of those resources.353  This marked a significant reversal of the more 
preservationist views Huxley had held earlier in his career, in addition to his previous 
views about the tsetse fly’s ability to protect nature.  With this, he transmogrified the idea 
of nature protection from that of preserving ‘unspoiled’ nature, to maximising its utility 
to national economies.354  In all, this represented a victory for the FAO’s and ECOSOC’s 
attitudes toward conserving, and optimising, the use of resources.  It defused the approach 
initially taken by UNESCO, which had focused on preserving wildlife and wilderness 
areas.   
 
With this victory, eradicating the tsetse fly became widely acknowledged as a legitimate 
conservation technique.  This, and other conservationist practices, became handmaidens 
of a global order preoccupied with building robust national economies.  In all, these laws 
and institutions congealed what appeared to be an internally-coherent and immanently-
rational ‘global’ order grounded upon the need to maintain, and optimise, the growth of 
national economies.  These reproduced logics that framed nature as a set of things needed 
that to sustain growth of those national economies.  Through the use of international legal 
instruments, therefore, conservationist projects also enabled a (techno-scientific) 
reorganisation and exploitation of the planet under the leadership of the United States, 
United Kingdom, and their key strategic allies.   
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III.  Transmitting Afflictions  
 
As we observed in the foregoing section, African nations were emerging as independent 
states at the same time that their former colonisers were making efforts to constrain their 
use of resources.  These infant nations—having wholeheartedly accepted Truman’s 
promise—embraced policies that sought to harness nature’s potential to serve expanding 
national economies.  I observed, however, that the tsetse fly impeded these efforts.  
It seemed necessary to reduce tsetse fly populations.  In the circumstances, international 
organisations saw tsetse eradication as a priority for proto-Third World economies.  
UNESCO, IUCN, and the FAO implemented assistance programmes that encouraged the 
prolific use of DDT—and other harmful pesticides—as part of their development plans 
for these countries.  Many also saw this strategy as one that could optimise the 
productivity of Third World lands for the benefit of First World consumers.   
 
In this section, I delve into some of the institutional projects by which the logic of 
conservation spread to proto-Third World countries, while causing the marginalisation of 
competing ideas about—or approaches toward—nature.  More specifically, in the 
following subsections, I inspect two particular sites in which conservationist techniques 
were both performed and transmitted.  The first, in Subsection 3.1, is about wildlife parks 
in Tanganyika and Uganda.  Following this, the focus of Subsection 3.2 is the Kariba 
Dam across the Zambesi River.  In both cases, I explore how the activities of international 
institutions reproduced distinctly conservationist conceptions of nature.   
 
3.1.  Valuing African Parks and Tourism 
 
In 1930, Huxley had approached the then-British Colonial Secretary Sidney Webb, 
attempting to garner support to establish wild game reserves on the African continent.  
These ‘national parks’ sought to protect—or ‘preserve’—what Huxley saw as pristine 
African wilderness, unsullied by human alteration.  An intended purpose of these parks 
was to prevent local African peoples from hunting wildlife for subsistence purposes.  
Nonetheless, Webb was initially dismissive of Huxley’s proposal.  To Webb, wildlife was 
merely ‘something for landowners to shoot’.  Similarly, he thought of game as something 
to be ‘kept safe for rich men’s sport’.  Following further deliberations, however, Huxley 
eventually convinced Webb to set up national parks in all of the three British East African 
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territories.355  Upon the independence of these African States in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
IUCN—along with other First World conservationists—encouraged their leaders to 
integrate nature conservation into their national development plans. 356   International 
tourism became a way to connect these two objectives.  Huxley proposed that African 
countries could generate national income from the ‘enjoyment value’ of ‘wild life and 
natural scenery’.  Through tourism, these countries could generate some degree of wealth 
from setting aside what was otherwise agriculturally-productive land.357  He explained:  
 
‘if the wild life of Africa is properly conserved in National Parks and similar reserves, 
and adequate accommodation, access, and viewing facilities are provided, an increasing 
number of visitors from all parts of the world will undertake the modern equivalent of 
pilgrimage to enjoy the spectacle, and revenue from tourism could become one of the 
mainstays of the economy of all East African countries.’358 
 
This logic was raised at the IUCN’s Seventh General Assembly in 1960.  The Assembly’s 
first three resolutions criticised foreign aid strategies in Africa, and raised ‘grave concern’ 
about efforts to safeguard African national parks and reserves.  Destruction of African 
wilderness, IUCN members thought, ‘was the most urgent international conservation 
problem of the present time’. 359   African foreign aid, some claimed, was ‘prone to 
overlook[ing] conservation and the value of wildlife and habitat’ as a vital ‘economic, 
scientific, and cultural asset’.360  Rather, members resolved that, only by the ‘planned 
utilisation’ of wildlife in this way, could its ‘conservation and development be 
economically justified in competition with agriculture, stock ranching and other forms of 
land use’.361  Through rational management and planning—designed to bring out its latent 
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economic value—wildlife conservation could be made compatible with a nation’s 
agriculture, forestry, and development.   
 
The IUCN’s response was to launch an ‘African Special Project’.  It aimed to convince 
African leaders that implementing ‘conservation practices’ was in their countries’ ‘best 
interests’.  The project brought together 21 newly-decolonised African countries, at the 
IUCN’s Arusha Conference in September 1961—three months before Tanganyikan 
independence—to discuss the possibility of African wildlife conservation.  The IUCN 
collaborated with several international institutions to deliver the project: the FAO, the 
Commission for Technical Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa, and UNESCO. 362  
Tellingly, it was also the first project in which UNESCO and the IUCN collaborated with 
the FAO.  The resulting ‘Pan-African Symposium on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources in Modern African States’ attracted widespread attendance by African 
leaders.   
 
As part of its strategy, the project’s main objective was to convince African leaders that 
approaches such as wildlife tourism could allow African countries to live ‘off the income 
of their natural resources’, rather than ‘the capital’. 363   To achieve this, proponents 
couched their appeals within the language of nationalism.  Huxley proposed, for instance, 
that national parks and nature reserves were important symbols of national prestige.364  
He identified them as symbols of modern nationhood, through which the former colonies 
could earn recognition on the world stage.  In the ‘modern world’, Huxley proposed, 
‘a country without a national park can hardly be recognised as civilized’.365  Slowly but 
surely, this aligned with a growing trend toward comprehending wildlife and nature 
reserves as indispensable resources that could be harnessed for the purposes of achieving 
Third World development.  Even as late as in 2002, national parks continued to be framed 
as part of the essential ‘international values’ to which all ‘nations and societies 
aspire[d]’.366   
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Bernhard Grzimek—an IUCN member and former Director of the Frankfurt Zoo—also 
encouraged new African governments to promote tourism as a source of national revenue.  
Participating at the Arusha Conference, Grzimek bluntly pointed out to Tanganyika’s 
Chief Minister Julius Nyerere that his country could not compete with American tourist 
attractions, such as the Alps and Rocky Mountains.  Nevertheless, Grzimek claimed, 
those tourists might flock to Tanganyika if they could ‘easily and safely watch elephants, 
lions, giraffes and rhinos – a wealth of wild animals that does not exist anywhere else’.367  
In response, Nyerere admitted his lack of concern for animals.  He admitted that he could 
not imagine spending a free day watching crocodiles.  Yet, he said that he knew of how 
Europeans and Americans found pleasure, fascination, even fulfilment from doing so.  
On this basis, he thought those animals worthy of protection.  In his keynote speech to 
the 1961 Arusha Conference, Nyerere stressed the importance of African wildlife as a 
source of revenue.  ‘These wild creatures amid the wild places they inhabit’, he said, ‘are 
an integral part of our natural resources and of our future livelihood and well-being’.368   
 
Significantly, many African peoples also attended the Arusha Conference.  It was the first 
time that they were permitted to participate in an international conference—as opposed 
to merely their leaders or elites—to publicly discuss the use of their resources.  
For instance, at a crucial point in the conference, a Sudanese forester named Sayed Kamil 
Shawki gave a stirring intervention.  He argued that natural resources were 
‘comparatively more fundamental to the economic development of underdeveloped 
countries’ than to the more highly industrialised states.369  Many other delegates seemed 
to concur with Shawki’s sentiments.  After some deliberations, they agreed that wildlife 
preservation was an unsuitable policy for African countries.  Interestingly, however, 
Shawki’s intervention also implied a belief that local practices—or traditional ways of 
knowing nature—needed revitalising.   
 
Moved by Shawki’s arguments, the conference participants also resolved that 
implementation of ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ natural resource management principles—
anchored by clearly quantifiable economic objectives—were necessary for their national 
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economies to flourish.  Influenced by this logic, the conference’s final resolutions 
revealed ‘the earnest desire of modern African states’ to expand wildlife management 
efforts.  This was to take place through greater ‘land-use planning’.370  In exchange, 
African leaders accepted financial and technical assistance—from First World countries 
and international institutions—to manage the economic affairs of their infant states.  
Therefore, attempts to assert local African practices and knowledge—to counter First 
World development models—failed.  In its place, a constellation of actors—African 
leaders, elites, and peoples—sought to strengthen their national economies by exploiting 
natural resources.   
 
Alongside this, a number of proto-Third World countries—working together in a political 
coalition called the Group-of-77 (‘G-77’) countries—sought to reform the global 
economic system.  They sought to achieve this in ways that would displace the hegemony 
of First World states—such as the United States and United Kingdom—over economic 
affairs.  Together, they passed a set of resolutions in the United Nations General 
Assembly where, collectively, they commanded more votes than could be marshalled by 
First World states.  As part of this strategy, African and other newly-decolonised states 
attempted to reassert ownership over their lands and resources.  It was a strategy linked, 
in one way or another, to the efficient exploitation of nature.  By way of illustration, the 
G-77 led the authorship and adoption, in 1962, of General Assembly Resolution 1803.  
This resolution, entitled the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (‘PSNR’), 
declared the following:   
 
‘The right of peoples and nations of permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national [economies] and of the well-
being of the people of the State concerned.’371   
 
Shortly following this, African countries joined other proto-Third World states to adopt 
another vital United Nations General Assembly resolution in December 1962.  
The resolution stated that economic development in proto-Third World countries had, 
prior to this, occurred ‘without due attention’ to natural resource ‘conservation and 
restoration’.  It also claimed that conservation techniques might be of ‘considerable 
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importance’ for proto-Third World economies.  Endorsing an earlier UNESCO resolution, 
the General Assembly unanimously suggested that such measures ‘be taken at the earliest 
possible moment simultaneously with economic development’.372  Yet, in a subsequent 
resolution only four days later, the same (proto-Third World) countries affirmed that 
those principles were to be interpreted within the ‘right to determine freely the use’ and 
to ‘exploit their natural wealth and resources’.  Their purpose was to maintain ‘the flow 
of capital’ to those countries.373  Ultimately, it was these logics that they sought to 
reproduce.  On this basis, Nyerere—along with other African leaders—decided to 
significantly expand national parks and conservation reserves.  These actions yielded 
immediate benefits.  Under Nyerere’s leadership, nature tourism quickly become 
Tanganyika’s third-largest source of income (after sisal and diamonds).374   
 
Nonetheless, this passion for conservation hid a number of other issues.  We can see this, 
for instance, in Grzimek’s similar advances to other African leaders, following his 
successes in Tanganyika. 375   Grzimek encouraged Uganda’s government to forcibly 
resettle Maasai peoples to locations outside the Serengeti region.  Despite heavy criticism 
by those peoples, along with other observers, Grzimek failed to take heed of these 
fundamental objections.  Instead, his actions persecuted indigenous peoples, and focused 
on protecting big game animals rather than whole ecosystems. 376   Yet, Huxley also 
praised this strategy.  He called the Serengeti ‘the world’s largest ecological 
laboratory’.377  The onset of commercial aviation enabled greater numbers of wealthy 
Euro-American tourists to enjoy its exotic wildlife.  With this, the idea of conservation 
(partly) absorbed anxieties about preserving wildlife populations.  It reformed those 
anxieties into an exploitative project, turning wilderness areas themselves into resources 
with which to generate national income.  Fundamentally, this project also transformed 
the African continent into ‘playgrounds’—or what some called ‘identity-forming 
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sanctuaries’—for the world’s wealthy minority. 378   This reified both the idea of 
conservation—as a set of activities directed toward economic productivity—as well as 
the concept of the national economy itself.   
 
Regardless of its exploitative logic, this idea of conservation was endorsed by many 
African governments.  A preambular paragraph to the Convention and Statute Relating 
to the Development of the Chad Basin, which its parties signed on 22 May 1964, endorsed 
the need to use the Chad Basin’s resources for ‘economic ends’.379  Thirty-Eight states 
also signed the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
at a September 1968 conference in Algiers.380  During its preparation, the Organisation 
of African Unity (‘OAU’) had requested assistance from the IUCN.  It also worked 
closely with the FAO and UNESCO to prepare the draft text.  Among other things, the 
convention declared that ‘soil, water, flora and faunal resources constitute a capital of 
vital importance to mankind’.  OAU member states also claimed a ‘duty to harness’ the 
continent’s natural resources for ‘the total advancement’ of its peoples.  
Expressing concern for the possible depletion of these ‘irreversible assets’, states 
accepted that their utilisation had to satisfy the ‘needs of man’, within nature’s ‘carrying 
capacity’.  The OAU thus sought to ensure that resources were conserved ‘with due regard’ 
to their peoples’ interests.  These interests were to be determined through ‘scientific 
principles’.381   
 
Successful implementation of these resolutions relied upon those states’ ability to control 
tsetse fly populations.  This was particularly the case in areas designated as tourist 
attractions.  States could profit from foreign tourists’ fascination with encountering wild 
animals, but only if national parks were clear of tsetse.  With this realisation, vast areas 
of land—particularly in Uganda and Tanganyika—were subjected to insecticide spraying 
with DDT and benzene hexachloride (‘BHC’).  These highly-toxic carcinogens found 
their way into rivers and streams, where they contaminated freshwater supplies across 
extensive areas, harming plants, animals, and people alike.   
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3.2.  Taming Rivers, ‘Reaching for the Sky’ 
 
Clearing tsetse-infected areas also enabled African states to reap vast material resources.  
These resources could then be reinvested in large-scale, cinematic, prestige projects.  
For example, the attraction of constructing mega-dams loomed large for these infant 
nations. 382   They found inspiration in numerous high-profile examples, such as 
Roosevelt’s Tennessee Valley Authority Project.  Ambitions to emulate First World 
economies, while reconciling these with resource management objectives, led to the 
widespread construction of similar projects across the African continent.  Constructing 
these became a well-known conservation technique.  Moreover, Rob Nixon explains that 
these structures were also widely regarded as symbols of modernity, nationalist self-
assertion, and ‘unifying spectacles of imagined community’. 383   Just as other mega-
projects were frontlines in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the ardour with which dams were embraced by African—along with many other 
proto-Third World—governments exemplified bitter rivalries with their former 
colonisers.  In place of nature protection or even human life expectancy, for instance, 
mega-dams were visual testaments to economic progress.  By taming their rivers, and 
literally ‘reaching for the sky’, these nations believed themselves to have joined the ranks 
of modern economies.384   
 
For example, flagship hydropower projects—such as Egypt’s Aswan High Dam, India’s 
Hirakud Dam, and the Kariba Dam (between Zambia and Zimbabwe)—were supposed to 
usher their host nations into the modern era.  Nevertheless, these complex projects tended 
to cost far more, but produce far less energy, than initially expected.385  They were also 
designed and built by technical experts.  It was hoped, for example, that the Aswan High 
Dam Project would increase agricultural land along the Nile River.  The dam was also 
anticipated to generate vast amounts of electrical power for use by Egyptian industries.  
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It was thought that this would both obviate the need to combust finite resources for power 
generation purposes, as well as offer a new resource—that is to say, electricity—which 
the country could export in order to generate income.  Perhaps most importantly, however, 
its construction became a symbol of Egyptian independence.  The dam’s redemptive 
symbolism was captured in chanting of crowds: ‘Nasser, Nasser, we come to salute you; 
after the Dam our land will be paradise’.386  Nonetheless, the dam ultimately reorganised 
and solidified power in a small group of corporate, industrial, and political actors.387  In so 
doing, constructing large dams became a technique for marginalising dissent, and for 
consolidating dominant logics about conservation. 
 
These mega-dam projects also heightened inequalities within states.  Nixon calls this the 
creation of ‘unimagined’ communities.  Large dams vindicated the task of disciplining an 
irrational natural world—along with its peoples—in ways that seemed to be exorcised of 
politics.  Yet, the resulting ‘displacement, dispossession, and exodus’ of peoples was 
considered a ‘heroic offering on the pyre of national development’.388  ‘If you are to 
suffer’, Indian President Jawaharlal Nehru said in 1948 to villagers displaced by the 
Hirakud Dam, ‘you should suffer in the interest of the country’. 389   Moreover, the 
immense costs of these glamour projects—funded by the World Bank, United States, and 
Soviet Union—shackled infant nations with calamitous debts.  Their stifling 
conditionalities created structures of dependence, which persisted for decades.  
The Kariba Dam, for instance, seemed to offer large-scale solutions to conserving water 
and energy resources, which could be used to develop Zambia and Zimbabwe’s national 
economies.  Straddling the border between these two Rhodesias, designed by First World 
experts—French architects and built by Italian engineers—the dam’s construction began 
in 1956.  Its purpose was to generate enough electricity for the countries’ extractive 
industries, particularly the copper mines in what was then Northern Rhodesia.  As Nixon 
argues, the harms inflicted by these projects was ‘the legacy of a very modern external 
plunder by far-off forces’.390   
 
The World Bank issued its largest-ever loan to finance the project.  While architects 
                                                 
386 Nixon (2011), p. 33 
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California Press, 2002), pp. 20-52. 
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390 Mitchell (2002), p. 165. 
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intended to ensure the dam could withstand a one-in-ten-thousand-year flood, their 
calculations used only three decades of Zambezi flow data.391  This proved inadequate 
for reliable forecasting.  In 1957, a year after construction began, the dam site encountered 
a flood that exceeded the architects’ projections.  They hurriedly enlarged the dam’s 
spillway, before the dam encountered yet another flood in 1958.  This was twice as large 
as the previous one.  So, the designers enlarged the spillway again.  It led them to deviate 
from the original plans, by installing six sluice gates—rather than three—to deal with the 
higher water levels.392  In the years since its completion, water flowing through the dam’s 
now-six floodgates has carved a vast crater, 100 metres deep, at its base (and in front of 
the dam wall).  Over the subsequent 50 years, the crater has grown to within 30 metres of 
the dam’s foundations.  The entire dam is at risk of collapse if the crater undercuts those 
foundations.  For this reason, since the 1990s, the dam’s operators—as a precaution 
against enlarging the crater—have been allowed to open only three of the floodgates at 
once.393   
 
Yet, this was not the end of the Kariba Dam’s difficulties.  Successive droughts lowered 
the Zambezi Reservoir to 12 per cent of its usual water levels.  This significantly reduced 
the dam’s hydroelectric generation capacity.  It is now predicted that intensified flooding 
events and droughts could imperil Kariba even further, particularly if it is damaged by 
water flowing over the top of the dam and down its face.394  Kariba’s collapse would 
release a torrent of water four times larger than the Zambesi’s highest recorded flood.  
The resulting flood would destroy another dam, Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa Dam—
located 480 kilometres downstream—that delivers 40 per cent of Southern Africa’s entire 
electricity supply.  Along with devastating the valley’s wildlife, the Zambesi River 
Authority also predicts that such a flood could put the lives of 3.5 million people at risk.395   
 
Moreover, the Kariba Dam affected countless people, who were forced to resettle in tsetse 
fly-infested lands.  As with many other mega-dam projects, more attention was given to 
the technical feasibility and national economic gains of these projects than to the 
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wellbeing of displaced peoples.  Homes, families, livelihoods, and traditions were lost to 
the reservoir’s rising waters.  According to a World Commission on Dams report, around 
57 per cent of area swallowed by the Kariba Dam’s Zambezi Reservoir—the world’s 
largest—was formerly arable land, settled by 57,000 indigenous Tonga people, and free 
of tsetse.396  Those peoples were offered no compensation, little information, and given 
no other choice but to relocate.  They were reportedly ‘treated like animals or things 
rounded up and packed in lorries’, before being resettled in new locations.  
Resistant communities were quickly suppressed by British colonial authorities.  
Their villages were burned so that they could not return to them.397   
 
To add further injury, the 36,000 Tonga peoples forcibly resettled in 1957 were not 
permitted to hunt wild animals on their new lands.  Such activities were prohibited by 
Rhodesian conservation laws.  Effectively, these peoples were resettled away from rich 
alluvial lands, which could be farmed without requiring the use of artificial fertilisers.  
Their new destinations were places marred by low rainfall, sandy soils—requiring heavy 
use of industrial chemicals to sustain even minimal levels of agriculture—and high tsetse 
fly populations.398  To make matters even worse for these resettled peoples, the shores of 
the Zambesi Reservoir—still the largest ever built—transformed into a habitat for tsetse 
flies.  Its low-growing shrubs became tsetse fly breeding grounds.  Before the dam’s 
construction, tsetse had only existed in isolated enclaves along the water’s edge.  
Tonga peoples, who lived along the Zambezi River, maintained complex trading patterns 
with urban communities.  They invested money from sales of fish, tobacco, and even 
locally-brewed beer, in cattle, cotton, and maize. 399   As Lake Kariba’s waters rose, 
however, rapidly declining fish stocks drove more Tonga fisherman to turn to farming as 
a source of their livelihoods.  However, falling nutrient levels along Kariba’s banks—
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caused by the dam blocking silt from flowing downstream—caused further impediments 
to their ability to successfully farm the land.400   
 
With tsetse fly populations multiplying along the reservoir’s banks, Tonga livestock 
became infected with trypanosomiasis.  In one region, the disease killed more than half 
of the cattle population.401  This reduced the amount of protein available to the Tonga 
peoples.  It also forced an expansion of industrial—as opposed to subsistence—
agriculture.  Perhaps predictably, then, extensive use of artificial fertilisers reduced soil 
fertility.  They also depleted aquifers and contaminated ground water.  Furthermore, these 
inputs were bought at high cost by Tonga farmers, many of whom earned low wages.  
As I suggested in the previous section, this was largely a result of Euro-American 
countries’ international legal interventions to ensure continued access to cheap natural 
resources.  Widespread use of DDT and BHC in these regions, as attempts to control 
tsetse populations, also caused severe illnesses among Tonga peoples.402  Furthermore, 
Tonga farmers’ efforts to replace wild crop varieties with limited high-yield 
monocultures—particularly cotton and maize—lowered biological diversity along the 
Kariba River’s banks.  These factors likely lowered Tonga farmers’ resistance to other 
pests, diseases, and their propensity to withstand the effects of climate change.403   
 
In all, this complex arrangement relied on the operation of international law and 
institutions.  British and Portuguese colonial authorities signed a 1954 treaty in Lisbon to 
resettle affected peoples—including Tonga communities—to areas along the Portuguese 
side of the dam.404  Upon the dissolution of the federation between what was North and 
                                                 
400 Ibid. 
401 Robert R Curry, Ferren MacIntyre, George Macinko, John P Milton, and Raymond J Sherwin, 
‘Discussion’, in Maxine E McCloskey (ed), Wilderness: The Edge of Knowledge (New York: Sierra Club, 
1970), p. 257. 
402 See generally, David Pimentel, ‘Green revolution agriculture and chemical hazards’ (1996) 188 The 
Science of the Total Environment (Supplement 1) S86. See also, WCD (2000), p. x. 
403 Cary Fowler and Pat Mooney, Shattering: Food, Politics, and the Loss of Genetic Diversity (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 2nd ed, 1996), pp. 63-81; United Nations Environment Programme and 
GRID-Arendal, The Environmental Food Crisis: The Environment’s Role in Avering Future Food Crises 
(Oslo: Birkeland Trykkeri AS, 2009), pp. 65-76; Gordon Conway, The Doubly Green Revolution: Food 
for all in the 21st Century (London: Penguin, 1997), pp. 86-104. 
404 Agreement between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 
their own behalf and on behalf of the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the 
government of Portugal with regard to certain Angolan and Northern Rhodesian natives living on the 
Kwando River, opened for signature on 18 November 1954 (entered into force on 18 November 1954). 
See also, Davison Saruchera, Jonathan Lautze, Juliet Mwale, Claudious Chikozho, and Osborne N Shela, 
‘Transboundary water cooperation: Taking stock and looking forward’, in Jonathan Lautze, Zebediah 
Phiri, Vladimir Smaktin, and Davison Saruchera, The Zambezi River Basin: Water and Sustainable 
Development (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), p. 287. 
 110 
South Rhodesia in early 1963, the parties agreed upon a new legal-institutional 
framework.  It established a Central African Power Corporation (‘CAPCO’) under the 
joint ownership and control of the two governments.  This set out CAPCO’s funding, 
assigned its responsibilities, and delineated its powers.405  South Africa also signed a joint 
agreement with Portugal in 1967 to finance the Kariba Dam.406  A 1969 instrument was 
written to formalise the dam’s supply of electricity to South Africa.407   
 
Like the tsetse fly, these instruments transmitted now-familiar logics of dominance, 
mastery, and conservation that spread—like trypanosomiasis—throughout Third World 
states.  We can also observe, in this case of the Kariba Dam, how law fostered a parasitic 
relationship—or hierarchical ordering—between the Bank, FAO, UNESCO, IUCN, 
Zambian-Zimbabwean governments, foreign experts, and Tonga peoples.  The Bank’s 
recent decision to finance Kariba’s US$300 million repairs also challenges the logic of 
desiring mastery over nature.408  Rather, it illuminates the fact that once these new orders 
are created, they must continue to be managed indefinitely.  Put simply, when enshrined 
in law, the logic of conservation became self-sustaining.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has furthered my central thesis by exploring what international law has had 
to do with how nature is understood.  In particular, I have investigated the role of 
international law in transmitting a particular vision of nature after the Second World War.  
In the chapter, I positioned this vision against the emergence of a particular notion of the 
economy.  I argued that this vision of nature became a precondition for the formation of 
what we call the national economy, which was constructed as an apparently separate 
regulatory object and realm of international law.  This relied upon a sustained framing of 
nature as a resource that was abundant and limitless.  Yet, by the end of the war, these 
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perceptions toward nature had induced anxieties and misgivings, not only at the highest 
levels of Euro-American governments, but also by the originators of the national 
economy concept themselves.   
 
Following this, my story suggested that a key task of post-war international lawyers—
and the freshly-minted international institutions—was to conserve the supply of—and the 
sustained access of wealthy First World countries to—essential natural resources, 
including iron ore, phosphate, and oil.  All the while, these conservationist techniques—
some of which included vast efforts to eradicate the tsetse fly—both stabilised and 
delimited visions toward nature and the economy.  This movement culminated in the 1949 
UNSCCUR.  Its organisers saw the conference’s purpose as that of finding methods to 
expand resource supplies for wealthy countries.   
 
Some tried to confront these logics.  The organisers of a separate conference—the 
ITCPN—initially sought to undermine the destructive economic trends that threatened 
wild places and wild creatures.  Central to their claims was the fact that demand for 
resources were transforming entire ecosystems.  Following this logic, some of these 
preservationists saw the tsetse fly as a blessing, as it impeded the ability to transform 
wilderness into natural resources.  Some participants thought organic agriculture and crop 
rotation techniques could be used instead of industrial farming, which they feared could 
impoverish both farmers and the land on which they depended for survival.  
During conference discussions, however, the ITCPN’s participants became compelled to 
soften their preservationists views in favour of more conservationist ideas.  Put simply, 
they shifted from finding ways to reduce demand for resources, toward promoting 
activities that sought to increase supply of those resources.  As a consequence, their efforts 
were successful insofar as they garnered public support for nature protection activities.  
However, they ended up shoehorning this support toward conservationism.  Meanwhile, 
the ITCPN’s proponents ended up undermining the very logics of ‘preservation’ that they 
had originally sought to promote.   
 
My story has suggested that this led to the establishment of a number of African national 
wildlife parks and projects to construction of large dams projects, which became regarded 
as archetypal conservation techniques.  African leaders became persuaded that these 
projects could help to foster growth of their national economies insofar as they could 
transform wilderness areas themselves into resources that could generate income from 
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tourism, and also increase supplies of renewable energy.  Added to this, many African 
leaders believed that these projects could help instil a heightened sense of national 
identity amongst their peoples.  Conservationist logics were thus transmitted—like the 
tsetse fly’s trypanosomiasis—through these international projects.  Subsequently, 
I observed how these projects not only undermined dissenting preservationist stories 
about nature, but also had often-detrimental effects upon the peoples living adjacent to 
them.   
 
One such effect of large dams, in particular, was to foster the proliferation of tsetse fly 
populations in lands resettled by peoples displaced as a result of constructing those dams.  
Accordingly, in all of this, I revealed how the tsetse fly was both an effect, and symbol, 
of international law’s operation.  Building upon this idea—that nature was framed in a 
way that gave preferences to some peoples and organisms at the detriment of others—the 
following chapter moves to examine how these patterns continued on through the notion 
of the ‘human environment’ that was inaugurated by way of the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment.   
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CHAPTER FOUR   
 
ADAPTATIONS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
‘The mind, that ocean where each kind  
Does straight its own resemblance find;  
Yet it creates, transcending these,  
Far other worlds, and other seas;  
Annihilating all that’s made  
To a green thought in a green shade.  
 
— Andrew Marvell, Gardens (1681)409  
 
Introduction  
 
The anatomy of living organisms is often closely adapted to their immediate 
environments.  Every organism must make continued physiological adjustments to 
maintain harmony with the conditions they inhabit.  This enables them to survive, and 
thrive.  The dromedary camel (Camelus dromedarius) is a famous example.  
Several unique physiological features enable them to thrive in deserts and arid climates.  
Most prominently, each dromedary has a single hump.  This enables them to store fats, 
which the animal can synthesise into water and energy for sustenance.  They also have 
other features—a second set of eyelashes, nictitating eye membranes, closable nostrils, 
and wide feet—to help them thrive in sandy environments.410  This example is pertinent 
to my story insofar as it helps demonstrate that what we tend to think of as ‘the 
environment’ actually tends to preference particular interests.  More specifically, attempts 
to foster any specific concept of the environment will invariably promote the interests of 
some species—or groups—of living organisms over others.  In this chapter, I detail the 
transmutation of nature into a concept of the ‘(human) environment’.   
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Seemingly cognisant of biases inherent in the emergence of this concept, one Brazilian 
delegate speaking at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(‘the Stockholm Conference’) asked rhetorically: ‘for whom—or under what criteria—is 
the environment to be considered healthy, pleasant, desirable?’.  ‘If the subject should be 
an “anaconda”, the world should be a swampy forest’, he pointed out.  However, if the 
subject in question were a dromedary, the Brazilian delegate added, ‘then the destruction 
of forests and the creation of deserts’ may indeed be proceeding ‘at too slow a pace’.411  
With this in mind, the question that I seek to elaborate upon in this chapter is for whose 
benefit the global environmental regime was constructed?  Who were the environment’s 
winners and losers?   
 
Clearly, the Stockholm Conference is a seminal event in this story.  It was the moment 
during which the concept of what we call ‘the environment’ first became recognised in 
international law.  With it, states first pledged themselves to follow ‘a system for co-
ordinating responses’ to shared environmental problems. 412   While conventional 
historiographies tend to acknowledge this, they ignore international law’s legacy in 
shaping the disciplinary formation of the environment.  This is the issue to which I now 
turn in this chapter.  As I argued previously, in Chapter Three, the idea of nature gradually 
reformed—through international law—to take on different configurations in the post-war 
period: namely, that of ‘conservation’.  At that time, the concept of the environment had 
not yet found common usage.  In fact, the term ‘environment’ only became commonly 
used to denote ‘the natural world or physical surroundings’—especially as ‘affected by 
human activity’—in leading scientific journals, and in mainstream media, during the mid-
twentieth century.413   
 
This chapter offers an alternative perspective—or rereading—of how this understanding 
of the environment—as a specific object of regulation—came to be globally recognised 
within, and through, international law.  Specifically, my interest lies in the legal structure, 
form, content, and parameters shaped during the Stockholm Conference negotiations.  
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I suggest, in telling this story, that the discipline contributed to making the environment’s 
meaning align with the priorities of the international development movement: particularly 
its focus on financial, industrial, and techno-scientific referents.  This relates to my central 
argument by showing how the environment is conceptualised, how law sustains it, and 
how it may also construct—or sustain the operation of—international law in particular 
way.   
 
By way of structure, Section I investigates how the environment in international law 
became entwined, at its outset, with First-Third World confrontations.  As such, we can 
see how the environment’s seemingly stable form and content actually became grounded 
with reference to a stable idea of international development as its central organising 
principle.  Section II then explores how this created anxieties for a number of actors 
involved in the negotiations.  Subsequently, these actors sought to oppose attempts to 
organise the nascent global environmental regime around development priorities.  
I highlight their efforts to realign the environment to a set of competing priorities.  
The section then investigates the means by which opposing parties and delegates 
absorbed attempts to reopen, reorient, and reconfigure the environment’s boundaries.  
Finally, Section III interrogates how—during the late-1970s and early-1980s—key 
specific parameters of the environmental regime became reified through a set of 
geopolitical events and circumstances.  This story, I suggest, accounts for the emergence 
of a body of prominent international (environmental) principles, constructed by soft law.   
 
I.    Developing Grounds 
 
As I observed in previous chapters, by the mid-1960s, an incipient body of international 
legal principles and institutions—directed at pollutants from specific locales, and on 
singular issues such protecting wetlands—had formed.  Spurred by prominent authors—
such as Rachel Carson and Garrett Hardin—their work provoked an educational process 
through which awareness of the effects of pesticide usage and resource scarcity entered 
the common vernacular.414  These legal measures were, however, often inchoate and 
disjointed.  Participants at the UNESCO Biosphere Conference—held in Paris in 1968—
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agreed, for example, that ‘changes have been taking place for a long time’.  Nevertheless, 
the conference’s final report observed that ‘nations of the world have lacked considered, 
comprehensive policies for managing the environment’.415  The Swedish Government 
offered a response.  It sent a memorandum to United Nations Secretary-General U Thant, 
in May 1968, proposing a global environmental conference.416  Swedish representatives 
also sponsored a General Assembly resolution, which raised concerns about an 
‘accelerating impairment’ in the ‘quality of the human environment’.  This impairment 
was correlated, the resolution suggested, with the rise of ‘modern scientific and 
technological developments’.417  Following this, member states decided to convene a 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.  This conference, to be held in 
1972, would aim to provide an international framework for:  
 
‘intensified action [...] to limit and, where possible, eliminate the impairment of the 
human environment and in order to protect and improve the natural surroundings in the 
interest of man’.418   
 
Yet, as others have argued, the governments of many newly-decolonised countries held 
misgivings about this proposed conference.419  Swayed by views that nature was a source 
of economic development and nationalistic identity—as we saw in the previous chapter—
these infant countries initially resisted any notion that measures to protect the ‘human 
environment’ should be internationally regulated.  In the first following subsection, I 
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examine a set of parameters—or argumentative structures—by which some governments 
sought to mount opposing arguments.  I focus upon how—even at the very outset of the 
negotiations—techno-scientific and industrial desires occupied the forefront of these 
representatives’ minds.  Together, these arguments helped to demarcate the scope and 
meaning of a separate environmental field in international law.  In the second subsection, 
I then turn to consider how conference organisers resolved this impasse.  They made the 
promotion of international development a centrepiece of the Stockholm Conference, a 
decision that had enduring effects.  Put simply, I explore how the environment was 
configured in terms of the idea of international development.   
 
1.1.  Foreclosing an Environmental Space 
 
Even from the outset, some governments regarded environmental problems as exclusively 
First World concerns, ‘the effects of a high per-capita GNP’.420  The discussions took 
place at a time during which former colonies were seeking to assert greater sovereignty 
over their natural resources.  Well before the conference’s opening session, many proto-
Third World representatives had already expressed fears that proposed environmental 
safeguards could impede their development aspirations.  As I foreshadowed in the 
Chapter Three, the substance of these specific aspirations is the subject of some 
momentous critical legal literature.  Of these, Sundhya Pahuja offers one of the most 
sophisticated accounts.  She claims that it was proto-Third World representatives 
themselves who emphasised that international development was a necessary remedy for 
their ‘economically backward countries’.421  This was a strategy, Pahuja reveals, to ensure 
that those countries’ wider national interests would be considered at the global level.422   
 
In her 2011 book, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and 
the Politics of Universality, Pahuja contends that the international legal separation 
between the discipline’s ‘economic’ and ‘political’ spheres—the lineaments of which I 
described in the previous chapter—had a significant effect.  This bifurcation enabled 
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members of the proto-Third World to identify themselves as (economically) 
‘backward’—a condition attributable to imperialism—without contradicting their 
(political) claims to independent statehood.  These governments sought financial 
assistance from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  Simultaneously, their 
representatives continued to assert claims for self-determination and sovereign equality 
in the political realm, governed by the United Nations.  For these representatives, Pahuja 
observes, the effect of adopting this ‘epistemology of the coloniser’ was to gain greater 
recognition for their views and interests within the First World-led Bank and Fund.423   
 
Yet, this strategy consigned proto-Third World countries to accepting international 
development models predicated upon the need for greater capital, industrialism, 
productivity, institutions, and economic growth.424  This contributed to a view of reality 
in which Third World ‘modernisation’ required principally ‘increased savings, growth 
rates, foreign capital, developing industrial capacity’.425  This nationalist strategy gained 
acceptance by First World states, as it maintained the putative objectivity of international 
law and their normative superiority in the hierarchy of nation-states.  It achieved this 
without resorting to pre-existing ideas of racial or civilisational superiority renounced 
following the Nazi Holocaust.  It also created an ‘indisputable hierarchy’, atop of which 
stood the United States and its allies, which apparently represented the ‘ultimate form of 
collective organisation’ and ‘social evolution’.426  Such a narrow outlook excluded the 
possibility that Third World development could be alternatively conceived, not only in 
economic or material terms, but also as a more holistic project that included broader 
individual, collective, and cultural endeavours.   
 
In light of this, during the Stockholm Conference’s first preparatory session, a high-
ranking Nigerian delegate called the environmental discussions merely ‘another obstacle 
in the already handicapped race for material progress’.427  In his view, like those of many 
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other Third World representatives, environmentalism would impede Third World 
development.  For example, Jamaican Ambassador Keith Johnson voiced his colleagues’ 
‘lingering fear[s] that Stockholm was merely another ploy by the developed countries to 
avoid supporting the development revolution’.428  The Eco Newspaper called it a ‘plot by 
the rich to hang onto wealth’, while at the same time ‘depriving the poor [of resources] 
in the name of ecological purity’.429  Organization for African Unity representatives went 
further, calling environmentalism an attempt to halt ‘the advance of the colored peril’.430  
They maintained—with almost rehearsed unanimity—that priority be given to increasing 
life expectancies, basic necessities—including food, shelter, clean drinking water, and 
sanitation—as well as generating employment for its ‘dark, poor and hungry masses’.431   
 
South American representatives promulgated similar demands.  They repeatedly 
cautioned against channelling resources from industrialisation to environmental 
protection.  Brazilian Ambassador José Augusto de Araújo Castro pointed out, for 
example, that Third World budgets could not always afford to purchase the ‘most 
advanced technology’ available from more industrialised countries for the purpose of 
reducing environmental harms.  Labour-intensive and ‘less advanced production’ 
techniques could instead, Castro argued, be an indispensable part of fostering domestic 
solutions to environmental problems. 432   Castro’s attitude exemplified a set of 
approaches—pioneered by South American scholars—that were known as ‘dependency’ 
theories.433  These were widely popular at the time of the Stockholm Conference, having 
already been implemented—with varying success—in some East Asian and South 
American countries.  Fundamentally, they were devised in response to ‘modernisation’ 
theories, which regarded First World laws, capital, institutions, and societal values as 
essential preconditions to development.  Rejecting these approaches, dependency theories 
located the causes of Third World impoverishment in First World countries’ exploitation 
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of Third World labour and resources.  The theories’ proponents argued that this 
exploitation created both internal and external structural imbalances.  Put alternatively, 
these imbalances originated from outflows of natural resources—from agrarian 
economies at the ‘periphery’ of the global order—toward an industrialised ‘core’ of First 
World countries, upon which Third World countries were financially and technologically 
reliant.434   
 
The resulting dependency impeded the ability of affected Third World countries to 
achieve self-sustained economic growth.  It also generated acute class relations. 435  
Matias Vernengo identifies its essential problem as an ‘inability of the periphery to 
develop an autonomous and dynamic process of technological innovation’.  Even foreign 
capital could not resolve it, because it led only onto a limited transmission of technology, 
rather than ‘the process of innovation itself’. 436  As a remedy, dependency theorists 
sought to diversify Third World economies away from excessive reliance upon exports 
of natural resources and agricultural products.  In their place, dependency theorists 
suggested that governments implement policies to incentivise innovation of technological 
and industrial products.  Such policies included what became known as ‘import-
substitution-industrialisation’ (‘ISI’) policies, which attempted to stimulate domestic 
innovation.  With this, dependency theory proponents attempted to make wholesale 
changes to affected countries’ structures of production, and to the distribution of global 
power.  By the mid-1970s, an ‘export-oriented’ variant of ISI—based on designing and 
exporting manufactured goods—was having a recognisable effect in boosting the GNP 
of some East Asian economies (those famously known later as the ‘East-Asian 
Tigers’).437   
 
Aligned with this reasoning, some participants felt that attempts to replicate ISI policies 
could be severely inhibited by efforts to legislate environmental protection measures.  
They recognised, for instance, that Third World infant industries simply could not 
develop new technologies, and innovative products, without also generating dangerous 
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pollutants.  In short, juridifying the so-called ‘human environment’ as an object of 
international legal regulation was seen by these representatives as a covert strategy for 
preserving global structures of power, plunder, and privilege.  These governments 
accused industrialised countries of trying to re-establish ‘old patterns of colonialism’ over 
their former subjects, all under the guise of promoting pollution controls.  Wealthy 
governments were ‘using environmental doomsday predictions as a racist device to keep 
the non-white third world at a relatively low level of development’, some representatives 
accused, and as ‘a neat excuse for the industrialized nations to pull the ladder up behind 
them’. 438   Abdelkader Dehbi—representing Algeria—said, for example, that his 
government did not wish to ‘sacrifice development on the altar of environment’.  
He contended that Third World nations’ environmental problems emanated from 
‘centuries of colonial rule that allowed depredation of natural resources’, rather than from 
their development activities.439  One Brazilian delegate also denounced what he called 
this ‘malicious trend’ of fostering a ‘pseudo-scientific outlook’ in order to ‘justify non-
development’ of the Third World.440   
 
Acting upon this rationale of opposing ‘non-development’, the Brazilian government led 
a Third World movement to ‘boycott the Conference’.441  Brazilian Ambassador Miguel 
Ozório de Almeida protested—in a speech to the General Assembly—against the First 
World’s excessively moral, or ‘Calvinistic attitude’, which he described as positing those 
countries’ rights to ‘salvation and perpetuation’ at the expense of ‘the more numerous 
underdeveloped peoples’.  Ozório argued that Third World peoples were now being asked 
to now ‘stop breeding and encroaching’ upon the First World’s ‘delicious enjoyment of 
nature and natural resources’. 442   This escalated to such a degree that—by the first 
Preparatory Committee meetings—the Brazilian government had already united many 
countries in efforts to undermine the conference preparations.  Like other governments—
in South Africa, Spain, Iran, and South Korea—the Brazilian government’s political 
legitimacy, and support from influential stakeholders, relied upon maintaining robust 
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economic results: ones that were measured almost solely in terms of GNP.  In all, 
these governments argued collectively that environmental restrictions ‘should not be 
allowed to curb economic growth’. 443   Given this—a senior United Nations official 
admitted—the need to ‘harmonize’ growth with the ‘preservation of a civilized human 
environment’ presented a ‘major challenge’ for the upcoming Stockholm Conference.444   
 
These factors prompted changes in proponents’ expectations.  In a private discussion with 
the United Kingdom government, for example, United States representatives ‘thought the 
main problem was to avoid total disaster’.  This was because few developing countries 
were inclined to put ‘the environment very high in their “shopping lists”’.  Participants 
agreed that ‘a lot of careful thought would have to be given to the phrasing of agenda 
items, in order to “sell” the work of the conference’ to Third World countries.  Yet, they 
concurred, it had to be done ‘without appearing to force’ those items ‘down the throats of 
unwilling recipients’.  The key to achieving Third World engagement, the officials 
concluded, ‘was basically a matter of presentation’.445  Subsequently, this was the ethos 
around which the conference’s Canadian Secretary-General, Maurice Strong, sought to 
frame the conference proceedings.  Responding to these criticisms, his actions helped 
shape the environmental realm’s meaning, and conceptual boundaries, in an enduring way.   
 
1.2.  Finding a ‘Libretto’ 
 
Prior to his work with the United Nations, Strong had formerly held positions as an oil 
company and financial management executive.  He had also previously directed Canada’s 
international development agency.  In this latter role, he became closely familiar with 
development issues, and well-acquainted with its key diplomatic players.446  Strong was 
appointed by member states in December 1970, but only after many governments 
acknowledged the conference preparations were on the verge of utter disarray.  In the 
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lament of Uruguayan economist Enrique Iglesias at the time, the conference ‘did not have 
a libretto’.447   
 
Early on in his tenure as the Stockholm Conference’s Secretary-General, Strong 
identified that a major cause of disagreements between member states was due to there 
being no agreed definition of the ‘human environment’.  So, he set out to formulate his 
own definition for what he called this ‘very subjective and ill-defined concept’. 448  
Strong declared that the human environment referred to ‘man’s activities which, by 
affecting the natural ecological systems of which he is part, affect his own life and 
wellbeing’.449  As such, damage to it threatened ‘human life’.  This posed an urgent need, 
Strong claimed, to institute ‘a degree of management’ upon the environment that was 
‘unprecedented in the human experience’.450  Aligned with this task, he also made efforts 
to narrow the conference’s objectives and maximise its relevance for Third World 
countries.  Aware that the conference would fail if Third World countries refused to take 
part, he sought to accommodate their concerns.  As a response, Strong prepared a revised 
agenda installing international development as the conference’s central theme.  
With these actions, he redefined the concept of the environment, linking it ‘directly to the 
economic development process’ of Third World countries.451   
 
Yet, some governments reacted with scepticism.  Brazilian Ambassador Castro wrote that, 
despite Strong’s ‘repeated professions of faith in “development”’—and his apparent 
‘willingness to “play” politically on two fronts’—Strong remained ‘clearly inclined’ 
toward policies ‘aimed above all at the preferences of the industrialized World’. 452  
The effect of Strong’s actions in the day-to-day planning of the conference, Castro 
claimed, was to stabilise the ‘economic gap between developed and developing countries’.  
Castro feared, as a result, that the conference outcome would be a mere ‘enshrinement of 
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the status quo’.453  Notwithstanding these misgivings, Strong quickly convinced many 
African representatives to accept his revised conference agenda.  He remained concerned, 
however, about its wider acceptability, particularly with South American governments.   
 
Seeking to mediate objections and promote his agenda, Strong convened—with British 
development economist Barbara Ward—a February 1971 meeting of development 
economists and practitioners to canvass reactions.  Prominent among them was an 
outspoken critic, Pakistani heterodox economist Mahbub ul Haq, who was at the time 
Director of Policy Planning at the World Bank.  ‘It is time’, ul Haq emphasised, that ‘we 
stand economic theory on its head and see if we get any better results’.454  He expressed 
deep scepticism toward new-found environmental concerns, offering a set of ‘devastating 
and simple’ arguments as to why Third World countries should refrain from participating 
on First World countries’ terms.  He contended—with support from Gamani Correa (of 
Sri Lanka) and Enrique Iglesias (of Uruguay)—that: 
 
‘industrialization had given developed countries disproportionate benefits and huge 
reservoirs of wealth and at the same time had caused the very environmental problems 
we were now asking developing countries to join in resolving. The cost of cleaning up 
the mess, therefore, should be borne by the countries that had caused it in the first place. 
If they wanted developing countries to go along, they’d have to provide the financial 
resources to enable them to do so.’455 
 
Strong responded with a challenge of his own.  He publicly confronted ul Haq to take part 
in a ‘rigorous, objective process of evaluating’ the possibility of redefining environmental 
challenges to serve as ‘a new basis for South-North cooperation’.456  Together, they 
formed a 27-member panel of development economists and scientists that met at Founex 
in June 1971.  They selected participants from a group of prominent international 
development practitioners.  Many of these participants would come to play further leading 
roles in crafting development policies and managing international institutions.  Yet, the 
choice of participants led some commentators to criticise the panel as being ‘long on 
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economists but short on the ecological side’. 457   Indeed, all had backgrounds either 
practicing, or having been formally educated, in economics.  Regardless of these 
criticisms, Strong saw the panel as the informal body responsible for formulating the 
Stockholm Conference’s ‘policy and intellectual underpinnings’.  Their work also 
engendered a ‘rising tide of interest and attention’ in the conference process across the 
world.  Consequently, Strong later called convening the panel ‘the most important single 
event’ leading up to the Stockholm Conference.458   
 
The Founex Report on Development and Environment (‘Founex Report’)459 recorded the 
panel’s deliberations.  It redefined the environment to appear coterminous with 
development.  The report’s central theme was that environmental problems ultimately 
differed, depending upon each country’s relative levels of development.  Referring to 
First World countries’ environmental problems as ‘very largely the outcome of a high 
level of economic development’, the report recognised that Third World environmental 
problems were ‘essentially of a different kind’.460  Specifically, these problems were seen 
as emanating from ‘the poverty and the very lack of development of their societies’.  
The report predicted that Third World countries would wish to avoid the ‘mistakes and 
distortions’ that had characterised the ‘patterns of development’ in industrialised 
societies.461  With this, the Founex Report stressed the need for differentiation between 
countries’ responsibilities with regard to the environment.  Yet, the report observed, other 
problems of the human environment—such as ‘poor water, housing, sanitation and 
nutrition’—could also potentially affect ‘the greater mass of mankind’.462  The report 
warned that these particular problems were factors that had potential to influence world 
trade patterns.  They could affect the distribution of industries, or the comparative costs 
of production in different countries.  As a consequence, the report indicated that these 
environmental problems could have significant effects on economic relations.463   
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Importantly, the report also stated that environmental concerns ‘must not and need not 
detract’ from the ‘overriding task of development’.  Those concerns, it added, could be 
‘overcome by the process of development itself’.  With these statements, the idea began 
to take root that international development could actually ‘cure’ major environmental 
problems.464  With this, Strong and ul Huq’s panel sought to absorb dissenting arguments 
that the environment was problematic for Third World development.  The report stated, 
however, that development needed to be expanded beyond the ‘objective of economic 
growth’, as measured by the rise in GNP.  Panellists recognised that, high growth rates 
had often been accompanied in many countries by ‘increasing unemployment, rising 
disparities in income’, as well as the deterioration of social and cultural conditions’.465  
So, the report called for the need to integrate more environmental objectives into 
development planning, declaring that these would have ‘beneficial impacts’ on the 
economic relations of Third World countries.466   
 
Following this, the report recommended that higher environmental standards be designed 
so as not to reduce aid flows, resource transfers, or trade with Third World countries.467  
It argued that pledging additional aid funding, or compensating for trade losses, were 
‘necessary steps’—to ensure that environmental measures would ‘not lead to major 
disruptions in international trade’.  The report added that these measures could also help 
restructure Third World investments, production, and export patterns to become more 
environmentally-friendly.  Interestingly, the report also underscored that inflows of 
foreign capital and ‘geographical relocation of productive enterprises’—away from First 
World countries—could result from higher environmental standards.468  As we can see, 
this demonstrates that the Founex Report framed environmental concerns almost 
exclusively with reference to economic imperatives.  Its authors—who were principally 
Strong and ul Haq—identified the environment as ‘a critical dimension of successful 
development’.469   
 
Upon its publication, the report had an effect in catalysing greater engagement in the 
Stockholm Conference process from previously-sceptical governments.  Its findings, 
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André Aranha Corrêa do Lago contends, ‘changed the direction’ of the negotiations.  
It led to a recognition of environmental problems’ relevance for these governments.470  
The report also led to a ‘general recognition’ of the need for all countries to ‘take part’ at 
Stockholm, irrespective of their ‘stage of development’. 471   In Johnson’s words, the 
Founex Report helped to offer some resolution—during ‘a time of uncertainty’ and 
‘understandable fears’—about what the term ‘environment’ meant for Third World 
economies.  He recalled that the report allowed a decision to be made to merge the 
‘development and environment’ items in the Conference agenda.472   
 
During meeting held in the subsequent months, many previously-reticent governments 
converged around the Founex Report’s conclusions.  They started to frame their 
arguments in terms of the report’s outcomes.  For instance, arguing for the need to 
recognise differentiated responsibilities between countries, Ozório stated that ‘the main 
environmental responsibility belongs to developed countries’.  By contrast, Ozório said 
that the Third World’s main environmental responsibility was ‘accelerated economic 
development itself’.  Importantly, he claimed that—over the long term—‘the very goals 
of development become environmental in nature’. 473   The G-77 Ministerial Group 
endorsed this logic in its November 1971 declaration that no environmental policy 
‘should adversely affect the flow, terms and criteria of financial assistance’ to Third 
World countries.  The G-77 Ministers also agreed that any such policies should ‘give rise 
to new types of unfavourable conditions in their international trade’—including 
additional non-tariff barriers to foreign markers—or obstruct Third World countries’ 
‘sustained economic development’.474   
 
A Brazilian-inspired General Assembly resolution, agreed the following month, observed 
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that Third World countries’ environmental problems ‘were caused by their lack of 
economic resources’.475  The resolution called for the upcoming Stockholm Conference 
to recognise that ‘no environmental policy should adversely affect the present or future 
development possibilities of the developing countries’.476  Put simply, it affirmed that the 
‘burden of the environmental policies’ rested with First World countries.  
These responsibilities could not, the resolution argued, be ‘transferred’ to Third World 
countries.477  This resolution was widely touted as a major achievement.  Many observers 
perceived it as a universal affirmation about the merits of global environmental 
cooperation.478  However, almost all First World governments disagreed with its content.  
Despite this, most of these governments abstained from voting.  With the notable 
exception of the United States and United Kingdom, First World governments chose not 
to vote against the resolution.  This was to ensure that Third World governments would 
continue participating in the Stockholm Conference process.   
 
Unlike many of its First World allies, both the United Kingdom and United States voted 
against—rather than abstaining from—the resolution.  They were highly concerned about 
what they saw as the resolution’s excessively ‘sweeping’ linkages between the 
environment and development.  Underlying their positions were fears that such linkages 
could potentially ‘polarise’ the Stockholm Conference negotiations into ‘“developed” and 
“developing” country camps’. 479   Both governments also rejected any notion that 
responsibility for pollution resided with First World countries.  The United Kingdom, for 
instance, believed that the conference’s focus on development was ‘too broad’. 480  
Its government also agreed with the concerns of United States representatives that the 
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Stockholm Conference might turn into ‘yet another platform for poor country demands 
for further economic aid’.481  Consequently, representatives from both governments were 
anxious to limit the scope of conference discussions to measures only dealing with 
harmful pollutants.  They sought to limit the possibility that Third World countries could 
use the conference to open the floodgates for additional financial assistance.482   
 
As a strategy to balance these sentiments, Strong commissioned Barbara Ward and Rene 
Dubos to write a second report in preparation for the Stockholm Conference.  The 
report—published under the title Only One Earth—became widely regarded by 
commentators as the First World countries’ response to the Founex Report.  It warned of 
threats—from population growth on resource availability—posed by the planet’s 
‘modernizing South’.  These, the book highlighted, would ‘alter dangerously and perhaps 
irreversibly’, the planet ‘natural systems’ upon which ‘his biological survival depends’.483  
With this observation, Ward and Dubos reiterated claims raised by the Club of Rome’s 
infamous simulation—published in 1972 as the Limits to Growth report—that predicted 
a ‘sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity’ caused 
by the systematic depletion of the world’s resources at a rate faster than those resources 
could be restored.484   
 
Ward and Dubos sought input on their manuscript from 152 ‘scientific and intellectual 
leaders’.  These included among its ranks dominant figures such as the industrialist Club 
of Rome’s founder Aurélio Peccei, British zoologist and civil servant Solly Zuckerman, 
oil company presidents, chairmen of international chambers of commerce, and other self-
proclaimed ‘citizens of the world’.485  Under the influence of these figures, the book held 
the ‘Green Revolution’ as an example of successful development.486  Largely sponsored 
by the Bank and Ford Foundation, the Green Revolution had sought to reduce world 
hunger by expanding global crop yields through a range of industrial agriculture 
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techniques.   
 
Despite this, many programmes implemented under the Green Revolution caused 
significant, ongoing social harms and transformed vast ecosystems.  They used extensive 
amounts of synthetic fertilisers and chemical pesticides, which reduced soil fertility, 
depleted aquifers, contaminated surface and ground water, and increased chemical-
related illnesses in local human populations.487  These programmes also replaced diverse 
wild crops with limited varieties of high-yield monocultures, which reduced ecosystem 
biodiversity.488  Studies now suggest that this reduction in the genetic diversity of the 
world’s food supply has lowered the resistance of crops to pests, diseases, and 
catastrophic climate change. 489   Green Revolution projects are now also widely 
acknowledged to have promoted ongoing dependency by commodity-exporting countries 
on industrialised countries and technologies.490  Meanwhile, their financial benefits also 
flowed mostly to multinational corporations—such as Monsanto—that had patented, and 
produced, these new crop varieties as well as the technologies needed to grow them.  In all, 
Ward and Dubos suggested that the emerging environmental regime be confined by the 
strictures of the existing global economic system.491  In this way, their recommendations 
merged with other calls for international law’s understanding of the environment to be 
made consistent with—or sustain—existing formations of global ordering.  First World 
governments welcomed these recommendations.   
 
Ever the strategist, Strong also convinced a number of Third World governments—
Afghanistan, Kenya, Swaziland, Turkey, the Philippines, and Burma—to accept help—
from predominantly Canadian consultants—to prepare for the conference.  
These consultants were paid through First World-funded aid programmes.  Whether at 
Strong’s direction or not, they issued national reports emphasising connections between 
the environment and development.  More specifically, these reports enumerated—in ways 
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aligned with the Founex Report—economic impacts derived from soil erosion, 
overgrazing, and urban pollution.  The national reports framed these economic issues as 
‘environmental’ concerns.  The Philippine report, in particular, compared the country’s 
environment to ‘leprosy in an advanced stage’, and noted that such a deterioration could 
‘no longer be ignored’.492   
 
Having now received such widespread support—from both First and Third World 
governments alike—Strong felt confident enough to declare that there was now ‘broad 
consensus on the importance of the problem’.  ‘Today, the dialogue is truly global in its 
scope’, he pronounced at the Stockholm Conference’s final preparatory meeting. 493  
His statement signified—for the first time—that all countries had come to recognise—at 
least in principle—that the human environment was a separate sphere—or object—of 
international law.  Put simply, the environment became imagined as a legal-institutional 
realm.  Yet, it was one that was shaped by—and positioned against—a stable set of 
developmental concerns, which acted as its referents.  Development—understood 
predominantly in terms of GNP—served as a so-called ‘new angle of vision’,494 which 
diverted the conference’s focus.  It was installed as the environmental regime’s central 
ordering principle around which the environment’s foundational tenets formed.   
 
II.   Crafting Law’s Environment  
 
In this section, I turn to the question of how international law imagined the environment’s 
internal parameters.  These were topics of discussion during the Stockholm Conference 
itself, which is the subject of this section.  I investigate, in the first following subsection, 
how the efforts of some governments to raise so-called ‘political matters’—as falling 
within the scope of environmental discussions—were consciously relocated to other 
international fora, or neutralised by promises of additional First World development 
finance assistance and transfers of technology.  Following this, I delve—in the second 
subsection—into the work of some international organisations and civil society groups in 
helping to cultivate a vision of the global environment as dependent upon the proliferation 
of techno-scientific, industrialised, trade-friendly, and market-oriented logics.  Finally, in 
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the third subsection, I explore how coordinated practices by some governments and 
organisations—to deflect attention onto anti-whaling issues—helped pacify what had 
previously been the Chinese government’s anti-imperialist stance.  These actions enabled 
the representatives to reach consensus upon the internal parameters of the environmental 
regime.   
 
2.1.  Neutralising External Voices 
 
By the Stockholm Conference’s opening session, on 5 June 1972, its 27-member 
preparatory committee had already agreed upon a draft declaration, as well as a lengthy 
set of technical recommendations.  Non-represented countries expressed dismay, 
however, as the documents had been agreed without canvassing their views.  Given this, 
some delegates tried to reopen debates on key subject matters from the podium at 
Stockholm.  For example, a number of Third World governments iterated their distrust 
for the conference process, as well as its objectives.  Some of them expressed concerns—
also raised during the preparatory committee meetings—that the conference was 
attempting to ‘ratify, and even enhance, unequal economic relations and technical 
dependence’.495  The governments feared this could mire them ‘in poverty forever’.496  
Other representatives raised more incendiary concerns.  Among those were issues relating 
to the exploitative legacies of imperialism, nuclear weapons proliferation, and what some 
referred to as ‘ecocide’.497  Clearly, the representatives raised an extensive breadth of 
issues.  When ‘pressed to its source’, said famed biologist Barry Commoner, 
environmental issues had an ‘uncanny way’ of bringing into focus the unresolved 
malaises of a world ‘still tragically dominated by poverty, racial conflict, and war’.498   
 
With these critiques, the representatives exposed anomalies in Strong’s carefully-
cultivated environmental vision.  In the Ivory Coast’s opening statement, for instance, its 
representative announced his wish that his country actually had more pollution problems, 
‘in so far as they [were] evidence of industrialization’.  Not only were most alleged 
linkages between pollution and industrial growth ‘false and pernicious’, he claimed, 
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however, but only growth was capable of overcoming resource scarcity.499  Speaking with 
disdain for diplomatic practices—refined over centuries by their European former 
colonisers—other representatives, particularly those from the African continent, invoked 
the spectres of imperialism and racial differentiation.  The presence of ‘the racist 
government of South Africa and other agents of colonial oppression like the Portuguese’, 
Adebayo Adedeji of Nigeria averred, ‘deceives no one’.  Adedeji spoke of the hypocrisy 
of treating ‘the environment with concern and consideration’, whilst treating the majority 
of humanity with ‘less than human consideration’.  The ‘acts’ and ‘pronouncements’ of 
such countries, he emphasised, ‘show that human beings themselves mean nothing’.500   
 
Similarly, the Libyan Head of Delegation’s opening statement argued that the 
conference’s focus should not detract from ‘persecution, unjustice [sic] and oppression’ 
of human life.  He cited a suite of examples to emphasise the point.  These examples 
included: the plight of Palestinian refugees ‘expelled from [their] historical land and its 
heritage’, the ‘domination of minorities’ in ‘areas of Africa’, ‘racial segregation [and] 
discrimination’ in the United States, ‘biological warfare’ in Indochina, as well as ‘mass 
destruction, spoiling lands and crops’ in the Philippines.  The Libyan representative 
argued that these situations underscored the necessity of addressing broader ‘historical 
and human responsibilities’ in environmental discussions.501  Wilbert Kumalija Chagula 
of Tanzania offered more examples.  He contended that the ‘evils of apartheid, racial and 
colonial oppression’ in Africa had ‘mercilessly’ eroded the resource base.  Yet, these had 
brought economic benefits to ‘only a minority’ of peoples. 502   Together, these 
interventions emphasised how conference discussions had become dominated by a 
narrow range of economic and technical issues.  At its expense, were other—more highly 
politicised—concerns that might otherwise have fallen within the conference’s purview.   
 
Also speaking at the conference’s opening plenary was Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi who—at Strong’s insistence—was one of only two attending Heads of State (the 
other being the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme). 503  Her speech opened with a 
reflection that ‘progress’ had now ‘become synonymous with an assault on nature’.  
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While ‘part of nature and dependent on her for every need’, she said, ‘[we] speak 
constantly about “exploiting” nature’.504  Yet, she also used her platform to bolster the 
Founex Report’s logics.  Gandhi also sought to temper the more radical views of those 
Third World countries for which she claimed to speak.  She insisted that conference 
participants could not ‘forget the grim poverty’ of majority of the world’s peoples.505  
The environment, Gandhi argued, could not be improved ‘in conditions of poverty’.  
In one of her most famous—frequently quoted—statements, she asked ‘[a]re not poverty 
and need the greatest polluters?’.  Peoples who ‘live in or around the jungles’ cannot, 
Gandhi clarified, be prevented from ‘poaching and from despoiling the vegetation’.  
Her argument identified poor peoples through their reliance on subsistence agriculture.  
She also implied that these techniques were major causes of environmental degradation.   
 
Before seeking to regulate such actions, however, Gandhi claimed that the international 
community had a duty to ‘provide employment and purchasing power for [the] daily 
necessities [of the world’s poor]’.506  Highlighting historical inequalities, she contended 
that industrialised countries had achieved ‘their present levels of affluence’ only through 
the ‘domination over other races and countries, the exploitation of their own masses and 
own natural resources’.507  This ‘sheer ruthlessness’ had enabled industrialised countries 
to gain an economic ‘head start’, Gandhi insisted.  Despite this argument, she was 
unwilling to abandon the logic of development.  Rather, Gandhi thought it necessary to 
join other colleagues in aligning the environment’s meaning and boundaries with 
development logic.  She saw development as ‘man’s cardinal interest’, which was that of 
material ‘acquisition’.508  As such, Gandhi proposed that alleviating the plight of poor 
peoples—whose lives were seemingly ‘contaminated at the source’509—was achievable 
through a wider diffusion of finance and technology.  Put simply, at the forefront of her 
mind was a development model based on export-led industrial growth.  With efforts to 
enjoin this with environmental measures, Gandhi thought, the world’s ‘disinherited 
majority’ might be convinced that environmentalism could ‘bring an improvement in 
their lives’.510   
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Unexpectedly, Swedish Prime Minister Palme’s opening address also raised controversial 
themes.  It broached linkages between environmental harm and warfare.  These issues 
had not been previously canvassed by the preparatory committee.  Speaking against the 
background of vast destruction caused during the Vietnam War, which was still ongoing 
at the time, Palme labelled the United States’ ‘indiscriminate bombing’ and ‘large-scale 
use of bulldozers’—strategies aimed at driving peoples from the land into urban areas—
as actions amounting to ‘ecocide’.  ‘We fear’, he added, that ‘active use of these methods 
is coupled by a passive resistance to discuss them’.  In dramatically undiplomatic terms, 
he called this ‘an outrage’.511  Naturally, Palme’s actions incensed the United States and 
its military allies.  Head of the United States’ delegation, Russell Train, rebuked Palme’s 
comments as a ‘gratuitous politicising’ of environmental discussions.  They were 
‘inappropriate’, he claimed, ‘for a host government’ to make.  Then, shifting focus onto 
more seemingly neutral issues, he added: 
 
‘I wish to see us work together in a spirit of positive cooperation for development and for 
global environmental protection. The injection of a highly charged issue by the Prime 
Minister can only do a disservice to this objective.’512   
  
Train’s attempt was to carve away what his government considered to be extraneous 
political issues.  He, like the United Kingdom’s representatives, sought to shift the 
conference’s focus.  The United Kingdom wanted to emphasise matters affecting the 
‘natural physical environment’—a position detailed in their delegation’s Cabinet-
approved negotiating mandate—‘in order that something useful and concrete emerges’ 
from the conference. 513   They recognised it as ‘inevitable that sociological or 
psychological problems’ would be ‘brought in to some extent’.514  The United Kingdom’s 
representatives recognised the most prominent of these problems as those seeking to 
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prohibit ecocide, imperialism, apartheid, the atmospheric effects of supersonic flight, 
human settlements, and nuclear weapons.515  Yet, the mandate suggested, these problems 
could not ‘in the nature of things be the subject of international regulatory agreements’.  
As a consequence, the mandate instructed the United Kingdom’s delegation to ‘ignore 
[these] socio-cultural issues’.  Representatives should ‘seek to leave such problems for 
consideration in some other forum’, the mandate stated.516   
 
To representatives of the United Kingdom and United States, therefore, discussions of 
what they called these ‘highly political matters’ were inherently ‘out of place’ at the 
conference.517  In making this argument, the representatives conveniently ignored that the 
environment was an unavoidably contested field.  Instead, the United Kingdom and 
United States governments—with the support of delegates from the European Economic 
Community—attempted to remove contentious issues from environmental discussions, 
while inserting them into discussions taking place in other United Nations fora and in the 
Bretton Woods Institutions.  The United Kingdom government maintained, for example, 
that draft recommendations on aid and trade were ‘properly issues for other fora such as 
UNCTAD or GATT’.518  ‘Environmental work was a function of good development 
planning’, emphasised its representatives, which ‘should be, and are, taken into 
consideration by aid donors’.  The strategy delimited environmental law’s scope.  It also 
expunged many potentially relevant issues, as a supposed means to shield this idea of the 
environment from any ‘contamination’ by politically ‘toxic’ concerns.519   
 
Aligned with this stance, the United States’ representatives accused governments 
highlighting these issues of trying to ‘wreck the conference’.520  Meanwhile, the Canadian 
government—along with many European governments—placated major dissenters by 
withdrawing previous objections to text calling for more financial and technological 
assistance to Third World countries.  These included Principle 9 of the Stockholm 
Declaration, which proposed that environmental ‘deficiencies’ could ‘best be remedied 
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by accelerated development’ through the ‘transfer of substantial quantities of financial 
and technological assistance’.  Principle 12 also called for ‘additional international 
technical and financial’ resources to be made available to ‘preserve and improve the 
environment’.521  Several recommendations in the Stockholm Action Plan reinforced 
these points.522  In all, these provisions became collateral concessions for the continued 
participation of many Third World representatives.  They also became the Stockholm 
Conference’s main remedies for global environmental problems. 
 
Notwithstanding this, the United States and United Kingdom governments retained their 
opposition to these resolutions.  They voted to abstain—as did representatives from 
Switzerland and Sweden—on Principles 9 and 12 of the Stockholm Declaration, as well 
as every Action Plan recommendation pledging additional transfers of finance and 
technology to Third World countries.  Similarly, Japan not only abstained, but also 
withdrew its text proposals criticising GNP as an appropriate indicator of nation-state 
progress.  Its impetus for this withdrawal was to limit any possibility of negative press 
coverage against the Japanese government.  Ultimately, the votes on financial and 
technological assistance measures passed easily, in what appeared at the time to be a 
major G-77 victory.523  Their result was to carve a space for discussions of these issues 
to proliferate in international environmental law.  Put simply, the environment—as 
understood in international law—became principally about two factors: firstly, 
marshalling ‘additional’ resources and finance to pay for low-polluting technologies, and 
secondly, compensation for lost revenues as a result of reorienting their affected national 
economies.  These factors took priority over discussions, for example, that might have 
focused on reducing production and consumption, or alternatively, on achieving a more 
equitable distribution of the world’s resources.   
 
2.2.  Harmonising an ‘Off-Stage Chorus’ 
 
Non-governmental and international organisations also played active roles in cultivating 
the environmental regime’s shape and form.  It was always Strong’s intention, from the 
outset of his tenure, to make the Stockholm Conference a ‘media-NGO complex’.  
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He thought this would make the conference ‘newsworthy and exciting’.  Strong feared 
that, unless an ‘off-stage chorus’ were present, media agencies ‘might not come at all’.524  
He generated a highly choreographed dialogue between governed peoples and their 
governments.  Nevertheless, Strong’s press adviser, Peter Stone, recalled how 
governments wished to limit the ‘political consequences’ of ‘uncontrolled’ NGO and 
public participation.  Some governments also expressed concern about the mass 
migration to Stockholm of what were predominantly Californians, who outnumbered 
participants from the entire African continent.  Measures ‘had to be put in place’, a United 
States representative explained, to ensure that the conference did not ‘become a highly 
charged atmosphere of a divisive kind’.525   
 
In response, Strong established what he called an ‘Environmental Forum’.  This was a 
side-conference designed to host industry groups and NGOs.  Its lectures, film screenings, 
and workshops offered an ‘open and unconstrained discussion’ of issues, particularly 
those deemed too politically sensitive for country delegates.526  Yet, the Environmental 
Forum also became an institution through which oppositional voices could be regulated, 
monitored, and contained.  An activist group, ‘PowWow’—which had earlier established 
a ‘People’s Forum’, with a view to introducing (radical) issues that had not previously 
been raised by other participants into the conference discussions—feared that the 
Environmental Forum might ‘confuse things and blur the distinction between the UN 
Conference […] and the criticism of it’.527   
 
Ultimately, PowWow’s fears were realised.  The task of establishing the Environmental 
Forum was led by the Scientists’ Institute for Public Information.  This was a group with 
a reputation for sponsoring what some referred to as the policies of ‘expansionist 
industrial and military states’. 528   Under the group’s direction, the Environmental 
Forum’s events became dictated by multinational corporations—such as Fiat Automobile 
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and Olivetti—who saw Stockholm as an ‘unusual opportunity’ to attract ‘worldwide 
visibility’ for their products.  These companies used the Environmental Forum to promote 
investment, and for ‘mobilising other resources’.529  Some NGOs made active efforts to 
align themselves with these companies.  Prominent NGO leader, American Russell Brand, 
whose group—calling itself the ‘Life Forum’—had occupied a tented field an hour’s 
commute from the conference centre, saw the group’s role in Stockholm as one of ‘crowd 
control’.  Even the Chief of Police Operations reported that Brand’s Life Forum did not 
‘intend to cause any disturbances’.  Instead, he told media agencies, its members only 
‘wish[ed] to quiet[en] other people’. 530   Specifically, these other people represented 
groups with opposing messages: including the Hog Farm’s ‘voluntary primitivism’, Dai 
Dong’s castigation of ‘ecocidal war’, along with PowWow’s grassroots movement.531  
So, although Strong’s policy was to integrate these marginalised voices, their integration 
took place on the dominant actors’ terms.   
 
Some international institutions’ actions reinforced these orthodoxies.  For example, 
World Bank President Robert McNamara seized upon an opportunity to expand the 
Bank’s role and influence.  He gave a plenary address, in which he informed that the Bank 
had recently established the post of Chief Environmental Advisor.  Its role was to ‘review 
and evaluate’ all investment projects for their environmental effects.  McNamara reported 
that the Bank had since discovered that ‘the recommended safeguards can and have been 
successfully negotiated and implemented’ in every instance.532  The Bank also distributed 
a brochure, advertising its successes on environmental issues, at the conference.  In one 
case study, the brochure described how fish populations around the Old City of 
Dubrovnik had declined in recent years, due to the dumping of municipal and industrial 
wastes.533  The Bank had financed the building of the ‘Babin Kuk’ complex, one of the 
world’s largest tourist resorts at the time.  The complex was designed to accommodate 
over 5,000 people.  It was intended to significantly expand the country’s tourism industry, 
a major source of the country’s revenue.  In what the Bank framed as a boost to its 
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environmental credentials, it devised plans to minimise the project’s effects on adjacent 
marine ecosystems.  The brochure proclaimed:  
 
‘The plans have been drawn up. Sewer outlets have been designed to keep wastes out of 
the area, leaving the waters clean for swimming and boating. The Yugoslav government 
is also planning to modernize – at a cost of $8 million – the sewage system for the entire 
city of Dubrovnik.’534   
 
In other words, the Bank’s plan was simply to discharge the sewage farther into the 
Adriatic Sea.  The planned remedial actions would not rectify the already highly-polluted 
waters.  Only by reducing the amount of effluent, or by constructing a wastewater 
treatment plant—at immense expense—could the Bank achieve that outcome.  However, 
the Bank was unwilling to advocate for—or fund—such policies.  The brochure revealed 
that the Bank’s actions were merely intended to protect capital invested in the resort.  
It framed this objective—of continued economic expansion—as one of environmental 
protection.  A UNIDO report, distributed at the conference, reinforced this perception.  
The report argued that countries could industrialise without ‘seriously damaging the 
environment’, through ‘careful planning and management’.535  The report promulgated 
the UNIDO’s optimism that a ‘use of proper technologies’ could make possible the 
avoidance—or mitigation—of damaging environmental effects.   
 
UNIDO’s report suggested that highly-industrialised economies—deploying 
‘sophisticated, capital-intensive processes requiring highly-trained workers’—would 
‘produce less pollution’ than countries with only ‘intermediate technologies’, which had 
‘high labour demands, small plant size and less reliance on energy’.  This was due to the 
‘increased efficiency and automation’ of advanced technologies.  Consequently, the 
report recommended that all states should prefer large-scale mechanisation over ‘small-
scale labour-intensive’ operations.536  Its logic sought to foster a vision of a healthy 
environment as synonymous with the vigorous use of advanced technologies.  
These technologies could, the UNIDO’s logic proposed, provide cheap energy from 
abundant or renewable sources.  Using these, the report suggested, all the mineral 
resources needed to sustain economic growth could then be extracted from sand or the 
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oceans.  The new technologies could then make deserts bloom with food crops 
synthesised from air and desalinated seawater.  Fundamentally, the logic dismissed any 
notion that radical structural changes to techno-scientific, industrialised societies were 
either necessary, or possible.   
 
2.3.  Bringing a Declaration to Life 
 
By the end of the two-week conference, the United States delegation—which had been 
instructed to achieve ‘a headline a day’537—found itself diplomatically outmanoeuvred, 
isolated, and constantly defending its positions, particularly in relation to its war in 
Vietnam.  The delegation searched for ways to re-establish its credibility. 538  
Representatives responded by seeking to deflect the conference’s attention onto a set of 
different issues, particularly anti-whaling.  This issue had not been raised before the 
conference.  Yet, it offered a ‘perfect opportunity’ for the United States’ representatives 
to ‘become ecology activists’.  Several years earlier, the country’s government—like its 
major European allies—had legislated a nation-wide moratorium on whale hunting.  So, 
domestically, it had ‘no stake in the issue’.539  Indeed, the only countries still carrying on 
these activities were the Soviet Union540 and Japan.  At the time, both countries happened 
to be the United States’ main economic rivals.   
 
Most NGOs supported the United States’ anti-whaling efforts.  The Life Forum and Hog 
Farm organised a number of events—most notably ‘Whale Night’ and the ‘Anti-Whaling 
March’—backing this cause.  Paul Ehrlich credited these events as having ‘the greatest 
impact’ on the conference’s official proceedings.  Strong even appeared as a ‘special 
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guest’ at these events.  This bolstered Strong’s pluralist image, and his claim to be 
engaging with marginalised groups.541  At the end of the conference, the United States 
sponsored—and comfortably passed—a resolution for a ‘10-year moratorium on 
commercial whaling’.542  Yet, this outcome did not endure for long.  The International 
Whaling Commission’s members rejected the moratorium only 20 days after the 
conference.  At a private meeting, scientists from Norway, Iceland, and Panama voted 
against the moratorium, reversing positions that their governments had voted for in 
Stockholm.  Canadian, Danish, and French scientists also decided to abstain on this later 
occasion, rather than vote for it.543   
 
Having put complex measures in place to install a particular vision of the environment—
dependent on financial flows, technology transfers, and now anti-whaling—only a final 
obstacle remained.  Midway through the conference, on 10 June 1972, the delegation 
from the Peoples’ Republic of China (‘PRC’) had tabled divisive amendments to the draft 
text.544  It lambasted the United States governments’ ‘imperialism’ in the Indo-Chinese 
region.  Having only recently emerged from decades of diplomatic exile—which started 
from the 1949 Chinese Communist Revolution—the Stockholm Conference was the 
PRC’s first international summit since its admission to the United Nations in October 
1971.545  Its government in Beijing was widely seen as trying to assert its new voice in 
global affairs.  Wade Rowland describes that few foreigners had experience dealing with 
Chinese diplomats.546  The PRC had not yet been United Nations members during the 
Preparatory Committee process, and had not participated in drafting the conference 
declaration.  On this rationale, the 31-member Chinese delegation appealed for an 
opportunity to discuss the draft declaration.547   
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Tang Ke—the head of its delegation—made efforts to reopen the environment’s meaning.  
He lambasted the draft declaration for failing to draw attention to what he identified as 
the main causes of environmental harms: ‘imperialist plunder’ of Third World resources, 
and the First World’s military ‘aggression’ across the globe.548  If the conference were to 
persist in promulgating clauses unacceptable to his government, he said firmly, the PRC 
would not participate in voting.549  He then forced, and won, a unanimous vote to have 
an all-country working group redraft the entire Stockholm Declaration.  
Chinese representatives also prepared a ‘ten-point plan’, which they then leaked to the 
Eco newspaper.  In this plan, the PRC’s government proclaimed the need to combine 
‘social progress’ with ‘industrious labour’ in order to ‘advance science and 
technology’.550  This was, the plan stated, essential for ‘continuous improvement’ of the 
human environment. 551   On this basis, the PRC argued that ‘advanced scientific 
technology’ should be ‘offered without compensation’ to Third World countries.552   
 
Predictably, many participants and observers initially reacted by fearing that these PRC 
actions would derail the conference, by making a consensus agreement impossible to 
achieve.553  It quickly became clear after private meetings between delegates, however, 
that the PRC plan—once stripped of its more polemic prose—was almost substantively 
identical to the existing draft declaration.  These included the PRC’s demands relating to 
states’ responsibility not to pollute, compensation for export losses caused by 
environmental regulations, financial aid, higher prices for primary commodities, and the 
need for consultation on policies with prospective transnational environmental effects.554  
Having come to this realisation, the conference participants largely returned to their 
previous discussions, which continued until the conference’s final session.  In this final 
session, the chair—wishing to bring the proceedings to a speedy end—suddenly 
announced consensus on the draft declaration.  Yet, in doing so, he ignored the PRC’s 
objections over the removal of text that its representatives had sought to include on the 
issue of imperialism and on prohibiting nuclear testing.  An argument between Tang and 
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the chair continued for nearly fifteen minutes.  During this time, the PRC representatives 
grew increasingly isolated and humiliated.555   
 
The United States government, still seeking to redirect the conference’s focus away from 
its own negative publicity, saw this as an opportunity to accuse Chinese representatives 
of trying to ‘wreck the declaration’.  Given the Chinese delegation’s intransigence, Train 
then said, no agreement at Stockholm was possible.  As an alternative, Train asked that 
the entire draft declaration be referred to the United Nations General Assembly. 556  
His hopes, in this regard, aligned with those of many other major industrial powers in 
preferring fewer—or, at least, more diluted—substantive provisions.  Sensing disaster, 
Strong frantically persuaded the chair to adjourn the meeting for private consultations.  
The chair refused, prompting Strong into yet another forceful act: secretly instructing an 
aide to unplug the interpreting device.  There was then no choice but to adjourn for 
‘repairs’.557  This allowed for informal discussions to take place among delegates on how 
to proceed.  It helped to ease tensions, during which representatives from 113 countries 
physically converged upon the Chinese delegates, pleading them to withdraw the 
objections.558  Following this, parties reached a consensus adopting the declaration, to 
huge ‘acclamation’, but one that remained ‘subject to reservations and observations’.559   
 
As a result, the United Kingdom Foreign Office reported, the Stockholm Declaration ‘did 
not work out quite as had been anticipated’.560  The linkages between development and 
environmental took centre stage: with Principles 8, 11, and 15 making this connection 
explicit, and Principle 9 stating that ecological degradation was ‘generated by the 
conditions of under-development’.  Further, Principles 12 to 14 called for ‘an integrated 
and coordinated approach to development planning’, for the purposes of achieving a 
‘more rational management of resources and thus to improve the environment’.  Yet, as I 
have contended, arrangements on finance and technology also became major elements of 
the declaration’s vision of the environmental regime.  References to trade, industrial 
growth, and anti-whaling became other prominent features of the regime.561   
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In place of these features, as I have illustrated, a number of competing issues became 
denigrated or trivialised.  These were arguments raised principally by actors seeking to 
not only aspirate other pressing issues of the day, but also to reject the dominant socio-
political arrangements of the global order.  As we saw, these included demands by some 
governments to remedy the ongoing effects of imperialism, the plunder of resources, 
environmental harms caused by supersonic flight, resettling peoples displaced by natural 
disasters, prohibiting war, ecocide, and nuclear weapons, as well as discussing alternative 
metrics to GDP as proxies for human wellbeing.  Some civil society groups also sought 
to promote alternative approaches—such as voluntary primitivism and self-sufficiency—
to cure threats of impending ‘limits to growth’ and ‘population explosions’.  A UNEP 
review of the Stockholm Conference recalled that these potentially relevant—yet 
competing—ideas of the environment were persistently dismissed by the conference 
organisers.  They were widely perceived as being of no great interest to those faced with 
‘poverty, hunger, disease and survival’. 562   Ultimately, the United Nations General 
Assembly overwhelmingly affirmed these arrangements—as its Resolution 2994—on 15 
December 1972.563  In all, they set international law’s vision of the environment on a 
familiar course.   
 
III.  Safeguarding the Regime 
 
The Stockholm Declaration inaugurated an environmental field, and regulatory object, 
within contemporary international law.  Nonetheless, its outcome immediately prompted 
criticism from many observers.  Commoner argued, for instance, that governments had 
merely agreed to ‘monitor pollution’ through enhanced technologies, instead of devising 
policies that actually ‘produced no pollution’.564  Replicating these carefully-engineered 
arrangements, however, the following decade witnessed a vast proliferation of 
international environmental laws and regulatory instruments.  These included treaties 
dedicated to the prevention of the dumping waste at sea,565 restricting pollution from 
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ships,566 protection of endangered and migratory species,567 the protection of wetlands568 
and habitats,569 as well as the prevention of transboundary air pollution.570   
 
Fundamentally, these instruments—like the Stockholm Declaration—sought to safeguard 
an underlying teleology of economic, industrial, and technological growth.  In this regard, 
I argue, the proliferation of environmental instruments during this era served a specific 
agenda.  The first of the following subsections examines how a number of geopolitical 
events, following the Stockholm Conference, sought to reorient the emerging 
environmental regime towards better addressing resource distribution issues.  
Facing these threats to a vision of the environment inscribed by the Stockholm 
Declaration, the second subsection below explores how powerful states sought to stabilise 
the environment’s parameters agreed at Stockholm.  More specifically, I consider how 
those states put into place regulatory measures ensuring that environmental instruments 
would not conflict with—and would perhaps even expand—their economic interests.   
 
3.1.  Geopolitical Reconfigurations 
 
Major geopolitical events occurred within a year of the Stockholm Conference.  
Two significant events were: firstly, United States President Nixon’s 1971 abandonment 
of the ‘gold standard’; and secondly, the 1973 oil crisis, which resulted from an oil 
embargo by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (‘OAPECs’) in 
retaliation for several oil importing nations’ efforts to supply arms to Israel during the 
Yom Kippur War.  The oil crisis triggered a 70 per cent rise in oil prices.  It led to a period 
of economic stagnation and high inflation (a combination known as ‘stagflation’). 571  
Facing such challenges, governments saw the codification of international legal 
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instruments on environmental issues as comparatively lower priorities than ensuring the 
continued access to key resources.   
 
The 1973 oil crisis also imbued OAPEC governments with a new sense of commodity 
power. 572   Resource-rich governments in the Third World became aware of the 
possibilities for using their vast natural resource endowments as instruments to gain 
‘better bargaining positions’ in international negotiations.  These G-77 countries 
intensified demands for a more equitable global economic order.  This led to turbulent 
debates within the United Nations General Assembly. 573   Following this, many 
governments of countries dependent on resource imports grew increasingly concerned 
about securing uninterrupted energy supplies.  They made efforts to limit their 
dependence on imported energy and raw materials. 574   Regardless, G-77 countries 
successfully promoted the famous May 1974 General Assembly Declaration, calling for 
the establishment of a ‘New International Economic Order’ (‘NIEO’). 575  
The declaration’s text reflected influences from dependency and neo-colonialist 
theorists.576  Governments of these countries used natural resources strategically as nodes 
in their demands for a NIEO.  They jointly declared that: 
 
‘pre-emption by the rich of a disproportionate share of key resources conflicts directly 
with the longer-term interests of the poor by impairing their ultimate access to resources 
necessary to their development and by increasing their cost.  All the more reason for 
creating a new system of evaluating resources which takes into account the benefits and 
burdens for the developing countries.’577   
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Even before the Stockholm Conference, states had already made abundantly clear—
during negotiation of the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands—that they would not 
agree terms that could infringe their sovereign rights to exploit their own natural resources.  
It was, therefore, ‘out of the question’, they concurred, ‘to draw up a convention 
prohibiting absolute change in the ecological status of wetlands, backed by mandatory 
sanctions’.578  As a result, the Ramsar Convention contained only vague—or vacuous—
obligations.  Its signatories intended that the convention’s substantive detail would only 
be subsequently agreed, and included as annexes, in future meetings.  For example, 
parties agreed to ‘formulate and implement their planning so as to promote […] as far as 
is possible the wise use of wetlands in their territory’.579  The wetlands over which the 
convention would apply had to be voluntarily listed by the countries themselves.  
While calling for the ‘wise use’ of protected wetlands, the concept was not clearly defined 
in the convention.  Countries had duties merely to ‘promote’ the concept, and then only 
‘as far as possible’.  These weak prescriptions, the IUCN observed, were ‘dangerous and 
to be avoided because they permit the illusion that problems are being tackled when in 
fact they are not’.580   
 
Soon after the 1973 oil crisis and NIEO declaration, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (‘UNEP’) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(‘UNCTAD’) convened an October 1974 joint symposium in Cocoyoc.  Chaired by 
Barbara Ward, participants discussed the implications of ‘Patterns of Resource Use, 
Environment, and Development Strategies’.  Echoing the Founex Report’s earlier 
frustrations, the Cocoyoc Declaration expressed outrage.  While 30 years had, by this 
time, passed since the United Nations Charter’s promise of a new international order, it 
had now ‘reached a critical turning point’.  ‘Its hopes of creating a better life for the whole 
human family’, the declaration declared, ‘have been largely frustrated’.  By contrast, the 
number of ‘hungry, sick, shelterless and illiterate’ peoples had risen since the United 
Nations was established.  At the same time, accelerating environmental degradation 
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brought into question whether the ‘outer limits’ of the earth’s physical integrity might be 
at risk.  Conference participants—who served in their individual capacities—concluded 
that it was biophysically impossible to satisfy the ‘inner limit’ of ‘fundamental human 
needs’.581   
 
This conceptual separation between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ limits was the grounding upon 
which the declaration called for a ‘new system’.  This new system was framed as one that 
met human needs, while simultaneously operating within environmental constraints.  
The declaration enumerated three requirements of this new system.  Firstly, it emphasised 
a need to ‘redefine the whole purpose of development’ to better attenuate the system to 
disparities in the distribution of basic needs between, and within, countries.  Secondly, 
the declaration underscored a need for peoples to generate ‘their own way[s] of life’.  
Concomitantly, it implored governments to recognise multiple ‘roads of development’.  
In doing so, the declaration explicitly rejected ‘efforts to imitate the historical model of 
[First World] countries’.  Finally, the Cocoyoc Declaration highlighted a need to increase 
‘national self-reliance’.  This meant relying primarily on each country’s ‘own resources, 
human and natural’.  To this end, the declaration spurned ‘exploitative trade patterns’, 
which it stated would deprive other countries of their resources.582  In all, the declaration 
offered a set of alternative visions with regard to the environment.  If implemented, these 
may have led to a different environmental regime in international law, namely one that 
reflected a ‘harmonized cooperative world, in which each part is a centre, living at the 
expense of nobody else, in partnership with nature and in solidarity with future 
generations’.583    
 
Yet, some governments rapidly dismissed the conference’s recommendations.  
For example, the United States ‘reject[ed] the [d]eclaration entirely’.584  Despite this, 
some of the declaration’s main themes endured.  Its view, that global inequality and 
environmental harms should be adjoined, gained some support.  For instance, a 1976 
UNEP Executive Director’s report reaffirmed the Cocoyoc Declaration’s argument that 
the worst use of the environment was occurring ‘at the two extremes of the scale of 
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wealth’.585  Indeed, these ostensible links between environmental and global distributive 
issues were raised so frequently in some circles that—at the fourth session of the UNEP 
Governing Council in 1976—several delegations questioned the need, felt by the UNEP 
secretariat, to defend such purportedly self-evident interconnections.  The ideas were 
‘well understood and well established’, they protested.  They could benefit from 
restatement, participants claimed, but ‘no further elaboration’ was necessary.586   
 
3.2.  Selective Regulation 
 
During the late-1970s, the United States and United Kingdom governments began to drive 
different approaches toward global environmental protection.  The Thatcher Government 
and Reagan Administration launched infamous ‘deregulation’ policies in the United 
Kingdom and United States.  These were inspired by Friedrich Hayek’s theories of 
‘laissez-faire’ neo-classical economics.587  The theories posited that markets—following 
what were supposedly self-evident principles of demand and supply—would give rise to 
the most efficient possible allocation of scarce resources.  Hayek predicted that unfettered 
market forces would also stimulate economic growth.  This would ‘trickle down’—
through all levels of society—creating jobs, raising productivity and wages, and reducing 
commodity prices.  Hayek also thought that unconstrained market forces could unleash 
unprecedented techno-scientific innovation. 588   Put alternatively, many neo-classical 
economic theories proclaimed that markets were self-regulating, provided that they were 
deregulated.  Putting this fact aside, those implementing these logics tended to ignore the 
fact that well-functioning markets inherently rely upon some form of government 
regulation to both establish, and maintain, those markets.589   
 
For example, the Reagan and Thatcher governments sought to scale back regulations, 
public ownership, and social welfare schemes.590  With this, they sought to limit any 
market distortions: particularly those associated with environmental protection.  
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Their domestic policies sought to reverse environmental regulations, or amend them in 
ways that would not conflict with the operation of markets.  Agreeing robust 
environmental treaties—such as those aimed at reducing air and marine pollution, or 
protecting endangered animals—were not seen as high priorities.  President Reagan’s 
disregard, in particular, was outlined in his acceptance speech to the 1980 Republican 
Party Convention, during which he declared, ‘the economic prosperity of our people is a 
fundamental part of our environment’.591  His Cabinet appointments of James Watt (as 
Secretary of the Interior), and Anne Gorsuch (as Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency)—both of whom were hostile to much of the environmental legislation 
they were responsible for administering—solidified Reagan’s disdain towards 
environmental policies.  Such was Watt’s antipathy to radical environmental movements, 
that he infamously suggested in 1990 that if ‘troubles with environmentalists’ could not 
be resolved ‘in the jury box or the ballot box’, then ‘perhaps the cartridge box should be 
used’.592   
 
Consequently, the United States and United Kingdom governments resisted attempts to 
codify international laws relating to the environment.  They framed environmental 
measures as both harmful to markets, and achievable through economic growth.  
Implementing this logic, they imposed strict cost-benefit standards.  These standards 
required that all new policies lead to net benefits, which were measured in terms of 
economic indicators.593  Evidently, many proposed laws and policies failed these criteria.  
Instruments passing its threshold—including those agreements outlined at the beginning 
of this section—were carefully designed to stimulate economic benefits: whether by 
enhancing financial flows, or through techno-scientific innovation.  These agreements, 
therefore, adhered to a dominant model of environmentalism ratified at Stockholm.  
At the same time, the agreements disregarded the claims of more radical environmental 
movements.  Ultimately, in what was a significant moment, neither of the world’s two 
strongest economies ratified any environmental agreements that fell afoul of these criteria.   
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The environment’s framing with reference to economic factors was so apparently self-
evident, in fact, that some economic institutions did not even feel the need to engage with 
environmental issues at all.  For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(‘GATT’) established a ‘Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade’ in 
1971, prior to the Stockholm Conference.  Yet, that group did not meet for the first time 
until 1991.594  This was in contrast to trade officials’ widely-raised fears, before the 
conference, that environmental protection could become used to justify unilateral trade 
restrictions.  In an added move, some environmental NGOs—such as the Environmental 
Defense Fund, the Nature Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund—diluted (or at least 
shaped) their activities to align with those of fossil fuel companies and highly-polluting 
industry groups.  These were tactics, Naomi Klein reveals, intended to secure funding and 
to gain more influence in government policy-making.595   
 
Meanwhile, one of the Stockholm Conference’s most celebrated successes was its 
creation of UNEP.  However, cautious of any new superimposed coordination of their 
work—and influenced by Reagan and Thatcher’s deregulation policies—other 
international institutions repeatedly resisted attempts to strengthen UNEP’s mandate.  
Clashing again upon definitions of the environment, the institutions underscored that the 
environment was ‘not a separate entity requiring its own operational body but a cross-
cutting theme’.596  As such, member states left UNEP with responsibility for all issues 
within the international environmental ‘sphere’.  Yet, they ensured restrictions upon the 
institution’s finances and status, so as not to encroach upon the economic interests of 
other governments, or the mandates of other United Nations agencies.597 
 
With these sensitivities in mind, Strong—who was by now Head of UNEP—acting in 
conjunction with UNEP’s Governing Council, carefully ensured that the institution’s 
activities would not conflict with those of other, more established bodies. 598  
Together, they also diluted UNEP’s powers: making it a United Nations ‘programme’,599 
rather than as a full United Nations specialised agency.  Years later, UNEP’s minimal 
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effectiveness was attributed by many to these restrictive powers, mandate, and budget.600  
As Former UNDP Administrator James Speth described it, UNEP was made a ‘peanut-
sized UN agency tucked away in Nairobi’ whose function was only to ‘stimulate and 
coordinate’ the work of ‘larger and more important agencies’.601   
 
These factors brought about only a limited number of international instruments, during 
the 1980s, directed at addressing environmental issues.  This era was punctuated by 
single-issue international environmental agreements: most notably, the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, and its (the ‘Montreal Protocol’),602 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’).603  Yet, the 
content of these few instruments were carefully engineered to align with familiar logics.  
For example, UNCLOS’s core policies were intrinsically forged upon the principles of 
‘sovereignty, property rights and rational bargaining’.604  The benefits of its content—
which included rules aimed at enclosing sovereign maritime boundaries and conserving 
fish stocks—were projected, in financial terms, to grossly exceed any regulatory costs.605  
Notwithstanding this, the majority of the UNCLOS treaty simply codified existing 
custom and was, therefore, relatively uncontroversial.   
 
Similarly, the Montreal Protocol—which was seen by even some radical commentators 
as one of international law’s few successes with regard to the environment—was agreed, 
in large part, as a means for enhancing financial interests, rather than necessarily seeking 
to impose economic costs upon its member states.606  The pace of negotiations was 
dictated by multinational corporations, many of which had already started mass-
production of lower-cost substitutes for the ozone-depleting substances enumerated in the 
                                                 
600 United Nations, ‘Delivering as One’: Report of the High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence 
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protocol.  The Du Pont Corporation, for example, had already begun to mass produce 
low-cost substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons (‘CFCs’): the gas that the protocol specified 
as having the earliest phase-out date.  Along with its competitors, Du Pont subsequently 
profited from marketing the transition between successive generations of refrigerant 
gases: namely, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (‘HCFCs’), halons, methyl bromide, and now, 
hydrofluorocarbons (‘HFCs’). 607   The protocol helped these corporations sustain 
comparative advantages over many infant industries—particularly those in Third World 
states—that manufactured refrigerant gases.  It also allowed corporations to exploit, and 
expand, commercial opportunities through the protocol.608  The protocol’s effect was, 
therefore, to enhance the economic interests of the world’s major industrial powers.  As a 
consequence, states and major corporations were able to redeploy the ozone layer crisis 
as a means for pursuing their economic and financial interests.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have sought to offer a portrayal of a foundational moment in international 
(environmental) law: the 1972 Stockholm Conference.  I have focused, specifically, on 
illuminating how ‘the environment’ emerged as a distinct object, and field, of 
international law.  Using the dromedary as an example, my story has suggested that the 
environment was adapted to suit particular animals: in this case, a minority of wealthy 
First World countries—particularly the United Kingdom and the United States—as well 
as the techno-scientific industrialists, financiers, and their bureaucratic allies seeking to 
uphold a trade-friendly global order.  During the preparatory stages of the Stockholm 
Conference process, the nascent environmental regime was grounded upon the 
(economic) development aspirations of Third World governments.  Yet, as we have seen, 
it was not merely First-Third World dynamics that shaped and impeded the disciplinary 
formation of international (environmental) law.  Once the actual conference commenced, 
some governments—particularly those that had no representation on the preparatory 
                                                 
607 Ibid.  
608 This perhaps aligns with Naomi Klein’s view that situations of disaster are sometimes commandeered 
to enforce reforms that strengthen forms of capital accumulation. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 
The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Toronto: Knopf, 2007). For an example of this in relation to legal 
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Climate Change: Climate-Ready Seeds in the Neoliberal Food Regime (PhD Thesis, The London School 
of Economics and Political Science, 2015), available at: 
<http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3201/1/Saab_A_Legal_Inquiry_into_Hunger_and_Climate_Change.pdf> (last 
accessed on 24 June 2018), pp. 191-196. 
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committee, such as the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Libya, Tanzania, and the PRC—sought to 
relate the issue of the environment to wider claims against imperialism, racism, human 
persecution, relocation of refugees, dangers of stratospheric pollution from high-altitude 
aircraft, as well as prohibiting ecocide and nuclear weapons.  These governments used 
the conference as a platform for seeking redress for what were significant issues in world 
affairs.   
 
I then highlighted strategies through which these struggles between competing aspirations 
were defused, moments of potential rupture foreclosed.  My story proposed that this 
occurred through a strategic turn to techno-scientific, industrial, and financial logics, 
which became central features of the conference’s outcome document.  I explained that 
this move—strategically orchestrated by the conference’s Secretary-General, organisers, 
and representatives of powerful states—was designed to ensure the engagement of 
dissenting governments in the conference process.  These actors conspired with a number 
of prominent NGOs to displace some of the more subversive ‘political’ issues to other 
fields of law that were seemingly beyond, or outside, the global environmental regime’s 
scope.  Key actors also castigated governments that sought to raise apparently 
controversial issues.  These actors momentarily domesticated and marginalised dissenting 
governments, who were accused of trying to subvert the international law-making process.  
As such, it was through these dynamics and logics—serving as primary referents—that 
the ‘human environment’ became forged as an international legal-institutional object.  
Consequently, the Stockholm Conference ratified a specific vision of the environment, 
which became projected as universal.   
 
This is not to say that the environment became imagined in ways that had no effect of 
reducing pollution, deforestation, overfishing, or trade in endangered species.  Instead, I 
have argued that international law envisioned the environment in a way that merely 
tinkered with these issues.  Yet, it left unperturbed their root causes: namely, the 
continued exploitation of raw materials needed to serve continuously growing economies, 
as well as the structural inequalities of the global economic system itself.  This was 
notwithstanding concerted efforts by some Third World commodity exporting countries 
to assert power over commodity prices, particularly in the decade following the 
Stockholm Conference.  As I have argued, the environmental realm was brought into 
being in ways adapted to sustaining the fundamental causes of the very problems it 
promised to resolve.  It denied the emergence of a more complex, multipolar, and less 
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static global order.  In this regard, my story demonstrates how a complex array of 
reinforcing interests constructed the human environment in ways that have shackled us to 
familiar patterns of resource extraction, consumption, and pollution.  While partly 
domesticated and marginalised, I will observe—in the following chapter—how dissensus 
re-emerged in the course of discussions about a concept that became known as 
‘sustainable development’.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
UNIFYING THE PLANET, MANUFACTURING A COMMON FUTURE 
 
 
‘The first step towards reimagining a world gone terribly wrong would be to stop the annihilation of those 
who have a different imagination [...] To gain this philosophical space, it is necessary to concede some 
physical space for survival of those who may look like the keepers of our past but who may really be the 
guides to our future.’ 
 
― Arundhati Roy, Broken Republic: Three Essays609  
 
Introduction 
 
Humanity’s first journeys into space brought us under the spell of a new image: not of 
space, the stars, or even the moon, but of the earth.  Looking from their lunar module onto 
a distant planet, the Apollo 8 astronauts photographed a small, fragile, and finite blue ball.  
They captured a vision of the earth as a single holistic object—enveloped by clouds, 
oceans, greenery, and soils—shining against the infinite darkness of outer space.  
Never before had this singular, unified image of the planet become visible to humanity.  
In its vulnerability and isolation, this image of a floating globe—what one commentator 
called ‘a small island of life floating in an ocean of empty space’—furnished many 
peoples with a collective awe and wonder.610  Indeed, some argue that the photograph 
imagined a new reality: that of the earth itself as a bounded place, condemned to a singular 
manifest destiny.611  With this, the idea of unity became a biophysical reality.   
 
Much has been written of this photograph—called ‘Earthrise’—as a transformative 
symbol of the earth’s vulnerability, and a normative icon of physical interconnectedness.  
The image is widely understood in terms of this type of significance.  It is now the subject 
of a huge body of literature.  Many Euro-American commentators, in particular, regard 
the photograph as a watershed moment in calls for greater responsibility toward the 
environment.  Environmental legal scholar Lynton Caldwell, for example, thought of it 
                                                 
609 Arundhati Roy, Broken Republic: Three Essays (London: Penguin, 2011), p. 183. 
610 Daniel B Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 5. 
611 William Anders, ‘Earthrise 1968’, in Robert Sullivan and Barbara B Burrows, Life’s 100 Photographs 
that Changed the World (New York: Time, 2003), p. 14.  
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as bringing about ‘a paradigm shift in ways of thinking about how the world works’.612  
Famed photojournalist Galen Rowel called it ‘the most influential environmental 
photograph ever taken’.613  In a pioneering manifesto, published in 1987, entitled Our 
Common Future, the World Commission on Environment and Development (‘WCED’) 
evoked the Earthrise image to convey a specific point.  It wrote that ‘humanity’s inability 
to fit its activities’ into the earth’s boundaries ‘is changing planetary systems’. 614  
The report envisioned all of humanity as framed by an enclosed planetary system, the 
operation of which was vulnerable to human actions.  This imagery of a bounded planet 
replaced that of ‘wide open spaces’ and limitless resources.615   
 
In this chapter, I offer a more critical reading.  Situating Earthrise against the backdrop 
of dissensus, I draw attention to the fact that it not only represents a unified world in 
geophysical terms, but also in ideological terms.  The imagery, I argue, was appropriated 
by environmental movements to promote the envisioning of a unified world in ways that 
occluded, and disposed with, dissensus.  Earthrise thus became a dream of power 
ensconced in the global gaze.  It offered a (transcendent) perspective of the entire world 
through the vehicle of ‘sustainable development’.  The WCED’s definition of sustainable 
development—as ‘development that meets the needs and aspirations of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’—has 
since become a ‘widely accepted starting point’ for those ‘concerned with environment 
and development dilemmas’.616   
 
Critics allege, however, that sustainable development was left ‘deliberately ill-
defined’.617  To many commentators, this disguised states’ inability to resolve key points 
                                                 
612 Wendy Read Wertz, Lynton Caldwell: An Environmental Visionary and the National Environmental 
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Edwards, Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (Cambridge: 
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614 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
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144. See also, ‘The great race’, The Economist (online), 4 July 2002 available at: 
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of conflict, thereby preventing a breakdown of negotiations.  Some labelled the term as 
‘constructively ambiguous’.618  ‘Consensus on a vague concept’, economist Herman Daly 
wrote, for example, was ‘better than disagreement over a sharply defined one’. 619  
Nevertheless, the idea of sustainable development was made neither wholly indeterminate, 
nor entirely unstable.  Its definition retained, within it, an inherent stability: it was both 
an inclusion, and an exclusion, of certain logics.  By systematising the inclusion of 
familiar logics, the WCED and subsequent 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (‘Rio Earth Summit’) became canonical moments in the 
history of international environmental law.   
 
In the following sections, I offer a re-description of how this global vision was forged.  
I begin, in Section I, by contemplating how the WCED conceived sustainable 
development as a means to co-opt—or domesticate—resistance to prior international 
legal attempts to align the idea of the environment with development interests.  
The section briefly looks at the lineage of the phrase to discern what logics are transmitted 
through it.  Thus, in the next section, I consider the strategies through which WCED 
commissioners excluded contradictory views in order to sustain this stable, but still fragile, 
vision of unity.  Finally, I consider—in Section III—how these logics became concretised 
in law through the Rio Earth Summit process.  My purpose is to explore how the process 
of juridifying sustainable development—as a symbol of apparent unity—erased local 
struggles, and de-radicalised the plight of peoples, from its totalising image of 
environmentalism.   
 
I.    Imagining a Transcendent Reality 
 
On the tenth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference, in 1982, the United Nations issued 
a report on the state of the global environment.  It indicated that massive increases in 
environmental degradation had taken place over the previous decade.  Whilst there were 
some observable achievements, the report argued, huge declines in key environmental 
indicators had occurred in many countries since the Stockholm Conference.  
Environmental problems were particularly worsening in Third World countries.  For this, 
                                                 
618 This term is often attributed to Henry Kissinger. See Geoff R Berridge, Lorna Lloyd, and Alan James, 
The Palgrave MacMillan Dictionary of Diplomacy (3rd ed, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 
p. 51. 
619 Herman Daly, Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development (Boston: Beacon Press 
1996), p. 2. 
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the United Nations blamed ‘the present international economic order’, which it claimed 
had ‘slowed down their development and protection of their environment’.620  ‘The high-
minded rhetoric of 1972’, Strong said, ‘was patently at odds with global reality’ in the 
1980s. 621   The Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(‘UNEP’), Mustafa Tolba, also expressed disappointment with this state of affairs.  
He acknowledged that environmental concepts had been ‘too slowly applied’, and in 
some cases ‘ignored entirely’.  ‘The inevitable result’, he said, is that the Stockholm 
Conference’s fundamental objective—protecting and enhancing the environment for 
future generations—had ‘not been fulfilled’.  ‘On virtually every front’, he stated, ‘there 
has been marked deterioration in the quality of our shared environment’.622   
 
With these observations, many felt compelled to renew ‘the sense of urgency and 
commitment’ to environmental protection.623  Leading these appeals was Canada’s High 
Commissioner to Kenya, Geoffrey Bruce, who first proposed—in 1981—a ‘commission 
of eminent people to study the challenges of the world environment’.624  The United 
Nations General Assembly endorsed the proposal.  It directed UNEP’s Governing 
Council to prepare plans for a ‘Special Commission on the Environmental Perspective 
for the Year 2000 and Beyond’.625  This commission was later renamed the WCED.  It 
was a political body—comprised of representatives from each of the United Nations 
regional groups—appointed, in 1983, under the chairmanship of the former Prime 
Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland.   
 
Brundtland invited twenty-three individuals to join the WCED.  Six were Europeans, 
three from North America, four each from South America and Asia, and six were from 
African or Middle Eastern backgrounds.  Each member brought to the WCED 
significantly diverse—and often contradictory—interpretations of what was needed to 
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bring environmental and development objectives together.  Despite what was an intense 
period in Cold War relations, East-West divisions remained relatively innocuous during 
the WCED’s discussions.  American and Soviet commissioners emphasised different 
priorities.  Yet, they tacitly agreed upon forms of market economy—combined with 
regulation through political controls—as the basis for global environmental 
governance.626  A more profound division took place along First and Third World lines.  
This division was epitomised, for example, through the familiar demands of some 
commissioners—notably Cote d’Ivoirian politician Lamine Fadika, Sudanese politician 
Mansour Khalid, and Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun—for First World 
governments to increase funding for development assistance.  The commissioners argued 
that this was necessary compensation for the imperialist exploitation of Third World 
countries.  Predictably, the proposal was met with incredulity by First World 
commissioners, such as by the vocal West German politician Volker Hauff.627   
 
A related issue emerging during the WCED’s discussions was how appropriately to 
balance trade-offs between what seemed as conflicting environmental and economic 
priorities.  Previous pronouncements about the apparently complementary character of 
these terms had, many commissioners realised, overlooked these fundamental tensions.628  
To some of the more radical commissioners—including South American environmental 
activists Margarita Marino de Botero and Paulo Nogueira-Neto, as well as the Mexican 
Marxist scholar Pablo González Casanova—participation on the WCED was a unique 
opportunity.  They saw their participation as a way to highlight—and advocate changes 
to—unjust social and environmental structures.629  On the other hand, American business 
leaders William Ruckelshaus and Susanna Agnelli immediately rebuked any such calls 
to radically reform the global system as fundamentally misguided.  They regarded the 
effects of existing socio-economic systems in an overwhelmingly positive light.  Yet, 
both Ruckelshaus and Agnelli acknowledged that some reforms might be needed to attain 
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environmental outcomes.630   
 
Even before the official meetings began, the WCED Secretariat recognised that resolving 
these many competing demands would become the commission’s most difficult 
challenge.631  Maurice Strong called it a ‘very unruly, divisive, frustrating operation’.632  
In response, Brundtland made the task of achieving a common narrative the commission’s 
main objective.  She said that the WCED’s day-to-day work was ‘to change reality, to 
sing a song or say a poem which can reach the ears of people and touch their hearts’.  
The ultimate objective, as Brundtland put it, was ‘to stir people’s imagination, to move 
their thoughts, feelings and sense of public responsibility’.633   
 
Aligned with this task, several commissioners—who represented both First and Third 
World states—sought to upgrade the Commission’s emphasis on development.  It was an 
issue, the commissioners thought, ‘that was not going away’.  In fact, Ruckelshaus 
thought that any endeavours to reject it ‘would lose very quickly’ the support of the 
fourteen Third World commissioners. 634   In light of this, many commissioners 
concurred—during an October 1985 meeting—that ‘the lack of growth and the lack of 
development presented greater environmental hazards than growth itself’. 635  
Rectifying this meant not only that Third World industries would have to raise 
production, but also that Third World peoples would need to increase their consumption 
of resources.  Yet, opposing this, some scholars—like David Satterthwaite—argued that 
‘the overall contribution of the poor to global resource consumption and waste production 
was negligible’.  He pointed out that ‘the high proportion of poor people among the world 
population had prevented pressures on global resources and waste sinks from rising 
higher’.636   
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In early 1986—at the height of its work—the WCED requested that its secretariat draft a 
memorandum aiming to reconcile these differing views.  The memorandum was written 
by Nitin Desai—an Indian economist—who sought to distil several key elements from 
the commissioners’ discussions.  Desai then moulded these elements into a position 
paper.  Sent to commissioners in June 1986, this paper introduced the idea of sustainable 
development.  Desai used the idea as a central theme for the purposes of merging 
competing demands within a singular narrative, or common policy framework.  
The language he used to frame sustainable development eventually found its way into the 
WCED’s final report:  
 
‘The concept of ‘sustainable development’ can provide the basis for such an integration. 
A development path is sustainable if it meets needs of the present without compromising 
the ability to do the same in future. There are three crucial elements in this short statement. 
The first is the concept of needs, the second is the ability to meet these needs and the third 
is the link between the present and future capacity to satisfy needs.’637   
 
Two particular features of this definition stood out.  One was the logic of ‘needs’, which 
invoked the primacy of human preferences and exceptionalism.  Desai inherited this 
formulation of needs from the Stockholm Declaration.  The Declaration made reference 
to ‘human needs and hopes’ as dependent upon the continued use of the environment.638  
Fundamentally, Desai’s characterisation similarly imagined the environment as a set of 
raw materials that were ‘essential’ for human ‘development’.639  Another glaring feature 
of the definition was its temporal distinction between ‘the present’ and ‘the future’.  
Investigating the lineage of these ideas might give some further insight into their logics.  
In this regard, American economist Kenneth Boulding argued—in a 1966 article, entitled 
the ‘Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth’—that the welfare of the individual 
person depended on two specific factors.  These comprised both an ability to identify with 
a ‘community’, in a spatial sense, and also ensuring the durability of such a community 
‘over time from the past into the future’.640   
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In a similar vein, the Club of Rome’s report, Limits to Growth, used the term ‘sustainable’ 
to describe what it considered to be a desirable ecological ‘state of global equilibrium’.641  
This followed Ward and Dubois’ usage of the word in their book Only One Earth.  
Also published in 1972, the book argued for the need to formulate development strategies 
as a means to ‘sustain livelihoods’.642  Under Ward’s guidance, this idea of temporality 
was put on the agendas of international fora.  The Stockholm Declaration’s recognition 
that the earth’s natural resources ‘must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future 
generations’ was largely a result of her efforts.643   
 
After the Stockholm Conference, language reflecting similar ideas was used internally 
within UNEP.  This included a number of phrases, such as ‘ecodevelopment’, 
‘development without destruction’, ‘development without destroying the environment’, 
and ‘environmentally sound development’.644  On one occasion, for example, UNEP’s 
Director of Economic and Social Programmes, Luis Sanchez, referred to 
‘ecodevelopment’—in a 1974 internal memorandum to UNEP staff—as an approach to 
development which ‘harmonizes economic and ecological factors’.  This harmonisation 
would be achieved in way that assured the ‘best use of both the human and natural 
resources’, of a given locality or region, to best meet the ‘needs and aspirations of the 
people on a sustainable basis’.  The approach had to involve ‘a creative and planned 
community effort’, with a view to cultivating ‘patterns of life, institutions, and techniques’ 
intended to give ‘fullest possible expression’ to their ‘distinctive cultural and social values 
and goals’.  As such, Sanchez wrote, ecodevelopment ‘would enhance the quality of life’, 
not only of individual people, but of ‘the community as a whole’.645   
 
Subsequently, in 1979, an International Institute for Environment and Development 
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(‘IIED’) study on the environmental performance of eight international institutions 
flagged ‘sustainable development’ as an ‘underexplored concept of development 
literature’.646  Perhaps the earliest attempt to comprehensively explore the term was, 
however, the 1980 World Conservation Strategy.  This was published in collaboration 
with UNEP and the World Wildlife Fund (‘WWF’).  The report carried the term 
‘sustainable development’ in one of its subtitles.  It also dedicated two chapters to the 
idea’s discussion.647  On the whole, the report’s stated objective was to take steps to 
achieving ‘sustainable development through the conservation of living resources’.  
Pursuing this objective, the report identified actions to ‘integrate conservation and 
development’ by improving ‘conservation efficiency’.648   
 
Imposing a clear order of priorities, the report called for the necessity of applying ‘human, 
financial, living and non-living resources’ in order to satisfy ‘human needs’, and to 
‘improve the quality of human life’.  For this to be ‘sustainable’, the report proposed, 
governments had to ‘take account of social and ecological factors, as well as economic 
ones’.  It noted that other relevant factors included the living and non-living resource base, 
as well as comparing ‘long term’ with the ‘short term’ effects of what the report called 
‘alternative actions’.  The World Conservation Strategy collapsed these various logics 
into its definition of ‘conservation’.  With this, conservation transformed into the concept 
of sustainable development.  While this concept did not eclipse conservation, it absorbed 
conservation in a specific way.  This is evident in the World Conservation Strategy’s 
framing.  Worth quoting here in full, it reveals a number of striking similarities to Desai’s 
characterisation:  
 
‘Conservation is defined here as: the management of human use of the biosphere so that 
it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its 
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations.  Thus conservation is 
positive, embracing preservation, maintenance, sustainable utilization, restoration, and 
enhancement of the natural environment.  Living resource conservation is specifically 
concerned with plants, animals and microorganisms, and with those non-living elements 
of the environment on which they depend.  Living resources have two important 
properties the combination of which distinguishes them from non-living resources: they 
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are renewable if conserved; and they are destructible if not.’649   
 
Shortly after the report’s release, usages of the phrase sustainable development became 
increasingly widespread.  Lester Brown’s book Building a Sustainable Society,650 along 
with a number of studies by international institutions—such as the World Bank—sought 
to elaborate upon the World Conservation Strategy’s approach.  For example, in 1984, 
the Bank’s staff circulated a paper entitled ‘Carrying Capacity, Population Growth, and 
Sustainable Development’ for internal discussion. 651   These works promised the 
possibility for countries to develop along conventional trajectories of techno-scientific, 
financial, and industrial growth, while also simultaneously preserving the integrity of the 
Earth’s natural processes.  Nevertheless, some astute actors recognised that the 
parameters of sustainable development could be cast in terms favourable to them.  
Michael Soule, for instance, criticised the concept as a ‘profane grail’ that carried within 
it an ‘odd delusion of having your cake and eating it too’.652  Yet, by building upon these 
logics, the WCED’s version of sustainable development offered a transcendent vantage 
point from which imagining a new reality—one that could apparently reconcile economic 
growth with the environment—became possible.   
 
II.   Unifying Fractured Narratives 
 
A key part of understanding how this new vision of sustainable development was 
manufactured is to consider the means by which dissident perspectives were either 
carefully shielded from view, or partly absorbed, by the WCED’s actions.  Despite what 
were—at the time—often-minimal responses from governments, many peoples’ attitudes 
continued to shift toward the need to tackle environmental issues.  These attitudes 
complemented an escalating recognition, by many scientists, of the severe consequences 
wrought by industrial expansion and rapid economic growth on human and environmental 
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health.  High-profile industrial disasters occurring during this period—such as those at 
Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and Chernobyl—also catalysed shifts in perceptions. 653  
Together, the factors compelled searches for new methods to bolster countries’ economic 
growth, while also addressing the concerns raised by environmental movements.  In the 
first subsection, I investigate how the task of promoting sustainable development—which 
became the final WCED report’s central theme—was perceived as being reliant upon 
strengthening poverty eradication, an objective exclusively achievable through economic 
growth.  Following this, I consider—in the second subsection—how commissioners 
sought agreement to downplay any role that affluence had as a significant cause of 
environmental damage.   
 
2.1.  Reinventing Poverty 
 
Following a number of discussions on Desai’s paper, many of the WCED’s 
representatives gradually accepted that a focus on poverty reduction might serve as a basis 
for reconciling their disparate positions.  Notwithstanding this, several Third World 
participants at the WCED’s public hearings spoke to different views.  Several speakers 
at the WCED’s Harare meeting in September 1986, for instance, insisted on the need to 
mobilise indigenous African knowledge and traditional skills for food and energy 
production.  They also argued that cash crops produced for foreign markets—which 
inevitably required an extensive use of synthetic fertilisers—should no longer be grown 
in preference to locally-adapted African crops.654   
 
Yet, the same speakers highlighted the fact that the global economic system did not allow 
African peoples’ regulatory autonomy to explore these policies.  Instead, these speakers 
pointed out that international trade law prohibited many types of infant industry 
protection.  It also made African exporters comply with non-tariff barriers—including 
rigorous food ‘standards’—as preconditions for supplying many First World markets.  
Therefore, they argued, international law indirectly forced African peoples to cultivate 
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foreign crops, which were destined mainly for export to high-income countries, in order 
to generate the national income necessary for economic recovery.655  These participants 
thus saw the benefits of large-scale irrigation projects as typically flowing to First World 
companies and a minority of wealthy Third World elites.  By contrast, they saw the 
majority of Third World peoples as having to bear the various costs of these arrangements.  
Such costs included an increased susceptibility to diseases from chemical use, in addition 
to degraded lands and ‘livelihoods’.656   
 
More specifically, one such comment was made by the Zambesi Wildlife Society’s 
Director, Dick Pitman.  He drew attention to the plight of some peoples, who he observed 
were ‘tied to a world system that creates such thing as beef mountains’.  Meanwhile, he 
said forcefully, those peoples were led to ‘destroy soil and forests’ in order to earn the 
‘foreign exchange’ they needed to survive.657  Using their traditional practices, however, 
Pitman argued that such people were ‘very capable indeed of developing in their own 
ways without destruction’.  With this, Pitman sought to open up the notion of 
development.  What was needed to achieve this, he said, was ‘a radical new approach to 
global problems’.  This approach could, Pitman proposed, permit countries to develop in 
‘their own more suitable manner’—that is to say, with their own resources and assets—
in ways that their peoples thought were ‘truly best for [a] general richer quality of life’.  
This was starkly opposed to conventional models of development, which Pitman claimed 
had already:  
 
‘led many industrial nations into the creation of shoddy consumer societies, the mental 
and physical ills of overdevelopment, the creation of appalling concrete slums and the 
assumption that true quality of life is based on a new car every two years and a 
conspicuous consumption of a wholly disproportionate quantity of the world’s 
resources.’658   
 
Pitman’s rejection of the global order spurred some commissioners to devote more 
attention to social issues than they had previously done so.  In particular, it seemed to 
have an effect on the two commissioners preparing the WCED report’s chapter on 
economic relations, Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal of Guyana and 
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former UNCTAD-UNECE adviser Janez Stanovnik of Slovenia.  Shortly thereafter, they 
circulated a draft document criticising the effects of international economic law on 
‘deteriorating terms of trade’, and on increasing the ‘debt-service obligations’ of poor 
countries.  Ramphal and Stanovnik’s draft also alleged that the International Monetary 
Fund’s and Bank’s structural adjustment programmes had depleted natural resources and 
degraded countries’ potential for achieving long-term development objectives. 659  
The result of such programmes, the two commissioners argued, was:  
 
‘[t]o require relatively poor countries simultaneously to curb their living standards, accept 
growing poverty and export growing amounts of scarce resources for the purpose of 
maintaining external credit-worthiness’.660   
 
Most of the WCED’s Third World commissioners supported Ramphal and Stanovnik’s 
assessment.  Yet, they encountered opposition from Hauff, Ruckelshaus, and Agnelli.661  
Allying themselves with many First World commissioners, these three spoke of their 
support for the draft chapter’s attempt to locate the sources of poverty.  However, they 
thought that the focus of debates should not have been on the role of the global economic 
system, or on international law.  Rather, they expressed belief that the chapter did not 
focus enough on the environmental causes of poverty.  In reply, Ramphal and Stanovnik 
confirmed that their draft chapter had perhaps strayed too far from issues about the 
environment, as narrowly-defined by the WCED.662  With this, they redrafted the chapter 
to reflect the discussions.   
 
The final report argued that the environment’s foremost adversary was not 
industrialisation, but rather the actions of peoples living in poverty.  ‘Those who are poor 
and hungry’, it said, ‘will often destroy their immediate environment in order to survive’.  
The WCED wrote that poverty forced such peoples to cut down forests, to overuse 
‘marginal land’, allow livestock to ‘overgraze grasslands’, and crowd into ‘congested 
cities’. 663   With this, the emphasis that Indira Gandhi—during her speech at the 
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Stockholm Conference—had placed on the issue of poverty shifted to a focus on poor 
peoples as the fundamental cause of environmental problems.  Forced to ‘overuse 
environmental resources to survive’, the WCED wrote, ‘impoverishment of their 
environment further impoverishes them’.664   
 
Our Common Future also argued that such a ‘vicious downward spiral’ tended to operate 
by forcing people ‘back into subsistence agriculture’.  This became cast as a source of 
environmental degradation.  Such activities, claimed the WCED, degraded the 
environment by drawing ‘heavily on the natural resource base’.665   Thus, the report 
argued, poverty reduced people’s capacity to use resources sustainably.  Addressing the 
United Nations General Assembly after the report’s publication, Brundtland similarly 
framed poverty as the principal cause and effect of environmental degradation, saying 
that it ‘lies at the heart of all issues’.666  In a contortion of logic, both poverty and 
environmental problems became reinvented in ways that shifted responsibility for their 
causes onto the very people suffering from those problems: that is to say, the world’s 
poorest people themselves.   
 
In the end, the WCED posited that stronger economic growth was the primary means for 
reducing poverty, and a central priority of global environmental work.  It proclaimed that 
‘meeting essential needs depend[ed] in part on achieving full growth potential’.  
Alongside this, the WCED emphasised that the world’s poor already had ‘their fair share 
of the resources required to sustain growth’. 667   Moreover, the report stated that 
sustainable development required ‘economic growth in places where such needs [were] 
not being met’.668  In practical terms, this meant ‘freer market access for the products of 
developing countries, lower interest rates, greater technology transfer, and significantly 
larger capital flows, both concessional and commercial’. 669   By highlighting the 
environmental impacts of poverty—and proposing that ‘more rapid economic growth’ 
could eradicate that poverty670—the WCED effectively co-opted the claims of Pitman, 
and other radical voices, to serve what became a global vision focused on growth as its 
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main goal.  Therefore, instead of emphasising self-sufficiency—or calling for a 
regeneration of people’s life-spaces—the commissioners proposed that economic 
interactions could potentially bind all states together in ‘ever-tightening networks’.671  
Ultimately, the WCED’s framing of poverty transformed the term from its wider, more 
traditional definition—implying some form of ‘deficiency’, or lack of a desired 
quantity672—into a version focused on maximising economic growth.   
 
The report’s identification of the world’s poor as a major cause of environmental 
destruction caused consternation.  Even some First World representatives admitted, in 
private, that ‘disproportionate attention was given to the role of developing countries’.673  
Yet, a number of other critics made emphatic attempts to oppose this.  For example, 
during a May 1986 meeting, the Brazilian commissioner Paulo Nogueira-Neto accused 
the WECD’s Secretary-General, Jim McNeill of Canada, of promulgating ‘excessive’ and 
‘extremely conservative’ Euro-American models of industrialisation and economic 
growth.674  Nogueira-Neto was highly critical of what he saw as the Secretariat’s efforts 
to frame these as exclusive forms of ‘development’.  His attitude irritated McNeill, who 
felt that Nogueira-Neto’s ‘moral superiority’ and ‘self-righteous’ demands had 
emboldened some other Third World representatives. 675   As a result, McNeill saw 
Nogueira-Neto’s contributions as increasingly undermining the Secretariat’s attempts to 
bridge divisions.   
 
In response, McNeill instructed the Secretariat to ignore Nogueira-Neto’s criticisms, 
feeling confident that these were not shared by the majority of commissioners. 676  
This effectively marginalised Nogueira-Neto, and several others with similar views.  
The Secretariat’s apparent lack of concern for these, seemingly radical perspectives, 
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prompted the Mexican Pablo González Casanova—who had been the ‘intellectual voice’ 
against imperialist trends—to feel increasingly unable to reconcile his own worldviews 
with the discussions taking place in the WCED.677  Shortly thereafter, Casanova resigned 
from the Commission—in August 1986—ostensibly for ‘personal reasons’.678   
 
2.2.  Understating Limits 
 
Many WCED members also sought to downplay synergies between high consumption 
patterns in affluent First World countries and environmental problems.  During the 
WCED’s public hearings in May 1986, for example, Stanovnik adamantly rejected any 
interpretation of development that implied economic stagnation.  Healthy societies, he 
argued, needed growth.  This growth, in turn, enabled countries to achieve budgetary 
surpluses and higher ‘GNP’.  Stanovnik opined, therefore, that the Commission should 
‘build into the concept of sustainable development the capacity of the society not only to 
reproduce itself but also to create surplus from which it could then go towards 
progress’.679  United States Treasury Secretary James Baker made the argument more 
forcefully.  He reasoned that economic growth would automatically lead to environmental 
protection.  This was because only people who had achieved high standards of living 
would begin to care for rivers and wildlife.  ‘No US political leader who wants to remain 
in office will endorse a slow-growth platform’, he added.680   
 
Hungarian commissioner István Láng, along with several others, expressed bitter 
opposition to these views.  A famed biologist, Láng argued that Third World demands for 
equity might require First World countries to limit their growth.  Ramphal shared this 
opinion.  He stated that biophysical limitations would likely prevent the possibility of all 
peoples ‘across the board’ from achieving First World ‘levels of consumption’.  As a 
consequence, Ramphal claimed, if rich countries continued to consume resources at their 
present rate, then it would not to be possible for poorer countries to achieve even 
‘tolerable level[s] of consumption’.681  An upshot of this, said one NGO leader, Tim Stoel, 
was that growth in First World countries would have to be ‘qualitative more than 
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quantitative’.  Meanwhile, he claimed that Third World countries would need greater 
quantitative growth.682   
 
Also speaking at the same meeting, Desai commented on the hypocrisy of downplaying 
affluence as a legitimate objective for Third World peoples.  Instead of reducing Third 
World consumption, Desai said, ‘the central issue’ should be the impact of First World 
industrial activities at the global level. 683   Ruckelshaus acknowledged that the 
commissioners came to realise that ‘there may be some limits to growth’.  Yet, he recalled, 
the WCED concurred that ‘we hadn’t approached them yet’.  Subsequent to their 
discussions, the commissioners ‘concluded that it was not an issue that [they] were going 
to be able to resolve’.  Rather, they agreed that what was needed—Ruckelshaus 
revealed—was a greater emphasis on ‘environmental stability’.  They saw this as a key 
part of the equation for encouraging both ‘economic growth as well as economic 
equity’.684   
 
Clearly, divisions about affluence and biophysical limits proved difficult to reconcile.  
While commissioners were unable to fully align their different views, the synthesis 
position outlined in Desai’s September 1986 memorandum proposed a consensus path.  
Desai’s proposal promised the possibility of ‘other, newer kinds of growth’.  
This included ‘higher levels’ of physical, intellectual, and spiritual growth, rather than 
merely economic growth.  There were ‘no limits to this kind of growth’, as opposed to 
‘the traditional sense’ of the term. 685   Some commissioners—such as Botero and 
Nogueira-Neto—appeared sympathetic to these alternative approaches to development.  
Some such alternatives called for profound changes to production and consumption 
patterns.  These included what became known as ‘steady-state’ or ‘de-growth’ 
economies.686  Regardless of this, First World commissioners remained unwilling to give 
up the consumer lifestyles on which their nations’ economies depended.  Proposals to 
reduce affluence were also criticised by the labour movements on which First World 
environmentalists depended for financial and political support.  On the other hand, most 
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Third World commissioners expressed eagerness for their nations to experience the 
benefits of consumer economies.  This inability—or unwillingness—to change 
preconceived views was reflected in McNeill’s explanation that:  
 
‘The politicians among us recognized that their colleagues in government couldn’t 
reconcile limits with the fact that in order to get elected they had to promise voters to 
grow the economy ever faster, indefinitely. And economists couldn’t reconcile limits with 
their basic models, which are utterly devoid of earthly constraints or which, at best, treat 
the earth as a mere externality.’687   
 
In light of these divisions, the WCED concurred that highlighting the role of affluence in 
the final report might become fraught.  Any strategy to do so might ultimately ‘cost more 
in lost support and potential misinterpretation’ than any prospective benefit in terms of 
‘accuracy and impartiality’.688  Therefore, the commissioners agreed to defuse the issue.  
As such, the final report simply asserted that sustainable development could act as a 
guardrail against crossing any biophysical limits.  While ‘growth and development were 
subject to constraints in available stocks of resources and of waste absorption capacities’, 
the WCED agreed, ecological limitations were ‘not absolute and physical but of a 
technological and social nature’.689  Explaining this logic further, Stanovnik declared that 
‘it is not resources and tangible materials which count’.  Rather, technology also had a 
role to play alongside them.  Given that the state of technology was ‘all the time changing’, 
Stanovnik claimed that there could be no certainty as to the ‘final limit’ of any given 
resource’.690  Building upon this claim, the WCED agreed to emphasise that all industrial 
activities could have potentially benign effects.  Aided by new technologies, the 
commissioners argued, the process of industrialisation could act as a cure—rather than as 
a cause—of environmental damage.  This could make environmental and development 
objectives both ‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing’.691   
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In addition to this, Our Common Future boldly declared that there were ‘no set limits’ to 
growth, either in population or resource usage terms.692  It emphasised a different notion 
of limits: those ‘imposed by the present state of technology and social organization’.  
The report highlighted these as affecting both the planet’s ability to absorb the effects of 
human activities, and humanity’s ability ‘to meet present and future needs’.693  The final 
report argued that technologies and societies could be ‘both managed and improved’, so 
as to ‘enhance the carrying capacity of the resource base’.  Together, it was said that these 
factors could ‘make way for a new era of economic growth’, in which all countries should 
aim for annual growth rates of 3 to 4 per cent.694  Any mention of possible risks tied to 
modern technologies—such as fostering countries’ ‘dependency’, or the ‘heavy social, 
economic, and environmental costs’ of deploying them695—was subsequently omitted 
from the report’s final version.   
 
In an added move, the commissioners took steps to cloak any potential conflicts between 
environmental and trade issues.  The WCED’s final report was replete with endorsements 
of the need to remove trade distortions and protectionist policies, liberalise trade, and 
increase the exports of developing countries.696  The inclusion of this text was partly the 
result of Strong’s repeated warnings to his fellow commissioners that any final product 
of their discussions would have to be ‘GATT legal’.697  Such a statement sidestepped the 
potentially immense complexities and precise conflicts between trade and environmental 
issues.  Fiona Macmillan describes the relationship as one of ‘systemic disharmony’.698  
So, clearly, Strong’s warnings—and the WCED’s report—prejudged the outcomes of 
these interactions between the environmental and trade regimes.  Put simply, the WCED 
prioritised trade and economic imperatives.  Its final report carefully conjured away 
potential conflicts—such as those arising from ideas about biophysical limits—between 
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any economic and environmental concerns.  McNeill later explained—after the final 
report’s publication—that this issue about the ‘limits to growth’ transformed into a 
recognition of the ‘growth of limits’.699  When Brundtland presented the WCED’s final 
report to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1987, she acknowledged that 
‘the contents of growth must be changed’.  Yet, she said, the WCED regarded economic 
growth as ‘absolutely necessary’.700   
 
Following the WCED’s work, the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) also attempted to 
reify perceived boundaries between the trade and environmental regimes of international 
law.  The WTO Secretariat clarified that it was ‘not an environmental agency’, and ‘only 
competent to deal with trade’.  With regard to environmental issues, the institution stated 
that its ‘only task’ was to ‘study questions that arise when environmental policies have a 
significant impact on trade’.701  Furthermore, the WTO also noted—in what was widely 
seen as a ground-breaking report—that trade liberalisation and economic growth could 
not, in themselves, resolve all environmental problems:   
 
‘Economic growth is not sufficient for turning environmental degradation around […] 
If economic incentives facing producers and consumers do not change with higher 
incomes, pollution will continue to grow unabated with the growing scale of economic 
activity.’702   
 
Moving from these issues of trade and the environment back onto sustainable 
development, the final version of Our Common Future designated that the concept was a 
set of techniques, and behaviours, designed to rectify both the ‘failures of “development” 
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and failures in the management of our human environment’.703  With this, the report 
sought to compel expanded efforts to monitor and regulate the planet: including air, water, 
soil, and energy usage.  This attitude—as I have highlighted in earlier chapters—was 
reminiscent of historical projects with regard to the ownership, dominance, and the desire 
for mastery over nature.  Led by this attitude, states installed centrally-designed 
institutions, regulatory mechanisms, and executive agencies—overseen by certain 
‘experts’ or technocrats—that were supposedly indispensable for performing these tasks.  
As Our Common Future stated, reorienting the mandates of ‘central economic and 
sectorial ministries’ to ‘anticipate and prevent environmental damage’ would require 
‘major institutional development and reform’.  This was particularly the case, it stated, in 
‘poor or small’ countries that have ‘limited managerial capacity’ and would ‘find it 
difficult to do this unaided’.  The report added that those countries would ‘need financial 
and technical assistance and training’.704   
 
Upon the final report’s publication, the United Kingdom and United States governments 
deeply opposed many of its recommendations.  Specifically, their representatives 
contested suggestions that new global institutions needed to be created.  They also 
rejected proposals to ‘channel revenue from the global commons to sustainable 
development’, as well as calls to relinquish corporations’ intellectual property rights over 
transferred technologies.705  Nonetheless, both governments offered unreserved support 
for the WCED’s vision of sustainable development.  For example, Sir Crispin Tickell—
speaking for the United Kingdom—welcomed the final report’s recommendation of 
tackling ‘poverty and environmental degradation through long-term economic growth’.706  
In support, United States President George Bush also spoke of the need to sustain 
‘economic growth as the key to sustainable development’.707  Accepting this logic, a 
number of other First and Third World governments made reservations—in the United 
Nations General Assembly—about possible risks that the WCED’s recommendations 
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might have upon countries’ economic prospects.708  Yet, member states committed the 
United Nations to the task of sustainable development.  They also agreed to implement 
sustainable development policies within their own countries.   
 
This gave an opportunity for the Bank to expand its operations.  It came at a time when 
the Bank was facing condemnation, from many fronts, for its infamous Third World 
‘structural adjustment programmes’.  Perhaps partly as a way of deflecting this criticism, 
its Senior Vice-President David Hopper declared—in 1988—‘that over the course of the 
next year, the Bank will be addressing the full range of environmental needs of its partner 
nations’.  These needs, he said, were both ‘technical’ and ‘institutional’.  Hopper 
proposed that they would take place at all levels of a project’s design plans: all the way 
from its ‘micro-details’ to the ‘macro-requirements of formulating, implementing and 
enforcing environmental policies’.709  Following this logic, the World Bank’s 1992 World 
Development Report sought to downplay what it called the ‘sensational’ risks of 
technological hazards and nuclear accidents.  The Bank implicitly highlighted its own 
expertise, stating that people ‘had to be educated to understand the true extent’ of these—
along with other—environmental risks.  It framed these risks as ‘less dramatic’ than many 
had portrayed, and ‘often under an individual’s own control’.710   
 
In all, the WCED’s vision of a common future attributed responsibility for environmental 
problems predominantly to the actions of the world’s poorest peoples.  At the same time, 
it explicitly endorsed increased production, consumption, and economic growth.  
This established a relationship of equivalence between economic development and 
environmental protection.  Significantly, these concepts were refashioned—through 
sustainable development—in ways making them appear reconcilable.  The meanings of 
both development and the environment became configured around economic demands.  
Put in simpler terms, this strategic formulation offered an imaginative attempt to dissolve 
perceived conflicts between environmental and economic priorities.  Fundamentally, 
what was sustained in the idea of sustainable development was the logic of growth-based 
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development.  The WCED manufactured a story in which the world’s poor were cast as 
unsustainable antagonists of the global environment, who desperately needed to reform 
their living patterns.   
 
Meanwhile, the WCED’s denial of affluence as a root cause of environmental harms 
reaffirmed the viability of technologically-advanced, industrialised societies as normative 
horizons to which all should strive.  This had a de-radicalising—or counter-
emancipatory—effect, which precluded any need to deeply alter prevalent development 
models or practices.  Subsequently, the report had a significant effect on changing global 
perceptions about limits to growth.  Following the WCED’s work, it became ‘politically 
incorrect’—by the early 1990s—to even mention the idea in international fora, save to 
deny or discredit it.711  The United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human 
Development Report declared, for example, that there was no longer any ‘tension’ 
between national economies and sustainable development.  Both concepts, it claimed, 
relied on the ‘universalism of life claims’. 712   The economy’s liaison with the 
environment thus fortified the ailing concept, which emerged with rejuvenated life: what 
the WCED ended up calling a ‘new era of economic growth’.713   
 
III.  A Fall Toward Apotheosis 
 
Despite widespread governmental support for Our Common Future, a number of 
prominent scholars and commentators voiced dissenting opinions against it.  Upon its 
publication, some immediately recognised problems with how the WCED had sought to 
balance environmental and economic concerns.  The outcome became highly 
controversial.  It attracted much condemnation from those who regarded economic 
growth as the main cause of environmental degradation.  For instance, Daly labelled it a 
‘glaring contradiction’.714   Likewise, economist Walter Rees described the WCED’s 
appeal for a ‘revitalisation’ of growth as ‘paradoxical at best’.715  Predictably, many 
NGOs and civil society groups also expressed dissatisfaction with the WCED’s 
conclusions.  At a follow-up meeting held for NGOs in December 1988, many 
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participants claimed that parts of Our Common Future were ‘profoundly wrong’. 716  
Mindful of this, the present section explores the means by which this dissensus became 
neutralised—specifically, during the Rio Earth Summit process—in order for the concept 
of sustainable development to become globally accepted.   
 
Energised by the WCED’s work, United Nations member states agreed to convene the 
1992 Rio Earth Summit for the purposes of ‘elaborating strategies and measures’ to 
promote sustainable development.717  With this, sustainable development became the 
conference’s leitmotif.  Bringing together more than 150 countries, 1,400 NGOs, and 
8,000 journalists,718 the conference represented another major moment in international 
law’s evolving vision of the environment.  During the first preparatory meetings, member 
state representatives reiterated their main demands.  At Maurice Strong’s urging, a focus 
development finance quickly dominated discussions.  ‘The key issue’, Strong announced 
at the first preparatory meeting in March 1990, was to negotiate Third World countries’ 
access ‘to the new technologies they needed’, and to the ‘additional resources’—above 
and beyond existing levels—required for integrating environmental activities into 
national development plans.719  This reflected a ‘stark reality’, he said, that these countries 
simply could not afford the short-term funds required to invest in sustainable 
development.  
 
Framing sustainable development in this way ignited conflicts amongst the meeting’s 
participants.  Representatives of the United States rebuked suggestions that additional aid 
needed to be given to Third World countries.  Instead, they repeated the importance of 
lowering trade barriers and eliminating Third World subsidies.  The United States 
government also sought to promote market-based solutions to environmental problems.  
Emboldened by Strong’s message, however, G-77 members devoted many of their 
attentions over the subsequent months to inserting text—obligating additional financial 
support from First World governments—into the draft papers of every major working 
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group of the Preparatory Conference.720  These actions caused even Strong to admit that 
‘little real progress’ had been made to the conference’s most pressing issues.721   
 
Added to this impasse were several interlocking factors that threatened to derail the 
conference completely.  In August 1990, the Iraqi government invaded Kuwait.  
This deflected attention away from the Rio Earth Summit’s preparations.  
Importantly, however, environmental factors—and specifically, the Iraqi government’s 
‘environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources’—was invoked as an alibi 
for the Security Council’s decision to intervene in the First Gulf War.722  The conflict led 
to high volatility in oil prices.  This reduced consumer confidence all over the world.  
As oil prices rapidly increased, they caused economic crises, particularly in Europe and 
the United States.  The resulting fiscal impacts made First World countries unwilling to 
offer any new financial commitments as part of the Rio Earth Summit process.723   
 
Maintaining these rigid positions also undermined European and American 
counterproposals.  One of the United States delegation’s legal advisers warned, for 
instance, that—without sufficient counter-incentives—many governments of the Third 
World and Europe, along with most American environmentalists, would likely ‘object to 
international emissions trading’ mechanisms as part of a proposed climate change 
agreement.  This was particularly the case where such proposals appeared to ‘dodge or 
displace reductions’ from sources in the United States to other nations.724  The Brazilian 
and Indian governments appeared acutely ‘hostile to the market-place permit concept’.  
They suspected First World countries would use ‘economic leverage’ to ‘transfer 
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emissions reduction obligations’ in ways that could ‘interfere with their development’.725   
 
Another noticeable aspect of the preparatory negotiations affected by First World 
governments’ inability—or unwillingness—to pledge additional financial support were 
those of a planned treaty to protect the world’s biological diversity.  Commonly referring 
to the immensely complex genetic variability of plants and animals, these were seen by 
many participants as safeguards for humanity’s future needs: particularly in relation to 
medicines and agriculture.726  As a result, the controversial Convention on Biological 
Diversity sought to consolidate existing agreements on species protection—including the 
Convention on the Trade in Endangered Species—into a more comprehensive agreement, 
covering both issues of species protection and guidelines for using resources.  The United 
States government long supported such a comprehensive approach to a biological 
diversity treaty.727  The country’s biotechnology industry had already gained, by this 
stage, significant financial benefits from patent laws that allowed companies to identify 
plants and animals with potentially lucrative uses in medicines, manufacturing, or 
agriculture.  These laws enabled transnational biotechnology firms to patent and sell these 
improved—or what some criticised as merely repackaged—‘discoveries’ as commodities 
back to their countries of origin, often at enormous profit.  Responding to these trends, 
some Third World governments—led by the government of Mexico—sought to claim a 
share of profits from species derived from their lands.728   
 
Like the parallel negotiations on a climate change treaty, many governments regarded 
this proposed treaty on biodiversity as an important trump card.  At the Rio Earth Summit, 
some G-77 nations allied to demand that the biodiversity treaty ensure that multinational 
companies ‘equitably’ share any benefits derived from genetic resources with the source 
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countries from which they were obtained. 729   Those countries also sought to codify 
measures restricting private investment and exploration upon what they claimed were 
their sovereign territories.  In response, the United States government—along with its 
European allies—contended that their corporations had legal rights to ownership over any 
discoveries they had made through free enterprise.  This argument shows how deeply 
embedded the logic of Vitoria’s justification for the Spanish appropriation of indigenous 
peoples’ resources in the Americas—and its conceptualisation of property—had become.  
Throughout the 1980s, the logic continued to serve as a basis for some wealthy First 
World nations’ threats to impose trade sanctions against countries—such as India—
whose governments were unwilling to recognise, or enforce, patent standards.730   
 
After significant delays, country representatives eventually agreed to appoint Strong and 
Singaporean diplomat Tommy Koh as joint chairs of the Rio Earth Summit’s Main 
Committee.  They decided to separate the negotiations into several workstreams.  
The first of these working groups met to draft the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21.  
A second working group was tasked with negotiating the proposed convention on climate 
change.  By May 1992, however, these discussions had reached a low point.  The United 
States refused to accept any stringent standards on greenhouse gas emissions, on the 
rationale that these would harm the trade competitiveness of American firms.  As United 
States President George Bush proclaimed, ‘the American lifestyle is not up for 
negotiation’.731   
 
Negotiators from the United States convinced British representatives to renege on a 
proposal for the draft treaty to include emissions caps, saying that it was the only possible 
option for avoiding a collapse of the negotiations.  The United Kingdom then lobbied 
other European governments to do the same.  These actions caused internal disharmony 
within the European Community.732  Following this, the treaty text was watered down 
during the working group’s final meeting by its French chair Jean Ripart.  He redrafted 
                                                 
729 Stephen Hopgood, American Foreign Environmental Policy and the Power of the State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 170. The issue was first openly raised by the Mexican government 
at a meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization (‘FAO’) in 1984. See Paul E Little, ‘Ritual, Power 
and Ethnography at the Rio Earth Summit’ (1995) 15(3) Critique of Anthropology 265, 269. 
730 Ibid 170.  
731 ‘A greener Bush’, The Economist (online), available at: 
<https://www.economist.com/leaders/2003/02/13/a-greener-bush> (last accessed on 18 May 2018). 
732 ‘Letter from Clayton Yeutter to Chris Sheehan, Environment: UNCED [1 of 3]’, David Bradford Files, 
Council of Economic Advisors, BPL, cited in Stephen J Macekura, Of Limits and Growth: The Rise of 
Global Sustainable Development in the Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 288.  
 184 
language on emissions caps and implementation timetables in more general terms than 
had previously appeared.  Several parties—including the Philippines and India—opposed 
his new formulation.  These parties refrained, however, from pressing for action against 
Ripart’s text, in light of the progress that had been made on other issues in the treaty, and 
their desire to secure a consensus position.733   
 
Relatedly, Strong and Koh established a third group to discuss terms of the biodiversity 
treaty.  These negotiations, however, faced a significant hurdle following the actions of 
several Third World governments’ to insert provisions demanding mandatory technology 
transfers on non-commercial terms into the draft treaty text.  These were squarely aimed 
at circumventing existing intellectual property rights held by First World multinational 
corporations.  The resulting draft Article 16 proposed that Third World nations should 
retain complete sovereignty over biological resources sourced from their territories.  
This conferred discretion on such nations to invalidate any existing patent laws that 
applied over new scientific discoveries derived from those resources.734   
 
These actions incensed the United States government.  Its State Department responded 
by declaring, only days before the conference was due to begin, that it ‘does not and 
cannot sign’ such a ‘fundamentally flawed’ agreement. 735   President George Bush 
claimed that the convention would ‘retard the development of biotechnology’, and 
‘undermine the protection of ideas’. 736   European governments also had interests in 
protecting their own biotechnology companies.  Yet, they recognised the inequality of the 
situation.  They supported a compromise text that recognised some intellectual property 
protections, but gave Third World countries access on ‘fair’ and ‘favourable’ terms.  This 
included some ‘concessional and preferential’ treatment.737  Despite this, many parties 
feared that the discussions might face a similar fate to that of a fourth group, which had 
attempted to negotiate a forest protection treaty.  This was abandoned at its final 
preparatory meeting due to a realisation that no substantive agreement was within 
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reach.738   
 
From 3 to 14 June 1992, delegates met in Rio de Janeiro to salvage an agreement.  As a 
concession for securing some of its other demands, G-77 nations abandoned proposals to 
establish a United Nations-administered ‘green fund’ for delivering additional 
development finance.  They did, however, secure a non-binding statement to increase 
financial assistance to them.  In addition, all governments agreed to sign a heavily-
compromised Framework Convention on Climate Change. 739   The final text of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity also attracted widespread acceptance.  A noteworthy 
exception was that of the United States, which did not sign it, ostensibly due to the reasons 
cited earlier.  Moreover, all governments signed the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21.740  
Importantly, the final text of these two outcome documents appeared more alike 
declarations on development, rather than ones directly on environmental issues.  
Participants invested much time and diplomatic skill to ensure that no provision could be 
interpreted as a restriction upon the development promise.  This served as a convenient 
compromise for all nations, which desired above all to protect the techno-scientific, 
industrial model of the global economy, regardless of its environmental effects.   
 
Fundamentally, the Rio outcomes reflected an ongoing global consensus to interpret 
environmental concerns in ways that were subsidiary to—or perhaps a subset of—
economic development.  For example, the Rio Declaration’s Principle 2 reaffirmed states’ 
prerogative to ‘exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies’.741  It duplicated Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, save 
for the addition of the words ‘and developmental’ after its reference to the environment.  
We might observe these as displacing the more delicate balance between environmental 
and development issues that had previously appeared in the Stockholm Declaration.  
In support of this argument, the Rio Declaration also affirmed that the ‘right to 
development’, which had been recognised by the General Assembly several years before 
the Rio Earth Summit.742  The Rio Declaration called for fulfilment of this right as a 
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necessary precondition for states’ ability to ‘equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations’.743   
 
As concessions for these (essentially) G-77 demands, First World countries petitioned for 
explicit recognition of a hierarchy between environmental issues and economic growth.  
Their efforts culminated in the Rio Declaration’s Principle 4.  It recognised that 
‘environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and 
cannot be considered in isolation from it’. 744   Then, turning to the central issue of 
sustainable development, the declaration recognised that ‘eradicating poverty’ was ‘an 
indispensable requirement for sustainable development’. 745   With this—and the Rio 
Declaration’s 13 other references to the idiom—the conference consecrated sustainable 
development as a central nodal point of international (environmental) law.  It reproduced 
a developmental logic dependent on economic growth.  Furthermore, it reified a view that 
all environmental problems—whether they resulted from agriculture, fishing, forestry, 
mining, nuclear energy, or urbanisation—were resolvable if only additional finance and 
transfers of industrial technology were possible.  Vandana Shiva observed that this 
reduced solutions for environmental problems ‘to a currency that the North dominates’, 
thereby expanding those countries’ spheres of control.746  This undermined international 
law’s capacity to operate as a genuine space for political debate.   
 
Conclusion 
 
I wish to return, at this juncture, to Earthrise.  The image offered an intoxicating 
perspective—one that was both universal and hegemonic—of the world.  With this in 
mind, I opened this chapter with a description of how the image—seen from transcendent 
vantage point—led to a global ideology.  This ideology was that of sustainable 
development.  In what followed, I engaged in a close study of sustainable development 
as a legally-produced concept.  Investigating the debates and discussions of two 
international bodies—the WCED, and the 1992 Rio Convention—I drew attention to the 
environment’s ongoing redefinition against the backdrop of dissenting voices.  
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These voices had sought to reveal global ecological disturbances effected by a 
developmental vision that was predicated on economic priorities.  Yet, sustainable 
development was strategically formulated in a way that obscured, and dissolved, these 
anomalies.  The idea mediated, and normalised, contradictory impulses between 
ecological disturbances, on one hand, and demands for greater use of raw material 
resources, on the other.   
 
I argued that sustainable development reframed the lifestyles of the world’s poorest 
peoples—those with minimal pollution, deforestation, and climate change impacts—as 
the principal causes of environmental problems.  It cast those peoples as unsustainable, 
and called for their reformation—along techno-scientific and financial pathways—to 
become paragons of developed, industrialised modernity.  Meanwhile, sustainable 
development framed the rich’s affluent lifestyles as pathways to salvation.  This, I added, 
made economic growth the principal focus of international law’s approach to 
environmental problems.  It reiterated a vision of environmentalism as being consistent 
with growth.  The concept also negated the possibility that such growth was limited by 
environmental factors.  Furthermore, sustainable development’s logic vested greater 
management and control to those who had successfully represented themselves as 
detached from the earthly cradle—certain governments, elite minorities, and international 
institutions—to oversee the world from a superior standpoint above it.   
 
Nevertheless, I observed that many peoples contested this framing.  They appeared to 
recognise the violence of homogenisation, and erasure of diversity, embedded in its logic.  
Proponents of these counternarratives sought instead to make visible alternative cultural 
heritages, knowledges, aspirations, and environmental approaches.  Specifically, these 
approaches included lowering production and consumption patterns, pursuing calls for 
‘environmental justice’, as well as simply seeking greater autonomy over own destinies.  
Within this context, the story I have presented in this chapter involves multiple, 
overlapping, and contested notions of the environment.747  Yet, these claims—and the 
radical potential of those peoples living ‘on the ground’—were co-opted through a range 
a tactics that were deployed to secure consensus.  In charting this interplay, I also revealed 
how the WCED and Rio Earth Summit stabilised the logic of sustainable development, 
which became deployed as a way to sustain the global order.   
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In conclusion, the effect of these interrelated conferences was not to dispense with—or 
reconstitute—pre-existing hegemonies.  Rather, it elevated a set of stories—and 
relationship to a particular notion of development—to a transcendent level.  This turn to 
a global (‘de-earthed’) vision helped to conceal international law’s potential to 
accommodate other stories.  By the same token, the realities of life ‘on the ground’—
namely, its real conflicts and oppositions—were given scant consideration.  Law’s ability 
to attenuate itself to these voices was then lost from view.  This also wiped away any 
notion of contestation to the apparently unified vision.  Yet, as I show in the following 
chapter, further anxieties with regard to this led to yet more reforms to international law’s 
vision of the environment.  We shall see how these gradually embedded smaller scales of 
locality into the global, which served to enlarge the operation of market fundamentalism.  
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CHAPTER SIX   
 
APPROPRIATING LOCALITY, SUSTAINING MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
 
‘Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their 
defeat, and then it turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what 
they meant under another name.’  
 
— William Morris, A Dream of John Ball (1888)748  
 
Introduction 
 
The Great Pacific Garbage Patch is the world’s largest collection of floating waste.  It was 
discovered by yachtsman in the late-1990s between Hawaii and California. 749  
Ocean currents collect debris in what is now a million square mile floating archipelago.  
The majority of it comprises over 79,000 metric tonnes of plastic debris.  
Microplastics allegedly comprise 94 per cent of around 1.8 trillion pieces of plastic in the 
patch.  Plastic fishing nets, and other fishing industry waste, account for the majority of 
this waste.750  The patch, however, represents only a fraction of 6.3 billion tonnes of 
plastic waste that has now built up in the world’s landfills and oceans. 751  
The proliferation of this type of waste—particularly since the 1950s—has been widely 
depicted in literature.  Made up of synthetic ‘polymers’—derived from the Greek words 
for ‘many’ (poly) and ‘parts’ (mer)—these repeating molecular structures were not 
intended to easily disintegrate.  On the contrary, they were designed with durability and 
longevity in mind. 752   They have since become a ubiquitous convenience: cheap, 
                                                 
748 William Morris, A Dream of John Ball (London: Booklasic, 2015) [1888], p. 22. 
749 Laura Parker, ‘The Great Pacific Garbage Patch Isn’t What You Think it Is’, National Geographic 
(online), 22 March 2018, available at: <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/03/great-pacific-
garbage-patch-plastics-environment> (last accessed on 30 March 2018).  
750 Laurent Lebreton, Boyan Slat, Francesco Ferrari, Bruno Sainte-Rose, Jen Aitken, Bob Marthouse, 
Sara Hajbane, Serena Cunsolo, Anna Schwarz, Aurore Levivier, Kim Noble, Pavla Debeljak, Hanna 
Maral, Rosanna Schoeneich-Argent, Roberto Brambini, and Julia Reisser, ‘Evidence that the Great 
Pacific Garbage Patch is rapidly accumulating plastic’ (2018) 8(4666) Scientific Reports 1. 
751 Laura Parker, ‘Plastics’ (2018) 6 National Geographic USA 40, 49. See also, World Economic Forum, 
The New Plastics Economy: Rethinking the future of plastics (Geneva: WEF, 2016), available at: 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_New_Plastics_Economy.pdf> (last accessed on 21 January 
2017), p. 7. See also, Simon Jennings, Frédéric Mélin, Julia L Blanchard, Rodney M Forster, Nicholas K 
Dulvy, Rod W Wilson, ‘Global-scale predictions of community and ecosystem properties from simple 
ecological theory’ (2008) 275(1641) Proceedings of the Royal Society B 1375. 
752 Susan Freinkel, Plastic: A Toxic Love Story (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), p. 7. 
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adaptable, and widely used.  They became known as plastics—originating from the Greek 
word plastikos—due to their infinite capacity to be shaped and moulded.   
 
I suggest, in this chapter, that international law’s post-Rio vision of the environment 
shares several similar characteristics. 753   Like plastic, the vision has now become 
ubiquitous.  Overwhelmingly, this is partly attributable to the flourishing of international 
legal instruments in the years after the Rio Earth Summit.  The moment marked an 
expansion of international regulations over environmental matters.  Yet, this coincided 
with a narrowing of perceptions toward the idea of the environment itself.  
Greater participation of actors in codifying laws regulating the environment also brought 
with it a more diverse range of perspectives.  This led to heightened attempts to destabilise 
what were, by now, persistently dominant (‘neoliberal’) 754  perceptions toward the 
environment.  The question to which I wish to turn, therefore, is how international laws 
and institutions responded to these competing, counter-hegemonic logics.  I argue that 
the outcome was not merely a compromise between opposing forces. 755  Rather, the 
present chapter investigates how the environment became a ubiquitous, durable, and 
malleable device with which to sustain a hegemonic global order, being both 
determinative and responsive to those logics and languages existing beyond it.756   
 
My argument consists of three sections.  In the first section, I argue that actors buttressed 
a trade-friendly, marketised global order in two ways: firstly, by diluting the mandates 
                                                 
753 Here, I use the word ‘polymer’—rather than ‘plastic’—so as to avoid any direct engagement with 
Catherine Malabou’s concept of ‘plasticity’, which some describe as a ‘triple movement of receiving, 
giving and destroying form’. However, I acknowledge that there may be resonances with her work. See 
Alberto Toscano, ‘Plasticity, Capital, and the Dialectic’, in Brenna Bhandar & Jonathan Goldberg-Hillier 
(eds), Plastic Materialities: Politics, Legality, and Metamorphosis in the Work of Catherine Malabou 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), p. 110.  
754 According to some scholars, ‘[t[he ideologically hegemonic position has been the neo-liberal agenda 
(widely called the Washington Consensus). It calls for trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation, 
deregulation, openness to foreign direct investment, a competitive exchange rate, fiscal discipline, lower 
taxes, and smaller government’. See William K Tabb, Economic Governance in the Age of Globalisation 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 3. The admission that the welfare benefits of 
globalisation were ‘overstated’ has led to ‘post-Washington Consensus policies that maintain a neo-
liberal approach to globalisation, pursuing privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation’. See, for 
example, Paul Krugman, ‘Globalisation and Welfare’, in United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD), ‘The Sources of Neoliberal Globalization’ (2002) 2 Report of UNRISD Seminar 
on Improving Knowledge on Social Development in International Organizations 4.   
755 For an excellent alternative argument advanced by Annelise Riles on this point, see Annelise Riles, 
‘Infinity within the Brackets’ (1998) 25(3) American Ethnologist 378.  
756 For a similar argument on law more generally, see Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also, Fitzpatrick’s elaboration of ‘receptive 
creativity’ in Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Reading slowly: The law of literature and the literature of law’, in Ruth 
Buchanan, Stewart Motha, and Sundhya Pahuja, Reading Modern Law: Critical Methodologies and 
Sovereign Formations (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 194. 
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and activities of institutions created to pursue environmental agendas, so as to neutralise 
challenges to the existing order; and secondly, to imagine environmental problems as a 
series of rectifiable ‘market failures’.  Following this, Section II examines how key 
political leaders responded to critiques by operationalising what became known as the 
‘green economy’.  Above all, it envisioned importing new classes of assets—in so-called 
natural capital and ‘environmental goods and services’—into economic thinking.  
These sought to assign monetary values to previously unpriced resources, and promote 
flexible regulatory regimes, through the operation of market mechanisms.  
Finally, Section III observes how recent legal instruments—the Sustainable Development 
Goals (‘SDGs’) and the Paris Climate Agreement—have sought to consolidate dominant 
logics, principally by preserving models of industrial export-based trade and market 
growth.  Examining these instruments, particularly the underlying logics and normative 
visions embedded in their construction, I suggest that they may make an authentic 
reimagining of environmental governance more difficult to accomplish.  
 
I.    Law’s Neoliberal Orientations: Marketising Ecologies 
 
Initially, the Rio Declaration was met by many social groups and scholars with derision.  
Wolfgang Sachs, for example, saw it as avoiding necessary discussions about how to 
change the global economy’s trajectory.757  Similarly, Martin Holdgate claimed that it 
‘left a mountain of problems untackled’ and that countless ‘fundamental questions were 
side-stepped’.758  Others disparaged the Declaration’s unwieldly, vague, and excessively 
cautious provisions, which lacked binding force.  In this vein, some ecologists—including 
Nicholas Hildyard—claimed that parties weakened UNEP by allowing United Nations 
agencies to appropriate and transform the environment into a development issue.  
He, along with several others, felt that the World Bank was the Declaration’s greatest 
beneficiary.  The Bank avoided any obligation to alter its operations, while increasing its 
funding by acquiring greater funding through its control of an expanded Global 
Environmental Fund (‘GEF’). 759   Meanwhile, Rosa Koire—founder of the Post-
Sustainability Institute—considered the Agenda 21 action plan as a hegemonic 
instrument:  
                                                 
757 Wolfgang Sachs, ‘Global ecology and the shadow of “development”’, in Wolfgang Sachs, Global 
Ecology: A New Arena of Political Conflict (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 10. 
758 Martin W Holdgate, ‘Questions about Rio’ (1992) 21(3) IUCN Bulletin 2. 
759 Nicholas Hildyard, ‘Foxes in charge of the chickens’, in Wolfgang Sachs, Global ecology: a new 
arena of political conflict (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 22.  
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‘implemented worldwide to inventory and control all land, all water, all minerals, all 
plants, all animals, all construction, all means of production, all energy, all education, all 
information, and all human beings in the world’.760   
 
It represented, she suggested, an unprecedented set of policies—masquerading as 
environmentalism—through which a minority class of global elites could exploit a 
majority of the world’s population.  If implemented, Koire argued that the Action Plan’s 
provisions—which she described as seeking to confer property rights over the 
environment for the exclusive pleasure of corporations and a rich minority of peoples—
could bring about ‘the greatest transfer of wealth’ in recorded memory away from the 
world’s poor.761  Her denunciation was shared by scholars, like Sylvie Brunel, who 
considered the ‘elitist vision of sustainable development’ a strategy for wealthy people to 
defend their high resource-consuming lifestyles by attacking the lifestyles of the poor.  
She feared that it would turn nature into a ‘museum’ of plants and animals, to be kept for 
the enjoyment of the wealthy, while depriving the poor of its benefits.762  These critiques, 
by Brunel and Koire respectively, reflected positions drawn from across the spectrum of 
mainstream Euro-American politics.  Both sets of critiques were, however, grounded on 
notions of economic wellbeing.  As such, their efforts sought to challenge problems 
associated with rapidly changing ecologies, while at the same time preserving the 
politico-economic logics that underpinned the pre-existing global order.  In other words, 
they attempted to justify their claims using the epistemology of their adversaries.  They 
sought, in Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger’s words, to uphold a logic in which:  
 
‘old thinking about economic growth prevails, old institutions promoting such growth 
persist, and the old development establishment that had made a living out of such 
economic growth has repackaged itself in green and miraculously represented itself as 
the new global environmental leaders’.763   
 
                                                 
760 Rosa Koire, ‘What is the United Nations Agenda 21?’, The Post-Sustainability Institute (online), 
available at <https://www.postsustainabilityinstitute.org/what-is-un-agenda-21.html> (last accessed on 27 
March 2018). 
761 Ibid. 
762 Sylvie Brunel, Le development durable (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 116-118, quoted 
in Iris Borowy, Defining Sustainable Development for Our Common Future: A History of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission) (London: Routledge, 2014), 
p. 200. 
763 Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, The Earth Brokers: Power, Politics and World Development 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 1994), p. 162. 
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Much of this alignment with—and durability of—economic interests was, according to 
Naomi Klein, attributable to the actions of environmental NGOs.  Desiring recognition 
as ‘serious’ players in environmental governance, some powerful organisations—like the 
Environmental Defense Fund and the Nature Conservancy—portrayed environmental 
issues as ‘narrow technical problems with no end of profitable solutions within the market 
system’.764  For example, Klein reveals that these NGOs partnered large multinational 
corporations—such as FedEx, General Motors and Walmart—to redefine the problem of 
climate change.  In so doing, they presented climate change as driven by circumstances 
other than material overconsumption, high-emissions industrial agriculture, internal 
combustion engines, or an internal trade system that largely ignored the effects of 
transporting commodities over vast geographical distances.  Discussion of such issues 
would have led to demands for fundamental changes to the global economic order, and 
to the structure of industrial societies: including how people ‘live, work, eat, and shop’.765  
Evidence suggests that some transnational NGOs even acted as ‘constricting forces’ that 
‘softened radical analysis’ in exchange for ‘minimal access to the halls of power’.766 
 
Buoyed by these organisations, and armed with their logics, many states sought to 
implement the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 through a vast array of international legal-
institutional instruments.  Certainly, their sheer volume might have been great cause for 
optimism.  Over the following decade—from 1993 to 2002—states built upon what they 
had agreed at Rio with over 5,505 international agreements, amendments, protocols, 
declarations, and resolutions.767  The first such post-Rio initiative, agreed through the 
United Nations, was to create the Commission on Sustainable Development (‘CSD’) in 
November 1992.  Agreed soon after the delegates left Rio, it gave some indication of how 
they intended the regime to blossom: particularly through its hidden logics, interests, and 
privileged actors.  A permanent body with a small secretariat, its intention was to ‘monitor 
implementation’ of the Rio Declaration.  The CSD’s Chair, Razali Ismail of Malaysia, 
called it ‘arguably the main tangible accomplishment of the Rio Summit’. 768  
                                                 
764 Klein (2014), p. 210. 
765 Ibid. 
766 Tim Simons and Ali Tonack, ‘The Dead End of Climate Justice’, counterpunch (online), 8 January 
2010, available at: <https://www.counterpunch.org/2010/01/08/the-dead-end-of-climate-justice> (last 
accessed on 12 April 2018), p. 10. 
767 Ronald B Mitchell, ‘International Environmental Agreements Database Project’, Version 2018.1, 
available at: <https://iea.uoregon.edu/base-agreement-
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accessed 11 August 2018). 
768 ‘Representatives from 53 Nations Meet to Organize Sustainable Development Unit’ (1993) 5 
International Environmental Reports 155, 155.  
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The Commission’s purpose—setting the tone for subsequent mechanisms (such as those 
established through the Paris Agreement, which I will address in Section III below)—was 
to generate sufficient publicity so as to make it politically imprudent for parties to renege 
from their obligations under the Declaration.   
 
Nonetheless, the body’s mandate was also left deliberately vague.  Its vast functions were 
also underfunded.  This operated such that the CSD did not disturb the intersecting work 
of competing international institutions.  As a consequence—a United Nations review 
pointed out in 2012—its ‘review of and impact on implementation of sustainable 
development remained weak and it was not able to adequately respond flexibly to new 
and emerging issues’.769  The Commission’s work was stretched across ‘too many issues’ 
and priorities. 770   Its reputation as a body concerned only with a narrow set of 
environmental issues also dissuaded participation from stakeholders outside this 
community.  Moreover, the CSD’s reporting guidelines were highly generalised and not 
comparable with either one another, or the guidelines of its partnering institutions.  
Many Third World governments had expressed concerns that information from their 
national reports could be linked with development funding.  On this rationale, they 
opposed the CSD Secretariat’s attempts to establish standardised forms or reporting 
guidelines, which could potentially have allowed for comparisons between them.  
Some other countries—like Australia and Norway—agreed, adding that reports be 
limited only to issues discussed during a particular session of the commission, and should 
be as brief and concise as possible.771   
 
Consequently, summaries produced by the Secretariat were so limited in scope, and 
presented in such general terms, that it was difficult to draw many meaningful conclusions 
from them.  As a result, the CSD never completed a periodic review of national 
                                                 
769 United Nations, Lessons learned from the Commission on Sustainable Development: Report of the 
Secretary General, 21 February 2013, available at: 
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sustainable development strategies—which its mandate had required—before the body 
was replaced by a High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in September 
2013.772  So, while taking steps to placate the majority of mainstream environmentalists, 
at least on paper, its central institutional regime was eviscerated of content and funding 
by some of the very states that had brought it into being.  This outcome aligned with the 
interests of those seeking to preserve a dominant formation of global ordering.   
 
In another notable move, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’) was agreed five years after the Rio Earth 
Summit.773  From its legal-institutional foundations at Rio, it eventually grew into one of 
the most intricate international environmental instruments.  Much of its complexity, and 
subsidiary instruments, were devoted to its three ‘flexibility mechanisms’: ‘International 
Emissions Trading’, ‘Joint Implementation’, and the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ 
(‘CDM’).774  These mechanisms set the regime on a course toward the pursuit of greater 
financialisation as an environmental conservation strategy, a technique that eventually 
found its way into other areas of environmental governance.  The largest and most 
prominent of these—at least in potential emissions reduction and financial terms—was 
the CDM.  This mechanism emerged in response to some critiques made against the Rio 
Declaration by the Brazilian government, on the basis that the Declaration had not led to 
adequate transfers of finance and technology to Third World states.  In response, 
Brazilian representatives proposed the establishment of a ‘clean development fund’.775  
Intended to impose fines on countries failing to meet their quantified emissions reduction 
targets, it was envisioned that this mechanism would generate proceeds that could then 
be diverted to finance low-carbon development projects in Third World countries.   
 
Rejecting this proposal, however, some countries—such as the United States—opposed 
any attempts to impose penalties (either pecuniary or otherwise) for non-compliance.  
They feared such measures might damage their trade competitiveness in international 
markets, or dissuade investment in the country’s domestic industries.  Therefore, United 
States representatives proposed an alternative whereby countries could—in order to 
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reduce their so-called Quantified Emissions Limitations and Reduction Obligations 
(‘QELROs’) under the Convention—voluntarily invest in low-carbon projects in Third 
World countries.  In the United Nations Secretary-General’s words, First World countries 
could ‘use the market to trade a new commodity: carbon’.776  This supposedly offered 
common benefits: for First and Third World countries, multinational corporations, and 
the global environment alike.   
 
By the eleventh-hour of the Kyoto negotiations, many other countries—across 
geopolitical divisions—had expressed strong opposition to these mechanisms.  European 
Union member states, for example, initially expressed negativity toward the proposal.  
Its representatives had already successfully lobbied for First World states to take on 
binding and individually-comparable QELROs.  These European states considered—as a 
means to lessen impacts on international competitiveness—that each country should 
enact policies to reduce their emissions domestically, rather than simply purchasing 
reductions from other countries. 777   On this rationale, the European Union was 
particularly opposed to these market-based proposals, which combined the idea of 
‘capping’ greenhouse gases in First World countries—or setting atmospheric ‘limits’ on 
emissions—with an innovative set of legal-institutional mechanisms to create financial 
markets in tradeable carbon permits.  European countries thought any attempts to allow 
countries with quantitative limits to purchase and trade emissions from other countries—
for the purposes of achieving QELROs—would circumvent the Protocol’s objectives.  
 
Addressing this opposition, however, United States Vice-President Al Gore, who led his 
country’s delegation, saw the mechanisms as ‘safety valves’ against any possibility of 
non-compliance with emissions targets.  He demanded the inclusion of flexibility 
mechanisms as concessions for acceptance, by the United States, of binding QELROs.  
These quantified obligations were features that European and G-77 countries considered 
essential to any agreement.778  Recalling the market-based sulphur dioxide and nitrogen 
dioxide trading scheme in the United States—which had, by this stage, already been 
pioneered to reduce atmospheric levels of gases causing acid rain—Gore argued that 
                                                 
776 United Nations, ‘In message to Kyoto Protocol Ceremony, Secretary-General calls on world 
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similar measures could be implemented, on a voluntary basis, to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Facing a potential refusal by the United States to agree to the Protocol, actors 
who had previously resisted the measures withdrew their opposition: a seemingly 
necessary trade-off for securing consensus.  Acquiescence to such a ‘Faustian bargain’, 
many of these actors concurred, was a necessary step in the incremental evolution of the 
regime.   
 
In essence, these dynamics sharpened perceptions about the environment within 
international law, but in a very particular way.  Rather than fundamentally changing pre-
existing views, states responded to critiques by reconceptualising the environment—and 
more specifically, the earth’s atmosphere—as a measurable, quantifiable set of units.  
Framed as such, greenhouse gases became capable of being traded, and ‘offset’, to 
achieve climate objectives without any corresponding need to change high-emissions 
lifestyles of affluent peoples.  Some refer to this phenomenon—of maintaining 
consumption patterns of the rich at the expense of Third World states, and the world’s 
poorest people—as ‘carbon colonialism’.779  Martin Luther King Jr might have cast this 
as the creation of ‘islands of material prosperity’, while dumping the waste by-products 
into ‘oceans of poverty’. 780   Framed as such, the necessary expertise was located 
exclusively within the First World.  Following this logic, climate change was then 
rectifiable through use of the First World’s limitless technological and financial 
capabilities.  This framing transformed visions of greenhouse gases.  What was once 
something maligned as a pollutant now became an economically-productive object, a 
flexible means for market expansion.   
 
Furthermore, this logic relied on several additional assumptions about humanity’s 
relationship with the environment.  It projected a techno-utopian depiction of a world 
running on improved technologies: including those designed to improve the recyclability 
of plastics.  This depiction supposedly assured the eventual attainment of sustainable 
usage patterns over finite raw materials.  The logic also assumed that innovation and 
production of these future technologies would certainly occur within sufficient 
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timeframes to avert irreversible climate change, pollution, and halt biodiversity loss.  
Enlarging financial investments—specifically by public-private sector actors—was a 
vital linchpin to achieving this vision.  Stated alternatively, such attitudes revitalised 
conceptions of the environment as tethered to techno-scientific and financial referents.  
Ultimately, they elevated the role of ‘human capital’ as primary ingredients for delivering 
environmental solutions.  Compelling actors to frame their arguments—and claims to 
justice—in terms of these referents, these logics also disavowed more radical, non-
orthodox perspectives, which were aimed at galvanising more fundamental changes in 
attitudes toward the natural world.  This revealed the regime’s postcolonial dimension.   
 
Hortatory announcements in support of the flexibility mechanisms—particularly the 
CDM—also masked a number of significant, and well-known, distributional problems.  
Two of these, in particular, stand out for the purposes of my central argument.  
Firstly, CDM projects were disproportionately skewed toward Asia-Pacific countries (in 
which over 80 per cent of CDM projects were implemented by 2012), while only 2.9 per 
cent were established in African countries.  Chinese companies, alone, earned 
approximately 70 per cent of all credits generated from CDM projects.781  The bulk of 
renewable energy projects also involved constructing large hydroelectric dams—some 
socio-ecological effects of which I described in Chapter Three—while merely 0.12 per 
cent were sourced from solar projects.  Secondly, around 54 per cent of all credits were 
generated from refrigerant gases reduction projects.  A handful of Chinese and Indian 
companies exploited lax guidelines and methodologies to generate allowances—totalling 
approximately US$5.75 billion782—by deliberately producing refrigerants purely in order 
to generate CDM credits.  So, rather than reducing operations, the CDM facilitated a 
boom in the industry.   
 
These brief examples highlight an even more fundamental point.  The CDM, and other 
market mechanisms, condensed fundamentally different socio-political preferences into 
quantitatively equivalent metrics.  Yet, this seemingly neutral and scientific exercise 
obscured the reality that climate change is not exclusively a scientific—or objective—
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problem.  It is clear, for example, that a tonne of emissions produced from luxury goods 
in the United Kingdom is not in fact equivalent—in social or political terms—to a tonne 
of carbon emitted to operate a school in Malawi.  Similarly, ‘luxury’ emissions—such as 
from flying affluent tourists across the world—are not comparable to the same amount of 
emissions from constructing solar panels to electrify a rural village.   
 
Put alternatively, there is little ‘equivalence’ in either these activities, or the resulting 
greenhouse gases emitted from them.  Offsetting carbon dioxide emitted from European 
installations by reducing superfluous refrigerants in China is problematic if the objective 
is to transition national economies away from dependence on fossil fuels.  Nonetheless, 
the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms rely on substituting different types of greenhouse gases 
with each other.  These gases are made comparable through complex calculations—
approved by member states—with reference to what is known as ‘carbon dioxide 
equivalence’. 783   Such attempts to make different greenhouse gases numerically 
equivalent shrouds visibility of the deeper socio-political characteristics around which 
they are emitted.  Yet, these processes are enshrined, through state consensus, in positive 
law.  This status gives them—and carbon markets more generally—the appearance of 
virtuousness, and the substance of what we believe to be just conduct.   
 
II.   Pride, Conceit, and the Emperor’s New Clothes 
 
As it turned out, the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms—and particularly, the CDM—
generated enormous flows of public-private finance to multinational corporations and 
Third World countries.  As such, they were eventually labelled by many as an ‘unexpected 
success story’ of the Kyoto Protocol.784  The mechanisms even displayed a resilience 
against notable predictions—made by some during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis—of 
neoliberal globalisation’s imminent demise.785  Indeed, the Kyoto mechanisms offered a 
                                                 
783 These are modelled on International Panel on Climate Change guidelines, a critique of which is the 
focus of Clark A Miller, ‘Climate Science and the Making of Global Political Order’, in Sheila Jasanoff 
(ed), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order (London: Routledge, 
2004). 
784 David B Sandalow, ‘Emissions trading is Kyoto’s success story’, The New York Times (online), 17 
February 2005, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/16/opinion/16iht-edsandalow.html?_r=0> 
(last accessed on 20 January 2016). 
785 See, for example, Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Is There a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus’, in Narcis 
Serra and Joseph E Stiglitz, The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘The Demise of Neoliberal 
Globalization’, YaleGlobal Online, 4 February 2008, available at: 
 200 
vehicle through which to sustain a pre-existing, trade-friendly, financialised, techno-
scientific, and market-oriented global order.  In the first subsection, I highlight the actions 
of key international institutions to promote the green economy, as well as the struggles 
of actors working through those legal-institutions to oppose it.  The following subsection 
illuminates how convergence on the idea of the green economy served as a basis for 
expanding marketisation of the environment.  It achieves this by framing rapidly-
changing environmental conditions as threats to the global economy’s expansion.  This is 
increasingly fulfilled through moves—through international law and institutions—to 
calculate natural capital, and so-called ‘payments for environmental goods and services’ 
(‘PES’).  With these, the entire environmental realm is deemed as a legitimate space for, 
and subjected to, international interventions to create the laws and institutions necessary 
for enlarged markets to function. 
 
2.1.  Greening the Colour of Money 
 
Prior to 2009, the term ‘green economy’ was scarcely used.  Similar phrases—such as 
‘green economics’—found some usage, however, by political parties and environmental 
campaigners.  Environmental scholars Molly Cato and Miriam Kennett wrote in 1999, 
for example, that green economics was ‘inherently concerned with social justice’.  
They described it as having ‘grown from the bottom up’ as a result of efforts from ‘those 
who are building a sustainable economy in practice’.786  With this, they framed green 
economics as amalgamating demands made by environmental justice advocates with 
economic objectives.  Before that, the term was used in the title of a 1989 report—entitled 
‘Blueprint for a Green Economy’—authored by a group of environmental economists for 
the United Kingdom government. 787   Nevertheless, its usage appeared to be an 
afterthought, as the report made no further reference to the green economy.   
 
Facing their own crises of legitimacy—particularly from their failure to prevent the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis—a number of international institutions responded by advocating 
                                                 
<https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/2008-demise-neoliberal-globalization> (last accessed on 11 January 
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for a ‘green new deal’. 788   Sensing a need to bolster their own reputations against 
accusations of systemic deficiencies and inadequate oversight, three international 
institutions—the World Bank, OECD, and UNEP—collectively revived the term ‘green 
economy’ in 2011.  Iceland’s environmental agency head recalled, several years later, 
that their attitude was one of ‘not let[ting] a good crisis go to waste’.789  Accordingly, 
these institutions repurposed the green economy as a model to ‘improving human 
wellbeing and social equity, while reducing environmental risks and scarcities’.790  It 
seemed, as Deutsche Bank had predicted as early as 2008, that the Global Financial Crisis 
‘exposed an unprecedented “green sweet spot” for infrastructure stimulus that promised 
both social progress and environmental good sense’.791   
 
This usage suggested a seamless elision between environmental objectives and sustained 
economic growth.  Importantly, it reflected a view—held by many governments—that 
the overwhelming purpose of environmental regulation was ‘managing the risks to 
growth from adverse environmental events.792  According to many ecological economists, 
this was achievable by valuing the ‘world’s ecosystems [as] capital assets’. 793  
For instance, UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner first defined the green economy 
as ‘an economic system that recognizes the properties of healthy ecosystems as the 
backbone of economic and social well-being and as a precondition for poverty 
reduction’.794  In the following year, a UNEP report explained that:  
 
‘In its simplest expression, a green economy is low carbon, resource efficient, and 
socially inclusive. In a green economy, growth in income and employment should be 
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driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, 
enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services. […] The key aim for a transition to a green economy is to enable 
economic growth and investment while increasing environmental quality and social 
inclusiveness.’795   
 
This UNEP report, entitled Towards a Green Economy, represented markets as primary 
determiners of value.  It stated that ‘markets comprise one of the key areas of green 
finance and provide an important discovery mechanism for the price of carbon’.  
The market was positioned as a universal referent outside politics, with UNEP insisting 
that a green economy ‘does not favour one political perspective over another’.  Rather, it 
was considered ‘relevant to all economies’.796  The United Nations offered further details 
in subsequent report, in which it called the green economy a ‘system in which the costs 
arising from the degradation of ecosystems are internalised’.  In this system, industries 
that operationalised sustainable technologies and agriculture could ‘serve as major 
engines of economic growth, job creation, and poverty reduction’.797  Nevertheless, its 
distinctiveness—from what the Bank labelled as the ‘brown economy’—was cast in terms 
of generating ‘economic benefits’.798  It represented a shift in emphasis—to improved 
investments and managerial decision making—rather than any fundamental change of 
logic.  As one NGO claimed, this framing did not critique dominant models of exploiting 
‘economic and social inequalities to create wealth’, or the ‘taking advantage of 
asymmetric market, trade, and financial mechanisms’.799  Rather, sustaining growth was 
at the core of the Bank’s concerns.   
 
Consequently, the green economy became conceptualised in a way that sought to 
reconcile environmental objectives with the logics of trade, globalised markets, and 
sustainable development.  In so doing, it foreclosed any opposition between these 
potentially-disparate logics.  It overcame the need to make difficult political trade-offs.  
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Attributing environmental problems to the ‘gross misallocation of capital’ denied any 
‘inescapable trade-off between environmental sustainability and economic progress’.800  
To the contrary, the green economy reemphasised that ‘economic growth, social progress 
and environmental stewardship’ could be ‘complementary strategic objectives’.801  As I 
have observed through carbon trading, however, policies devised with this objective in 
mind provoked new problems and conflicts.  In Naomi Klein’s observation, this apparent 
‘win-win strategy’ created ‘a lot of losers’.  These were people ‘sacrificed in the name of 
win-win’.802   
 
Even some World Bank officials seemed to acknowledge this, at least in part.  
Kristina Georgieva—Director of the Bank’s Environmental Division—stated: ‘I’ve never 
seen a real win-win in my life.  There’s always somebody, usually an elite group grabbing 
rents, that loses.  And we’ve learned in the past decade that those losers fight hard to make 
sure that technically elegant win-win policies do not get very far.’803  In light of this, the 
Bank admitted that it could ‘not presume that green growth [would be] inherently 
inclusive’.  Nonetheless, it immediately sought to downplay this observation.  If only 
‘carefully designed’, the Bank wrote, green economy policies could potentially 
‘maximise benefits for, and minimise costs to, the poor and most vulnerable’. 804  
What remains striking in this carefully-constructed logic is the Bank’s neglect for 
discussing any possible flaws with the green economy principle itself, rather than those 
of its implementation.   
 
Discussions about the green economy were focal points of proceedings leading to a 
highly-anticipated conference marking the 20-year anniversary of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration.  Aptly designated as the Rio+20 Conference, it was held once again in Rio 
de Janeiro at the invitation of the Brazilian government.  Member states agreed that the 
green economy would be the central theme of a Rio+20 Conference convened to address 
deep concerns about a persistent ‘gaps’ in implementing sustainable development and 
                                                 
800 UNEP (2011), p. 16.  
801 Ibid v. 
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poverty eradication efforts.805  During its preparatory sessions, many states—sharing 
underlying attitudes advocated by the Bank and UNEP—revealed preferences for 
legislating the green economy as a new ‘one-size-fits-all’ model, or ‘pathway’, for 
achieving sustainable development. 806   Some Third World representatives, however, 
expressed significant unease about the concept.  The same wealthy, technologically-
advanced states that promoted the green economy, they argued, had previously made 
‘many commitments’ that had ‘not been fully met’.  In particular, a number of countries 
argued that few efforts had yet been made—since as far back as the Stockholm 
Conference—to ensure that environmentally-friendly technologies would be transferred 
to Third World economies.807   
 
With this in mind, some Third World representatives opposed attempts to displace 
sustainable development with the outwardly-narrower idea of the green economy.  
Some underscored that the green economy should not emerge as a ‘normative straitjacket’.  
Nor, others argued, should it ‘alter the agreed definition’ of sustainable development.808  
At the heart of their concerns, was a deep resistance to any attempts to interpret the green 
economy in ways that could impose trade restrictions under the pretext of environmental 
protection.809  Representatives from Ecuador, for example, expressed concerns that it 
could ‘lead to a new era of structural adjustments’, which could undermine the 
competitiveness of Third World industries and undermine their national sovereignty by 
dictating Third World countries’ economic policies.810  If allowed to run its course, these 
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representatives feared, the green economy could significantly damage Third World 
economies.  At particular risk, some thought, were countries that were reliant upon 
exports of agricultural commodities.  The Bank endorsed this view, stating that the ‘best 
way to accelerate [environmental] technology diffusion is to reduce trade barriers’.811  
Similarly, the head of the Algerian delegation (speaking as Chair of the G-77) cautioned 
that:  
 
‘The transition to a green economy should not lead to conditionalities, parameters or 
standards which might generate unjustified or unilateral restrictions in the areas of trade, 
financing, [overseas development assistance] or other forms of international assistance.  
Illegitimate barriers to trade – tariff and non-tariff – could emerge if the discussions are 
geared towards or captured by protectionist interests, which might ultimately lead to 
green protectionism’ proposals that would run counter to the multilateral trading 
system.’812   
 
As a result of this, the idea of trade liberalisation retained stability in the face of challenges 
to it.  Yet, Bolivian representatives distanced themselves from these views.  Many of them 
repeatedly expressed fears that the concept might merely promote the commodification 
of ecological processes.  In an incisive critique of the Draft Rio+20 Outcome Document, 
Chief Negotiator of Bolivia, René Orellana indicated that the green economy masked an 
‘implicit suggestion of free markets with a weak role of the states’.813  He lamented that 
the green economy was based merely on the ‘commodification of biodiversity open to 
private investment, and monetary measurement of our natural resources for the creation 
of green markets’.814  He joined with other representatives—from some South American 
states, Small Island states, grassroots social movements, as well as a number of 
indigenous groups—in warning against what they regarded as the green economy’s 
overreliance on financialisation.  Such an approach to global environmental governance, 
they argued, would likely favour only the interests of private actors and, most of all, 
multinational corporations.  This could create even more problems through the 
widespread use and diffusion of risky technologies, privatisation, and growth.  One appeal 
made by the Indigenous Peoples Global Conference—which took place on the side-lines 
of the Rio+20 Conference—stated:  
                                                 
811 World Bank (2012), p. 20. 
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‘This inseparable relationship between humans and the Earth, inherent to Indigenous 
Peoples, must be respected for the sake of our future generations and all of humanity. We 
urge all humanity to join with us in transforming the social structures, institutions and 
power relations that underpin our deprivation, oppression and exploitation. Imperialist 
globalization exploits all that sustains life and damages the Earth. We need to 
fundamentally reorient production and consumption based on human needs rather than 
for the boundless accumulation of profit for a few. Society must take collective control 
of productive resources to meet the needs of sustainable social development and avoid 
overpopulation, overconsumption and overexploitation of people and nature which are 
inevitable under the prevailing monopoly capitalist system. We must focus on sustainable 
communities based on indigenous knowledge, not on capitalist development. […] We 
demand that the United Nations, governments and corporations abandon false solutions 
[…] that endanger the future and life as we know it.’815   
 
This built on a similar set of demands, made two years earlier by a gathering of 466 
grassroots civil society groups, indigenous peoples, and governments—calling itself the 
Climate Justice Action network.  In a leaflet distributed at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate 
Conference, the network stated that ‘[w]e cannot trust the market with our future, nor put 
our faith in unsafe, unproven and unsustainable technologies’.  The leaflet offered several 
alternatives to achieve ‘system change not climate change’.  At the heart of these was an 
aim to fundamentally transform how societies were organised and ordered.  
The network’s proposals included:  
 
‘leaving fossil fuels in the ground; reasserting peoples’ and community control over 
resources; relocalising food production; reducing overconsumption, particularly in the 
North; recognising the ecological and climate debt owed to the peoples of the South and 
making reparations; and respecting indigenous and forest peoples’ rights.’816 
 
                                                 
815 ‘Kari-Oca 2 Declaration: Indigenous Peoples Global Conference on Rio+20 and Mother Earth’, 17 
June 2012, Rio de Janeiro, available at: <http://www.ienearth.org/docs/DECLARATION-of-KARI-OCA-
2-Eng.pdf> (last accessed on 1 May 2018). See also, Indigenous Peoples Global Conference on Rio+20 
and Mother Earth, ‘The Solutions’, quoted in Peter Jacques and Sharon J Ridgeway, Power of the Talking 
Stick: Indigenous Politics and the World Ecological Crisis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p. 153. 
816 Climate Justice Action, ‘What does climate justice mean in Europe?’, quoted in Paul Chatterton, 
David Featherstone, and Paul Routledge, ‘Articulating Climate Justice in Copenhagen: antagonism, the 
commons and solidarity’ (2010) European Consortium of Political Research, available at: 
<https://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/df62d983-ec12-407b-9e11-412997d57898.pdf> (last accessed on 
13 May 2018). See also, Annaleen Kenis and Matthais Lievens, The Limits of the Green Economy: From 
re-inventing capitalism to repoliticising the present (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p. 158. 
 207 
Several months later, in April 2010, many of the same participants met to agree a 
declaration called the People’s Agreement of Cochabamba.  In it, the conference’s 35,000 
participants agreed upon the necessity of a ‘new system that restores harmony with nature 
and among human beings’.  The People’s Agreement proposed: 
 
‘the recovery, revalorization, and strengthening of the knowledge, wisdom, and ancestral 
practices of Indigenous Peoples, which are affirmed in the thought and practices of 
“Living Well,” recognizing Mother Earth as a living being with which we have an 
indivisible, interdependent, complementary and spiritual relationship.’817    
 
In turn, the People’s Agreement sought to restore the integrity of ‘our Mother Earth and 
all its beings’ by calling upon First World countries to address their ‘climate debt’, and 
act toward actualising ‘restorative justice’ as a supplement to financial compensation.  
The agreement attempted to address this through a profound shift toward sustainable 
agricultural practices used by ‘indigenous and rural farming peoples’, as appropriate to 
‘local cultural contexts’.818  Correspondingly, it rejected models of ‘agribusiness’, free 
trade agreements, technological solutions, monoculture plantations, and the application 
of intellectual property to living organisms.  The People’s Agreement also demanded a 
stop to actions ‘based on market mechanisms’.  These mechanisms proposed ‘non-
existent and conditional results’.  They were grounded on principles that had proved 
incapable of regulating the global financial system, which was ‘fragile and uncertain due 
to speculation and the emergence of intermediary brokers’, the agreement stated.  It was 
thus ‘totally irresponsible’ to leave, in the hands of markets, ‘the care and protection of 
human existence and of our Mother Earth’.819   
 
The Bolivian government drew heavily upon the agreement as a basis for its own climate 
policy.820  It enshrined a ‘Law of Mother Earth’, which sought to grant nature the same 
rights as that of humanity.  The government also advocated for radical measures to reduce 
pollution and control the country’s rate of industrialisation.  It legislated, for example, 
that the rights of nature ‘not be affected by mega-infrastructure and development projects 
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that affect the balance of ecosystems and the local inhabitant communities’.821  Moreover, 
this notion of duty and responsibility to nature has now been codified in the Constitution 
of Ecuador, which states that:  
 
‘Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral 
respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, 
structure, functions and evolutionary processes’.822   
 
In addition, Cuba’s radical five-year transition from a net food importer to a completely 
self-sufficient food supply—based on organic farming practices—has become another 
case in point.823  Its government’s ‘Revolución Energética’ has also helped the country 
move toward a more efficient and decentralised energy system.  Implementing stringent 
energy efficiency policies, it has caused estimated energy savings of approximately one 
million tonnes of oil since 2006.824   
 
UNEP Executive Director Steiner made a number of notable comments in response to 
these movements.  He claimed, in March 2012, that debates with regard to the green 
economy were ‘generally maturing beyond ideology’ into ‘managing legitimate 
concerns’, such as maximising poverty eradication efforts.825  Clearly, his claim—to be 
speaking from a standpoint ‘beyond ideology’—was a highly politicised one.  In Steiner’s 
depiction, the green economy functioned in a way that was non-ideological: a move that 
Slavoj Žižek might label as ‘ideology par excellence’,826 or what Haraway might call 
‘God’s trick’.827  Fundamentally, this trick skilfully concealed and accentuated relations 
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of domination under a seemingly objective—or neutral—façade.  Far from resolving 
conflicts, Steiner’s self-representation of the green economy—as ‘technical’—merely 
sought to mask them in very particular ways.  This was through a specific polemic, 
whereby the opponent became delegitimised and disqualified—as ideological, merely 
political, or non-scientific—in order, as Carl Schmitt might have recognised: ‘to portray 
oneself as non-political (in the sense of purely scientific, purely moral, purely juristic, 
purely aesthetic, purely economic, or on the basis of similar purities) and thereby 
superior’.828   
 
Other proponents resorted to more directly coercive techniques.  For example, the United 
States withdrew significant aid funding from a number of South American governments 
conducting themselves under a coalition called the ‘Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples 
of our America’ (or ‘ALBA’).  Positioning themselves as reviving the work of Simon 
Bolivar, ALBA countries had sought to resist imperialism and untrammelled market 
forces, favouring policies intended to foster greater independence and self-determination.  
Countries from which funding was withheld included Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, 
Venezuela, as well as Bolivia.  This tactic was deliberately aimed to ‘neutralise, co-opt 
or marginalise’ opposition to the green economy in international negotiations.829  In 2011, 
Pablo Salón—Bolivia’s Ambassador to the United Nations—confirmed that the United 
States had ‘cut aid to Bolivia and Ecuador’.  Salón continued, adding that ‘they said it 
very clearly: “We’re going to cut it, because you don’t support [us]”.  And that is 
blackmail.’830  Similarly, cables suggest that the United States also paid millions of 
dollars to countries, including the Maldives, in exchange for greater support of the United 
States’ negotiating positions.  For instance, during a private discussion with the newly-
appointed Ambassador of Maldives to the United States, Abdul Ghafoor Mohamed, 
representatives of the United States government claimed that they:  
 
‘would like to see that small countries, like Maldives that are at the forefront of the 
climate debate, receive tangible assistance from the larger economies. Other nations 
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would then come to realise that there are advantages to be gained by compliance.’ 831  
 
Facing a threat of isolation—with many of its diplomatic allies seemingly unwilling to 
maintain their objections—Bolivian efforts (which were supported, at least at first, by the 
country’s Cuban, Ecuadorean, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan allies)832 could only stall, but 
not prevent, the outcome document’s retention of a significant emphasis on the green 
economy.  The document stated that the green economy:  
 
‘should contribute to eradicating poverty as well as sustained economic growth, 
enhancing social inclusion, improving human welfare and creating opportunities for 
employment and decent work for all, while maintaining the healthy functioning of the 
Earth's ecosystems.’833   
 
Yet, following concerted objections, the conference participants could only agree that the 
green economy was ‘one of the important tools available for achieving sustainable 
development’.  The outcome document held that, whilst it ‘could provide options for 
policymaking’, the concept ‘should not be a rigid set of rules’.834  Nonetheless, perhaps 
anticipating this outcome, many states had already aligned with private actors—outside 
the Rio+20 process—to commit themselves, legally and politically, to valuing natural 
capital and ecosystem services.  For example, the Green Growth Knowledge Platform 
was a legal-institutional framework—jointly created by the Bank, UNEP, and the OECD 
in early 2012—aimed at greening national economies.  I discuss some of these initiatives 
in more detail in the following subsection.  
 
With these developments, the Rio+20 Conference became—in United Nations Secretary-
General Ban Ki Moon’s words—a ‘free market revolution for global sustainability’.835  
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In a report on the conference’s outcomes, he opined that the Declaration emphasised 
‘strong economic performance’.  Any transition to a green economy, he added, required 
‘public policies to avoid negative effects on economic growth’.836  With regard to this 
aim, the Rio+20 Declaration replicated text in the UNFCCC—and GATT—to explicitly 
reject any ‘green economy policies’ that threatened to ‘constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade’. 837  
The Declaration also affirmed that any action performed by a country to improve its social 
welfare—including endorsing financially-lucrative, but resource-intensive, urban 
infrastructure projects—were countable toward its sustainable development indicators.838   
 
The Declaration did afford some recognition—at least in superficial terms—of 
indigenous peoples’ knowledge and interests.839  Yet, it gave no indication of how any 
conflicts between these and other logics were to be resolved.  Rather, the declaration 
preserved the economic aspirations of global minority of techno-scientific industrialist 
elites.  It thereby safeguarded perceptions that consumerism was a ‘materially embedded 
ideological reality’.840  Serious attempts to revive other forms of knowledge through 
renegotiation—or otherwise diverge from a dominant global order—were met with 
acrimony.  Their proponents were accused of deliberately impeding official processes by 
re-aspirating settled debates (or, in vernacular of international negotiations, ‘backsliding’).   
 
2.2.  Conjuring Natural Capital 
 
The Rio+20 Conference’s focus on the green economy became a springboard.  It launched 
additional policy frameworks, and private initiatives, to value both natural capital and 
ecosystem services.  These legal-institutional mechanisms led the vanguard of 
movements toward greater decentralisation and flexibility in environmental governance, 
a feature that many civil society and environmental groups had fought for.  Drawing 
attention to a need for taking local and ‘national circumstances’ into account in designing 
global environmental regimes, these advocates unwittingly fed the development of a 
                                                 
836 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Objectives and Themes of the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development’, in Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/CONF.216/PC/7 (22 
December 2010), paras. 4, 36. 
837 UNFCCC, Art. 3.5. This text originated from the GATT. See Marrakesh Agreement, Art. XX. 
838 The future we want (2012), para 56. 
839 Ibid, para. 197. 
840 Rob White, ‘Environmental harm and the political economy of consumption’ (2002) 29 Social Justice 
82, 89. 
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neoliberal framework oriented to valuing natural capital and ecosystem services.  At the 
forefront of these attempts—to associate natural capital accounting with green 
economies—were a number of prominent public and private institutions.  
UNEP underscored, for instance, that ‘a green economy recognises the value of, and 
invests in, natural capital’.841 
 
Furthermore, the Communiqué on Natural Capital Accounting, launched at the Rio+20 
Conference—supported by over 50 countries and 86 private companies—invited private 
companies, national governments and international institutions to ‘work together to create 
the conditions necessary to maintain and enhance natural capital as a critical economic, 
ecological and social asset’.842  The Communiqué also invited private actors to strengthen 
the valuation and commodification of natural capital, by creating economic metrics and 
technically-sophisticated calculative mechanisms.843  This idea, of valuing natural capital, 
was inspired by the work of economists—such as David Pearce in 1988—suggesting that 
sustainable development could be achieved by conceptualising environments as natural 
assets serving economic functions.  Embodying this logic, the Communiqué promulgated 
a widely-held view that the green economy could be:  
 
‘categorised by economic change subject to “constancy of natural capital stock”—the 
stock of environmental assets are held constant while the economy is allowed whatever 
social goals are deemed appropriate’.844   
 
UNEP partnered with a number of private financial institutions—calling themselves the 
Natural Capital Finance Alliance—to support voluntary efforts to value natural capital.  
In a joint declaration, agreed over a number of years, they defined natural capital as 
comprising ‘the Earth’s natural assets (soil, air, water, flora, and fauna) and the ecosystem 
services emanating from them, which make human life possible’.  The declaration also 
emphasised the central role of natural assets and services in underpinning ‘productivity 
and the global economy’.845  Their definition shared the United Kingdom Natural Capital 
Committee’s definition of natural capital, as ‘the elements of nature that produce value 
                                                 
841 UNEP (2011) 
842 Natural Capital Communique (2012), available at: 
<http://www.wavespartnership.org/sites/waves/files/images/Final%20NCA%20Communique.pdf> (last 
accessed on 18 May 2015).  
843 Ibid. 
844 David W Pearce, ‘Economics, equity and sustainable development’ (1988) 20 Futures 598, 598. 
845 Natural Capital Finance Alliance, ‘Natural Capital Declaration’, available at: 
<http://www.naturalcapitaldeclaration.org/declaration-full-text> (last accessed on 31 March 2018). 
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or benefits to people (directly and indirectly)’.  Such elements were asserted to include, 
for example, ‘the stock of forests, rivers, land, minerals and oceans, as well as the natural 
processes and functions that underpin[ned] their operation’.846  In UNEP’s view, these 
stocks ‘yield[ed] flows of valuable ecosystem goods or services’.847   
 
Admittedly, some prominent models for valuing natural capital in economic terms 
appeared to acknowledge at least some of the critiques levelled against them.  One such 
initiative, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (‘TEEB’), declared that it 
‘does not propose a one-size-fits-all, cost-benefit-based stewardship model’.  
The initiative, launched by UNEP, emphasised that approaches to ‘recognizing value’ did 
not necessarily need to rely on ‘recourse to monetization or even economics’.  Yet, it 
advocated for the demonstration of values through ‘economic tools and methods to make 
nature’s services economically visible’.848  These included, most prominently, ‘payments 
for ecosystem services’ (‘PES’).849  This TEEB approach was, therefore, predominantly 
about incorporating this logic into decision making through ‘price signals’.  
This capturing of value in economic terms was seen as ‘critical’ to effective land 
management practices, through its role in enabling policymakers to ‘address trade-offs in 
a rational manner’.  Through this, TEEB claimed to correct ‘the bias’ of present 
approaches—which ‘favour[ed] private wealth and physical capital’850—while obscuring 
an identical set of biases in its own approach.  Ultimately, the initiative diminished the 
notion of the environment.  It sought to extend the market’s operation, thereby 
sustaining—rather than fundamentally destabilising—the root causes of problems that it 
professed to resolve.   
 
Similarly, in 2012, the Bank promoted a Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem 
Services (‘WAVES’) initiative as a central component of its ‘Environment Strategy’.851  
The initiative offered guidance, and a methodology, to determine what it called the ‘true 
value of natural resources and its ecosystems’.  The Bank regarded these as ‘assets that 
                                                 
846 Natural Capital Committee, The State of Natural Capital: Towards a framework for measurement and 
valuation (London: UK Government, 2013), p. 10. 
847 Pavan Sukhdev, Heidi Wittmer, and Dustin Miller, ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
(TEEB): Challenges and Responses’, in Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, Nature in the Balance: The 
Economics of Biodiversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 4. 
848 Ibid 6. 
849 Ibid 7. 
850 Ibid 6. 
851 World Bank Group, Toward a Green, Clean, and Resilient World for All: A World Bank Group 
Environment Strategy 2012-2022 (Washington DC: World Bank Group, 2012), pp. 48, 51. 
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support[ed] human well-being’.852  It acknowledged that its conception of environmental 
value reflected subjective human preferences: namely, ‘people’s willingness to pay for 
environmental goods and services or willingness to accept compensation for the loss of 
an environmental asset’.853  This understanding of nature, the Bank proposed, could serve 
as a basis for incorporating natural capital and ecosystem services into countries’ national 
‘wealth accounts’.  To this end, WAVES endorsed attempts of the United Nations 
Statistical Commission’s System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (‘SEEA’) to 
recognise a global accounting standard for measuring natural capital and ecosystem 
services.854   
 
Since then, proponents of natural capital have consistently affirmed its emergent potential 
to be a ‘new asset class for the future’.855  Even previously-resistant environmental NGOs 
have now jumped onto this lucrative bandwagon.  For example, the President of 
Conservation International recently called for natural capital to be ‘the most central 
element in long-term sustainable development’.856  Moreover, the IUCN’s quadrennial 
World Conservation Congress—last held in 2016—endorsed a controversial proposal to 
integrate the ‘language and concepts of natural capital’ valuation into the organisation’s 
policies.  The Congress noted that these were becoming ‘widespread within conservation 
circles and IUCN’. 857   Prior to this vote, an IUCN working group had organised a 
                                                 
852 Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services (‘WAVES’), Moving Beyond GDP: How 
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workshop—entitled ‘Matters of Value: Natural capital, cultural diversity, governance and 
rights’—to discuss the issue.  During the fractious debates that followed, many voiced 
support for promoting the role of natural capital in supporting ‘continued economic 
wellbeing’.858  The CEO of Credit Suisse said, for example, that the idea could construct 
attitudes that ‘saving these ecosystems is not only affordable but profitable’.859  Another 
participant saw it as a potentially promising way to achieve what he called ‘greenery by 
stealth’.860   
 
Opposing these perspectives, however, a Peruvian participant warned of possible effects 
produced by natural capital’s reliance on the construction of an external nature.  
Highlighting the difficulties that many Andean indigenous peoples felt in understanding 
the idea, he explained how humanity and nature were deeply intertwined in many 
alternative worldviews.861  Nonetheless, these views were rapidly dismissed by a senior 
IUCN representative in his summary of the proceedings.  He chose instead to frame 
natural capital in fatalistic terms: saying that the conservation movement could ‘either 
embrace it, or continue internal debates that create confusion’.862  Again, it seemed, these 
views were sacrificed to more dominant views upon a perceived need to achieve political 
consensus.  Ultimately, the Congress adopted a motion to establish a working group to 
draft an ‘IUCN policy on natural capital’.  This policy would include frameworks, 
principles, and methods for applying natural capital ‘approaches and mechanisms’.  
These, the Congress held, could eventually become foundations for implementing so-
called ‘no net loss’ biodiversity objectives, calculated with reference to natural capital.863   
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While nascent, these legal-institutional approaches clearly sought to ratify particular ideas 
about how humanity, the environment, and the relationship between them were 
constituted.  Nature became expressed as equivalent to, and exchangeable for, a common, 
quantitative unit: money.  Intrinsically, natural capital accounting was instituted in 
attempts to make nature visible ‘on the balance sheets of financial institutions’, 864 
principally by subjecting it to a range of mathematical and calculative techniques.  
Through these, however, the environment became refashioned—by the new instruments 
and techniques that sought to measure it—in a way that more deeply reified the primacy 
of economic indicators.  Yet, in all these natural capital valuations, qualitative evaluations 
were invariably substituted with inherently subjective—but seemingly objective—
numerical variables.  These transformations enabled nature to be more effectively 
deployed to serve the expansion of globalised markets.   
 
For example, the use of ‘discount rates’—to estimate present costs of future 
environmental harms—were underpinned by heavily socio-politicised economic 
assumptions.865  Put alternatively, natural capital accounting conferred these techniques 
with power to condense the environment into atomised, but homogenous, numerical units.  
Then, these units could easily be translatable into markets bestowing monetary—or 
economic—value. 866   Through these modalities of governance, supposedly separate 
elements of the environment were made to appear numerically-quantifiable, fungible, and 
commensurable.  They could then be used in financial accounting models and cost-benefit 
analyses, which prioritised optimal economic management over all other considerations.  
Reifying this dominant logic, the environment became reconceived as natural capital.  
This vision diminished the infinitely-diverse biophysical arrangements that make up what 
we call the environment.   
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Notwithstanding these failings, and regardless of how carefully these mechanisms are 
designed—how cautiously their boundaries are drawn, or how many safeguards are in 
place—their reliance on market logic means that they can only ever be capable of partially 
reflecting nature’s values.867  Their confined, quantitative, and homogenous vision of 
nature can never completely capture the reality of infinitely complex, qualitative, and 
heterogenous natures.  They are only able, at best, to value certain ways of seeing nature 
(or ideas of justice)—as understood through a discrete set of methodologies—while 
ignoring others.  Internalising all relevant ecological costs would likely mean that any 
irreplaceable, vital ecosystems would have infinite aggregate costs, because their true 
values in perpetuity—in ecological and evolutionary terms—would be indeterminable.868  
The mechanisms also reveal an unresolvable asymmetry.  Their ability to generate ever-
increasing flows of money, is incompatible with a reversal of that transformation: that is 
to say, money cannot be reconverted into natural capital.  Put alternatively, the 
environment ‘has itself no use for money’.869   
 
In all, these techniques of natural capital valuation replenish the accumulative tendencies 
of a neoliberal governmentality.  These initiatives disproportionately benefit a wealthy 
minority of peoples and societies—those disproportionately contributing to 
environmental harms—to become beneficiaries of new revenue streams.  They enable 
those proprietors to manage corresponding natural spaces for financial reward: what the 
IUCN called the ‘biggest business in the world’. 870   Their efforts, to increase the 
economic value of conservation, are also consistent with what Foucault called the 
‘calculated management of life’.871  They amplify the role of market logic as the supreme 
                                                 
867 See, for example, Lohmann (2009). Evidence suggests that markets for natural capital and ecosystem 
services tend to be highly imperfect. Some even argue that such well-developed schemes—like, for 
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 218 
arbiter of environmental values.  Some suggest that such extensions of market-based 
governance regimes into previously externalised socio-ecological dominions might also 
be thought of as a ‘territorialising activity’.872  Stated in another way, this represents an 
attempt to sustain what Moore calls an ‘ecological surplus’ by defining previously 
unvalued environments in such ways that feed the voraciously expansive appetite of 
globalised markets.873   
 
Similarly, the concept of natural capital has displayed a capacity to mould ingeniously to 
‘traditional’—or local—knowledges.  Multinational corporations—seeking to capitalise 
on the enormous economic potential in ‘cultural diversity and human creativity’874—have 
typically welcomed a desire to ‘mobilise’ and ‘translate’ indigenous knowledge into 
economically-productive sustainability practices.  Indigenous peoples’ traditional 
stewardship practices over forests, for example, are seen by some only as efficient means 
of conserving natural capital and ecosystem services.  Yet, their cultural practices are still 
regarded as epistemically inferior: valued only insofar as they had potential to generate 
sustainable knowledge and practices about the environments under their stewardship.875  
With this, the radical potential of these alternative worlds and local ecologies were 
captured, or enfolded, into a global task: that of extending global markets.  Diversity, in 
other words, became useful for creating new commodities, property, and financial 
instruments.  So, rather than directly excluding—or disciplining—non-occidental 
knowledges—as we saw in the development paradigm—natural capital operated through 
a series of inclusions.  This resembles Escobar’s formulation of a ‘new capitalization of 
nature’, which relied on what he called three ‘semiotic conquests’:  
 
‘This new capitalization of nature not only rests on the semiotic conquest of territories 
(in terms of biodiversity reserves) and communities (as the ‘guardians’ of nature); it also 
requires the semiotic conquest of local knowledges, in the sense that ‘saving nature’ 
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requires the valuation of local wisdom about the sustainability of nature.  Modern biology 
begins to discover that local systems of knowledge are useful complements.’876   
 
Yet, this transformation—of previously uncapitalised external natures into the 
environment of globalised markets—also reveals international law’s reflexive quality.  
Natural capital techniques of legal-institutional governance demonstrate how critiques 
made against a global order became transformed into a set of positive legal-institutional 
innovations directed at unleashing new sources of finance and technology.  Specifically, 
these transformed perceptions about limits to growth into what might be thought of as 
possibilities for the dynamic growth of limits.  Buttressed by law, the market took on new 
forms, reconfiguring itself in response to possible threats, without radically interfering 
with the global order’s dominant structural configurations.  The resulting instruments 
produced visions of a ‘greened’ economy.  Their ultimate reality, however, was precisely 
the opposite: a world facing total economisation, or polymerisation.  In essence, the green 
economy and natural capital initiatives emerged as ways to neutralise those critiques, 
while growing economies and sustaining the neoliberal global order.  This masked the 
market economy’s complicity in creating the very problems it now sought to resolve.   
 
III.  Unrest in Vain Citadels 
 
A number of recent, high-profile multilateral agreements lend heightened support to the 
programmes described in the previous section.  The Sustainable Development Goals 
(‘SDGs’) and the Paris Climate Agreement—both agreed in 2015—represent new forms 
of delimitation.  They are important episodes in my story insofar as these instruments are 
typically perceived—in both mainstream scholarship and in media—as authorising a new 
era of environmental protection.  With this, they are regarded as the epitome of 
international law’s efforts to address environmental issues.  By contrast, in my view, these 
agreements might alternatively be seen as a continuation of efforts to sustain a global 
ordering grounded on the expansion of markets.  They aimed to tinker with the existing 
global order, retaining its dominant logics, rather than seeking to fundamentally 
reconfigure them.  In other words, their objectives were to narrow the terrains of struggle 
in ways that accentuated the durability of neoliberal environmentalism.   
                                                 
876 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (2nd ed, 
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As we will observe, most of the putatively ‘environmental’ provisions in each of these 
agreements were phrased in vague and highly qualified terms.  Meanwhile, the 
instruments’ most concrete prescriptions operated as enablers of a competitive market 
established through a complex set of legal-institutional governance and regulatory 
mechanisms.  It is important to note here that their lack of concreteness might not in 
themselves be flaws.  When combined, however, with concrete provisions designed with 
market expansion in mind, it becomes clear that those flexible instruments were designed 
and oriented toward serving this purpose.  Operating together, these actually enable new 
markets—and the subjectivities they require—to function properly.  Meanwhile, their key 
legal and governance initiatives are squarely aimed at sustaining GDP growth.  As such, 
the following subsections seek to confront the effectiveness of these agreements—and 
what social effects they are actually producing—instead of simply celebrating the fact 
that a form of international consensus has been reached in each case.   
 
3.1.  Sustaining the Development Goals 
 
A major innovation agreed upon by parties to the Rio+20 Conference was to commence 
negotiations on the SDGs.  Its impetus was to search for more extensive indicators of 
human and environmental wellbeing than those modelled in the Millennium 
Development Goals (‘MDGs’).  Indeed, the MDGs considered environmental issues 
almost as ‘afterthoughts’.877  Originally, the Bank and OECD led efforts to build this 
novel set of development indicators.  Their research was supported by a number of 
prominent leaders—such as South African President Thabo Mbeki and Swiss President 
Moritz Leuenberger—who voiced, as early as 2006, repeated calls to pay greater attention 
to the work of these international organisations in formulating new indicators.  Eventually, 
the Colombian and Guatemalan governments formulated a joint proposal in November 
2011 to create a total of eight SDGs.  Underpinned by a set of targets and metrics, these 
were to be ‘general in character and establish a universal objective for safeguarding the 
environment’.  Building upon this, the Colombian-Guatemalan proposal highlighted the 
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possible SDGs as pertaining to: poverty reduction, consumption patterns, sustainable 
settlement development, biodiversity and forests, oceans, water, food security, and 
energy.878   
 
While widely welcomed, the general proposal controversially extended this list—
following a suggestion by an association of civil society organisations—to 17 SDGs and 
169 targets.879  The resulting agreement—labelled as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development—was intended by its parties to be a single, global, and supposedly 
universal ‘blueprint’ for addressing the world’s major challenges.  It sought to connect 
efforts to tackle poverty eradication and environmental protection with ‘sustained and 
inclusive’ economic growth.880  As such, many regarded the resulting Agenda as a ‘truly 
transformational’ agreement, one that was ‘[b]reathtaking in its scope and ambition’.881  
Underpinned by the widest-ever public consultation process held by the United Nations, 
it was adopted by consensus and without any reservations by its parties.   
 
Ostensibly, the SDGs offered a vision of a world liberated from extreme poverty and 
hunger.  They strived to reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and increase 
access to safe and affordable medicines.  Their ambitions—with regard to enhancing 
literacy, gender equality, water quality, sanitation, and universal access to affordable 
clean energy—were also highly lauded.  The SDGs also specified more concrete 
commitments, such as increasing standards of living for all peoples above the current 
extreme poverty threshold of $1.25 per day.882  Through it, governments also committed 
themselves to reducing rates of maternal mortality to under 70 deaths for every 100,000 
live births.883  Added to these were a number of notable preambular phrases affirming 
that ‘planet Earth and its ecosystems are our home’, and underscoring the need to achieve 
‘harmony with nature’.884   
 
Yet, importantly, other SDGs—on reducing production and consumption, tackling 
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climate change, halting biodiversity loss, deforestation, desertification, and overfishing, 
as well as restoring terrestrial and marine ecosystems—were couched in deliberately 
ambiguous terms.  The SDGs proposed only generalised and highly qualified solutions to 
these problems.  For instance, Goal 13.1 called upon countries only to make efforts to 
‘integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning’. 885  
The goal contained no guidance on how this goal might be achieved, particularly in light 
of potentially competing priorities (such as poverty eradication).  Moreover, the targets—
on reducing food waste, making resource use more efficient, and encouraging companies 
to adopt sustainable practices—explicitly avoided any references to the need for reducing 
the consumption of the world’s privileged few.   
 
Contrasting these vague prescriptions, however, was Goal 8’s commitment to ‘[s]ustain 
per capita economic growth’.  The goal included a specific target for least developed 
countries to achieve ‘at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum’.886  
In addition, all countries pledged to achieve ‘higher levels of economic productivity’, 
which was to be achieved ‘through diversification, technological upgrading and 
innovation’.887  The goal was added by the SDG Open Working Group chairs—Csaba 
Körösi of Hungary and Macharia Kamau of Kenya—to the SDG zero draft document.  
It reflected the preferences of some governments—the most vocal of which were those 
of Bhutan, Thailand, and Vietnam888—for prescriptive growth-based targets.  Indeed, by 
including the goal in the SDGs, the chairs explicitly rejected the High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda’s May 2013 report, which 
recommended that a GDP target—or any commitment to higher productivity—not be 
reflected in the SDGs.889  Some delegations expressed antipathy toward this goal.  Yet, 
Goal 8’s inclusion by the chairs in an outcome document—presented on a ‘take-it-or-
leave-it’ basis in the final plenary of the conference890—left little choice but for all parties 
to agree to it.891   
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In all, Goal 8 exposed a devotion to growth—based on export-oriented trade of industrial 
products892—which overshadowed all other competing demands.  The diffuse wording of 
these goals, written against the prescriptive language of Goal 8, held the entire 2030 
Agenda hostage to an existing growth model, as well as its pathology of extraction, 
refinement, and consumption of natural resources.  To further illustrate, the SDGs’ 
predominant approach to ending global poverty relied on expanding ‘economic 
resources’, as well as access to ‘new technology and financial services, including 
microfinance’.893  In other words, the entire 2030 Agenda not only privileged growth-
based objectives, but also anchored GDP growth as a fundamental ambition of the global 
order.  It was the core objective, and central ordering principle, around which a set of 
circumscribed SDGs became anchored.  As such, the SDGs invariably assumed a certain 
calibration of social life.  This tended to elevate some logics—particularly that of 
growth—while neutralising contradictions and anomalies between inherently competing 
logics.   
 
Conceptualised in such a way, achieving the SDGs relied upon the idea of ‘decoupling’ 
growth from environmental impacts.  It was an idea endorsed by most orthodox 
economists and policymakers,894 who tended to draw inspiration from more discrete 
schemes—such as carbon markets and natural capital initiatives—to emphasise this 
possibility.  Following these ideas, President Barack Obama proclaimed, in a January 
2017 article, that a 9.5 per cent fall in greenhouse gas emissions during his presidency—
combined with a 10 per cent growth in the United States economy over the same period—
‘put to rest the argument that combating climate change required accepting lower growth 
or a lower standard of living’.895   
 
                                                 
agreeing to a draft text, or reopening all of its provisions for negotiation. Given the lack of time necessary 
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However, this reasoning relied on three vital misconceptions.  Firstly, the substitution of 
carbon-intensive energy sources with renewable technologies only resulted in ‘partial’ 
decoupling, at best.  Continued GDP growth along this pathway would require the ever-
increasing construction of renewable energy technologies: such as solar panels, wind 
farms, geothermal plants, and lithium batteries.  Their proliferation and diffusion, at the 
necessary scale, are ultimately reliant upon steady supplies of finite and increasingly 
scarce raw materials and land.  Secondly, growth in the financial sector might enable an 
appearance of expanding economies without any correspondingly higher use of resources.  
The resulting wealth, however, tends to accrue to a small minority of affluent peoples, 
rather than genuinely directed toward the wellbeing of the poor.   
 
For example, the world’s poorest 60 per cent of people received only 5 per cent of the 
total income generated between 1999 and 2008.  On these trends, it will likely take at 
least 207 years, and a global GDP of 175 times its existing size, for all peoples to earn 
more than US$1.25 per day.896  In addition to this, resource-intensive production has 
increasingly shifted away from its places of consumption.  Wealthy nations, for instance, 
appear to consume increasing amounts of goods produced in poorer nations.  When these 
imported goods are included in GDP-environmental impact analyses, some argue, the 
results shed doubt on whether any genuine decoupling effects have actually taken 
place.897   
 
3.2.  ‘We’ll Always Have Paris’ 
 
In a similar vein, the Paris Agreement was a multilateral instrument agreed for the stated 
purpose of catalysing stronger global action on environmental problems: in this case, on 
tackling climate change.  It envisaged the creation (or reform) of several institutions 
directed at, amongst other objectives, stimulating financial flows consistent with low-
emission development pathways.898  Negotiated over a four-year period, the Agreement 
was immediately hailed by many negotiators as a resounding success.  French Foreign 
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Minister Laurent Fabius, who presided over the negotiations, welcomed the Agreement 
as a ‘historic turning point’. 899   The United Nations Secretary-General called it ‘a 
monumental triumph for people and our planet’.900  Others saw it as a much-needed 
victory for multilateralism, calling it ‘the world’s greatest diplomatic success’. 901  
Riding upon this wave of positive sentiment, the Agreement entered into force earlier 
than its initial 2020 commencement date—in November 2016—after obtaining 
ratifications from more than fifty-five parties (representing over 55 per cent of global 
emissions).902   
 
Despite this eulogisation, a careful reading of the Agreement’s history and provisions 
reveal that it was carefully engineered to align with a pre-existing global order.  
The Agreement was a concise instrument.  Many of its operational details were left to be 
elaborated through subsequent decisions by its parties.  Yet, the Agreement gave 
significant discretion for each country’s actions to be guided by their ‘different national 
circumstances’.903  Some commentators argued that this represented a shift from the 
‘binary’ approach of the Kyoto Protocol—that distinguished countries’ obligations on the 
basis of their status as either developed or developing countries—toward more flexible 
forms of differentiation. 904   This movement toward greater flexibility, in lieu of 
prescriptive ‘top-down’ approaches, was a feature inherited from the 2009 Copenhagen 
Conference.  Its infamous collapse had the effect of paving a ‘historic first step 
forward’905 toward the Paris Agreement.   
 
Proposals for all major economies to take on binding emissions targets—made by the 
United States and European countries in the lead-up to the Copenhagen Conference (with 
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the intention of replicating a Kyoto Protocol-styled agreement)—were fiercely rejected 
by many Third World representatives—who argued for flexibility to pursue development 
ambitions.  Chinese representatives, for example, initially resisted even voluntary 
emissions targets.  A precondition to such targets, they stated, was that the United 
States—and other First World countries—had to pledge significant emissions reductions, 
and commit to new development funding.906  A pledge by these states to establish a 
US$100 billion fund by 2020 to finance low-emissions development in Third World 
countries later became a central pillar of the Paris Agreement’s legal architecture.907  Its 
vision emphasised export-led development and globalised markets as the principal logics 
of the forthcoming Paris Agreement negotiations.   
 
During the negotiations, both First and Third World countries took pains not to undermine 
either these logics, or the seemingly stable global order constructed upon them.  
Delegates crafted a legal-institutional architecture, which could allow states to desist 
from making concrete emissions reduction commitments.  They also ensured weak 
consequences for non-compliance.  Reflecting this, the Paris Agreement’s institutional 
architecture was also based almost exclusively on procedural—rather than substantive—
requirements.  Fundamentally, the Agreement did not anticipate sanctions or compel 
remedial actions against states that either sought only to undertake minimal actions to 
reduce their emissions, or which failed to implement their intended policies.  This was a 
deliberate strategy.  It offered governments an opportunity—as Robert Keohane and 
Michael Oppenheimer observe—to use the Agreement’s vagueness, and the discretion it 
permitted, to ‘limit the scope or intensity of their proposed actions’.908  Arguably, these 
legal-institutional features diluted the effectiveness of compliance mechanisms created 
under previous climate treaties.   
 
More specifically, the climate pledges themselves were not binding.  The Agreement did 
not oblige parties to implement their own commitments: what it called ‘nationally 
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determined contributions’ (‘NDCs’).  Instead, the Agreement only required parties to 
pursue domestic mitigation measures with the ‘aim’ of achieving their NDCs. 909  
Moreover, the Agreement did not require even First World economies to commit to 
absolute emission reductions, as the Kyoto Protocol had done.  Its text merely implored 
that they ‘should’ do so.  This is not to argue that the NDCs, or international laws, had to 
be binding in order to be legitimate.  Rather, the example merely emphasises that 
governments took steps to guarantee that the new climate agreement would not threaten 
to subvert pre-existing legal regimes—many of which had binding force—emphasising 
the expansion of global trade and markets.   
 
Following this, a number of party representatives—led by the United States—made 
additional efforts to safeguard the global order.  They called for the removal of text that 
prevented countries from lowering their NDCs at any time.  They argued this would 
ensure that all countries had incentives to put forward higher emissions reduction targets 
than they would otherwise have done if they were strictly bound by their NDCs. 910  
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance mechanism, therefore, the Paris Climate 
Agreement did not impose strict emissions reduction obligations.  Furthermore, it did not 
create any enforcement regime with the power to impose sanctions on states that failed to 
comply with their obligations.   
 
Instead, the Agreement intended that the implementation and compliance of treaty 
obligations would take place only through an ‘expert-based and facilitative’ committee.  
The committee would merely offer advice to non-complying parties, based on a 
‘transparent, non-adversarial, and non-punitive’ framework, as determined by the parties 
to the Agreement.  In offering advice to parties, the Agreement required the committee to 
afford particular attention to parties’ ‘respective national capabilities and 
circumstances’. 911   In all, these carefully-constructed features led some scholars to 
observe that parties have essentially no ‘obligation to comply’ with the Paris 
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Agreement, 912  it being only a voluntary ‘statement of good intentions’. 913  
The Nicaraguan government refused to sign the agreement.  Its chief negotiator explained 
that:  
 
‘the concept of universal responsibility and voluntary commitments doesn’t work. 
Universal responsibility is a spin. It’s a spin on historical responsibility and common, but 
differentiated, responsibilities.’914 
 
Other notable commentators—such as scientist James Hansen—made even more critical 
statements, calling the Agreement a ‘fraud’ on the basis that it contained ‘no action, just 
promises’.915  This critique was later supported by the French government’s admission, 
in January 2018, that their country—which hosted the conference and was the 
Agreement’s most vocal proponent—had missed its own emissions goal for the year 2016 
by 3.6 per cent over its targeted 447 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions. 916   Some studies also indicate that aggregate global emissions have risen 
annually to record levels since the Paris Agreement’s signing.  While Asian countries 
contributed to two-thirds of this increase, emissions from the European Union also grew 
by 1.5 percent (or 50 million tonnes) in 2017.917  Adding further weight to Hansen’s 
opinion was a United Nations report’s revelation that, even if individual countries 
achieved their NDCs, they would be unlikely to conform with the Agreement’s long-term 
temperature goals.  Rather, the report stated that countries collective targets would likely 
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lead to global average temperature rises of between 2.9 and 3.4 degrees Celsius before 
the end of this century.918   
 
Furthermore, the Agreement’s new ‘Mechanism to Support Sustainable Development’ 
(‘SDM’) reinforced perceptions of the environment as a territory for market expansion.  
Closely resembling the CDM, at least in principle, the SDM was established with a view 
to offering incentives for public and private institutions to partake in host countries’ 
emissions reduction efforts.  Contributing states could benefit by counting emissions 
reductions achieved through these host country projects to fulfil their own mitigation 
pledges.  Unlike the Kyoto mechanisms, however, the SDM extended its eligibility to 
participants from all countries.  Affirming this was Article 6(4)’s phrasing, which 
suggested that all countries would be entitled to generate, trade, and count SDM units 
toward their emissions pledges.919  The mechanism’s expanded scope aligned with trends 
toward neoliberal environmental governance outlined throughout this chapter.  With the 
SDM’s inauguration, however, incentives became no longer limited to First World 
countries.  Any public or private institution could now presumably be eligible to reap its 
financial benefits, regardless of their geographical origins.  Underpinning this expanded 
market, and serving as its linchpin, was a legal-institutional architecture linking operation 
of the SDM with NDC compliance.   
 
Despite this, the SDM was in fact the last provision to achieve consensus at the Paris 
Climate Conference.  Its Article 6 was the final provision added to the Paris Agreement 
text before its adoption by the parties to the UNFCCC on 12 December 2015.  For the 
entire preceding six-year period, since the Copenhagen Conference, country 
representatives uncomfortable with the idea of carbon markets repeatedly called for 
attention to what they termed ‘non-market approaches’.  With this, some delegates—
typically from ALBA countries—attempted to recognise a wider set of logics and 
perceptions toward the environment.  In short, they urged adoption of alternative (‘non-
market’) mechanisms, rather than those that would merely serve as enablers for major 
emitters to maintain conventional patterns of industrial growth.   
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Such approaches included a familiar proposal, made by Bolivian representatives, directed 
at protecting ‘Mother Earth’.920  This reflected the views of some NGOs, particularly one 
calling itself the Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change.  The condensed format 
of side-events did not enable discussions of any specific traditional knowledge 
practices—or concrete projects—in depth.  So, many references to traditional knowledge 
as putative ‘solutions’ remained ‘elusive and rhetorical’.921  However, at one side-event, 
Felix Santi—leader of an indigenous Kichwa community from Sarayacu in Ecuador—
joined other Kichwa leaders to promote a proposal called Kawsak Sacha (roughly 
translated as ‘the living forest’).  He introduced this proposal in the following terms:  
 
‘We came from the remote land of Ecuador, upset by the situation of indigenous people, 
connected with the guardians of the forest, with a connection to the cosmic world. Climate 
change affects all the living beings that live on this little planet, the Earth. Sarayacu 
elaborated its living plan and its proposal: Living Forest, Kawasak Sacha. Sarayacu’s 
proposal is a space where we apply the ancestral knowledge. Our Yachak, our wise men, 
interact with the beings who protect the water, the mountains and the forest […] The main 
objective is to reach a clear recognition by the Ecuadorian state of this space as a sacred 
bio-cultural heritage, free from oil exploitation. Our call to the international community 
is to become aware of the necessity to maintain the Kawasak Sacha, the living 
rainforest.’922 
 
Speaking during a High-Level Segment of the Paris Conference, Patricia Gualinga—
another Kichwa leader—warned participants that ‘[c]limate change is not a business’.  
Fundamentally, she explained that Kawsak Sacha sought to critique what the Kichwa 
described as ‘a system that threatens life, that intends in different ways to perpetuate 
colonial law’.923  Confronting this system, the proposal attempted to offer alternative 
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visions of humanity’s relationship with the environment based upon the ancestral 
practices of these often-ignored, unseen, and unheard peoples.  Specifically, the Kichwa 
proposal stated:  
 
‘The path for achieving common goals in defense of life is to bring together experiences, 
wisdoms, and good will, to return to the principles of life in which all beings are 
interconnected spiritually. We call these ways of being “nature”, she represents life and 
to her we are indebted. Therein one sees our conception of life, how we understand life 
and continuity thereof, it is the simple reason we defend it.’924   
 
Relatedly, certain Zapatista groups imagined this form of life as ‘a movement of many 
movements’.925  At the heart of this challenge, they argued, was to sustain diversity and 
difference, while unifying social movements.  Many of its supporters travelled to Paris to 
demand systemic changes to the draft Agreement’s text.  Demonstrations and protests 
took place across the city, in contravention of a blanket ban on public outdoor 
demonstrations—imposed by the French government—following terrorist attacks on 13 
November 2015.  An affiliated group, calling itself the Climate Games, explained that 
their actions were driven by a conviction that ‘the geopolitical and economic dynamics 
that underpin climate chaos are the same as those that feed terrorism […] all feed the 
same inequalities that lead to cycles of violent conflict’.  The group’s written statement, 
in response to the terrorist attacks, continued: ‘[t]he biggest threat to security, to life in 
all its forms, is the system that drives the climate disaster’.926  It was this, and other similar 
critiques, that informed the negotiating positions of many ALBA nations.   
 
Yet, they mounted challenges using tactics that had the effect of impeding the objectives 
that they set out to achieve.  One specific diplomatic tactic, for instance, involved some 
ALBA representatives attempting to nullifying negotiations on market mechanisms by 
way of tabling text proposals on what they referred to as ‘non-market approaches’.  
Importantly, they relinquished their previous strategy of impeding—or ‘blocking’—
market mechanisms, moving instead to one of promoting non-markets approaches, 
alongside more traditional market-based approaches.  ALBA governments advocated for 
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the insertion of such text into an existing draft article dealing with market mechanisms, 
rather than seeking to add a separate, stand-alone article purely addressing non-market 
approaches.927  With this, ALBA negotiators enjoined their demands to a more settled, 
and visible, work stream.  Their choice to pursue this tactic may have been made in an 
effort to afford protection against what they thought might be some parties’ attempts to 
excise references to non-market mechanisms from the final agreement.  After all, attempts 
to remove such demands were made more difficult if references to them were vested 
within a set of relatively uncontroversial demands, rather than as an independent article.   
 
As an unintended effect, however, these tactics prevented any visibility of the ALBA 
proponents’ alternative visions without also simultaneously promoting calls for expanded 
market mechanisms.  Put alternatively, the decision of ALBA negotiators to adjoin non-
market approaches with markets-based mechanisms meant that alternative visions—such 
as those of the Kichwa leaders and other indigenous groups—only appeared in the draft 
agreement as an adjunct to—or alongside—the dominant ideas to which they were 
opposed.  As an unintended consequence of this, non-market advocates effectively ended 
up breathing renewed life into market-based approaches.   
 
Efforts by some ALBA nations to more precisely articulate the scope of possible non-
market approaches—over the course of 2013 to 2016—were met with unrelenting 
derision from the majority of parties, which supported carbon markets.  Seeking to have 
any references to non-market mechanisms removed, some market proponents shared 
close ties with multinational fossil fuel companies.  For example, the lead markets 
negotiator for the Panamanian delegation—a role that coordinated the G-77’s position—
was an active board member, and former president, of a private organisation known as 
                                                 
927 See, for example, Submission by the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the UNFCCC, ‘Non-market-
based approaches under the Convention’, 2 September 2013, available at: 
<http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/market_and_non-
market_mechanisms/application/pdf/nma_bolivia_03092013.pdf> (last accessed on 4 January 2016); 
Submission by the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the UNFCCC, ‘Non-market approaches under the 
Convention’, 8 November 2013, available at: 
<http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/market_and_non-
market_mechanisms/application/pdf/bolivia_nma_081113.pdf> (last accessed on 4 January 2016); 
Submission by the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the UNFCCC, ‘Framework for Various Approaches 
and Non-Market-Based Approaches’, September 2014, available at: 
<http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/application/pdf/submission_fva_and_nma_20.09.201
4.pdf> (last accessed on 4 January 2016); Andrew Howard, ‘UNFCCC Briefing on the Technical Papers 
on FVA, NMA and NMM’, 1 December 2014, available at: 
<http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/sbsta/application/pdf/sbsta_techpapers_briefing_nov2014.pdf> (last 
accessed on 4 January 2016). 
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the International Emissions Trading Association (‘IETA’).928  IETA was established by 
a number of companies—including fossil fuel giants British Petroleum and Rio Tinto—
with a view to ensuring that global climate policies caused only ‘minimal economic 
harm’.929  Its members now also include many of the world’s major fossil fuel companies: 
including Chevron, BHP, and Statoil.930   
  
Nevertheless, non-market proponents steadfastly resisted these influences.  As such, 
market-based approaches remained highly contested in the Paris Conference’s 
preparatory negotiations.  To capture these discussions adequately, without allowing 
them to infect the rest of the draft agreement, the chairs of this work stream reduced both 
market and non-market proposals to a single sentence of a draft negotiating text, which 
was publicly released in October 2015.931  Following this, during the first week of the 
Paris Conference—in December 2015—many representatives voiced profound concerns 
about there being insufficient time to deliver a compromise text.  Fierce divisions 
remained between non-market and market proponents until the final moments.932   
 
At this moment in the proceedings, non-market advocates—fearing omission of their own 
text from the Agreement—finally conceded.  They agreed to recognise market approaches, 
alongside non-market approaches, within a stand-alone article of the Agreement.  
These, they concurred, could operate as a set of voluntary mechanisms with which parties 
could use to meet their emissions reduction targets.  At the signing ceremony of the Paris 
Agreement, a number of heads of state—from Canada, Chile, Ethiopia, France, Germany 
and Mexico—as well as leaders of the World Bank, IMF, and OECD also announced an 
agreement to price carbon emissions.  They set a challenge to ‘turn the Paris Agreement 
into action’, principally by doubling the coverage of carbon pricing to 25 per cent of 
                                                 
928 Corporate Accountability, Polluting Paris: How Big Polluters are undermining global climate policy 
(Boston: Corporate Accountability, 2017), p. 17. See also, Partnership for Market Readiness, ‘Expert: 
Andrei Marcu’, available at: <https:// www.thepmr.org/expert/andrei-marcu> (last accessed on 2 April 
2018).  
929 International Emissions Trading Association (‘IETA’), ‘Our History’, available at: 
<http://www.ieta.org/page-18201> (last accessed on 15 March 2018). 
930 IETA, ‘Our Members: Industry, Energy & Power’, available at <http://www.ieta.org/page-18201> 
(last accessed on 15 March 2018). 
931 ‘Non-paper: Note by the Co-Chairs’, Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, UNFCCC Doc ADP/2015/8/InformalNote (5 October 2015), available at: 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/8infnot.pdf> (last accessed on 12 February 2018). 
932 See Andrew Howard, ‘Voluntary Cooperation (Article 6)’, in Daniel Klein, María Pía Carazo, 
Meinhard Doelle, Jane Bulmer and Andrew Higham (eds), The Paris Climate Agreement: Analysis and 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 183. 
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global emissions by 2020, and 50 per cent coverage within the following decade.933   
 
As a result, non-market proponents paid a high price for making visible their worldviews 
through international law.  Their visions—of an alternative set of relations between 
humanity and the environment—became dependent on the existence of expanded markets 
for trading greenhouse gas emissions.  This authorised not only the continuation, but also 
an expansion, of the very phenomenon that ALBA representatives sought to subvert.  
So, these non-market proponents reified a now-familiar conception of the environment, 
even if that was not the objective that they had sought to achieve.  This environmental 
vision was one in which the environment persisted as a precondition for export-based 
trade: not only a warehouse of raw materials and a sink for waste pollutants, but also a 
new territory for the expansion of the market, and ultimately, a means for sustaining a 
dominant vision of endless, unbridled expansion of the market.   
 
Conclusion  
 
I have argued, throughout this chapter, this moment consolidates pre-existing forms of 
subjectivity and a global ordering of things, species, and people.  My story demonstrates 
international law’s ongoing role in this phenomenon.  It is possible to gain a sense of hope 
from the fact that endeavours to mount opposing and counter-hegemonic claims appear 
to be intensifying.  Yet, principally, I have observed how these competing, aberrational, 
and subaltern logics became strategically de-radicalised, appropriated, transformed, and 
integrated—through the actions of lawyers, diplomats, and institutions—into the service 
of modified hegemonic forms.  Importantly, these efforts tended to re-establish consent 
in the pre-existing global order. 934   This took place by creating new tradeable 
commodities for accumulation, and investment, to enlarge the operation of a supposedly 
self-regulating market.  It also had an effect in transforming the ways in which many 
opponents of the global order manifested themselves, and how they articulated their 
claims.   
 
                                                 
933 Virginia Wiseman, ‘Implementation Update: As Governments Prepare for Paris Agreement Signing 
Ceremony, Carbon Pricing in the Spotlight’, IISD Reporting Services (online), 21 April 2016, available 
at: <http://live.worldbank.org/turning-the-paris-climate-agreement-into-action> (last accessed on 11 July 
2018). 
934 The phenomenon might also be regarded as a variant of what Balakrishnan Rajagopal calls the 
‘instruments effect’, in which radical demands had a ‘paradoxical effect of expanding and strengthening 
international institutions’ engaged in environmental activities. See Rajagopal (2003), pp. 76-77.  
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As a result, the logic of global environmentalism is now beholden to the view that serious 
actions should be taken to address a host of problems.  Yet, the logic of market-oriented 
management itself must apparently remain unchallenged.  This tends to reify a global 
vision in which reverence to the sacred idols of self-regulating global markets and trade 
liberalisation intensifies.  With this, I have observed how law has had a constitutive role 
in enlarging the market-mediated production and fostering new avenues for the exchange 
of resources, as well as suppressing resistance to them.  Thus, the environmental vision 
is one transformed into a constantly-enlarging domain of monetary value.   
 
In short, the environment’s meaning might be seen as exhibiting some similar properties 
to that of polymers.  Its underlying patterns and structures were continually replicated.  
When faced with opposition, it displayed a durability and a malleability, redefining 
itself—through international law and institutions—in ways that fulfilled two fundamental 
criteria.  Firstly, it has responded malleably to serious observable problems such as 
species extinctions, climate change, deforestation, and pollution.  Secondly, the 
environment retained a durability, reforming itself to sustain the logic of globalised 
markets, and expansion of economic growth.  Through this phenomenon, law’s vision of 
the environment has had an effect in rationalising the existing global order as an inevitable 
product of the world in which we live.  That stance underwrites a resigned acceptance 
that market expansion and green economic logic is the environment’s best, or only, hope.  
It also promotes the devaluation of traditional cultures and indigenous experiences.  
Accordingly, there is little resulting sense that any conflicts between these ideas may 
indeed be irreducible.  Rather than any radical reconfiguration, therefore, contemporary 
legal-institutional innovations have merely tended to reproduce, and reify, intrinsic 
parameters of the existing global order.  This ended up stultifying international law’s 
critical—or emancipatory—potential.   
 
Concomitantly, a likely effect of the resulting regulatory responses was to concentrate 
greater power and resources in the hands of experts: the techno-scientific, financial, and 
industrialist acolytes possessing the knowledge and power to implement them.  
This might well contribute to sustaining the forms of life, and a global ordering, upon 
which those elites are beholden.  The pollutive by-products of these logics—replicated 
through international summits—accumulate in international treaties, institutions, and 
ultimately, in physical spaces such as the Great Pacific Garbage Patch.  It is, in this sense, 
that law has become imbricated in transforming our collective attitudes and responses to 
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environmental problems.  Thus, from Kyoto to Paris, perhaps those radical voices seeking 
to destabilise the status quo were left forsaken: their hearts emboldened with hope, but 
their feet planted on ever-more unstable ground.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
‘Our strategy should be not only to confront empire, but to lay siege to it. To deprive it of oxygen. To shame 
it. To mock it. With our art, our music, our literature, our stubbornness, our joy, our brilliance, our sheer 
relentlessness – and our ability to tell our own stories.’  
 
―Arundhati Roy, War Talk (2003)935 
 
Throughout a long span of history, international law has contributed to our understanding 
of key concepts.  These concepts have also, in turn, helped inform developments in 
international law.  Many governments, international organisations, civil society groups, 
and environmental campaigners have sought to marshal international legal rules and 
techniques to address a diverse range of (global) problems.  These include the problems 
of industrial pollution, climate change, species extinctions, the clearing of forests, 
poverty, and income inequality.  Their putative ‘solutions’ have tended to involve 
enlarging mechanisms for financialising ecosystems, hastening techno-scientific and 
market-friendly innovation, as well as expanding the growth of national economies.  
Yet, in all of this, there is little sense that the problems these policies aim to solve might 
themselves be legally-produced.   
 
With this in mind, the central question that I have sought to investigate in this thesis is 
how attempts to deploy international law might actually be imbricated in the reproduction 
of these problems, by working to shape—or transmit—particular perceptions of the 
natural environment.  As we have seen, international law—with its global reach and 
appearance of universality—has had a significant role in this phenomenon.  In this, I have 
conceptualised law itself as a form of story-telling, or technique of narrative practice.  
The stories we tell through law make up some of the equipment by which we navigate 
reality.  They also create their own realities.   
 
This thesis forms part of the body of international legal scholarship that endeavours to 
highlight law’s constitutive role in configuring interactions between what we typically 
                                                 
935 Arundhati Roy, War Talk (Cambridge: South End, 2003), p. 112. 
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refer to as humanity and nature.  My work contributes to knowledge in this area by 
demonstrating some of the historical contests, and oppositional struggles, through which 
specific configurations of knowledge-power have been shaped by—and also themselves 
shaped—international law.  Put simply, my original contribution to scholarship has been 
to demonstrate how international law has historically reproduced particular stories about 
nature, which have helped to preserve the power and privileges of a small minority of 
political actors.  More broadly, we might see these stories as helping to sustain a specific 
formation of global ordering.   
 
These stories—or visions—about nature, I argued, are about human exceptionalism, an 
ever-expanding control by a minority of wealthy techno-scientific industrialists, perpetual 
growth of national economies, and the ability to surpass all ecological limits.  
Following this observation, I suggested that the reproduction of such stories about nature 
operate in ways that stymie international law’s potential to regulate environmental 
problems, reduce poverty, inequality, or reconfigure the global economy to better serve 
the interests of the world’s poorest peoples.  As I have emphasised throughout this thesis, 
existing legal doctrines and techniques with regard to the environment are largely the 
products of active efforts—by powerful governments, international institutions, and 
NGOs—to partly neutralise, or absorb, latent subaltern stories in ways that reinforce 
dominant languages and logics.  Their underlying impulse is perhaps exemplified in a 
handwritten letter by outgoing United States President Barack Obama to President 
Donald Trump in January 2017, which read: ‘[i]t’s up to [some of] us, through action and 
example, to sustain the international order […] upon which our wealth and safety 
depend’.936  Measures implemented in furtherance of this objective have helped stabilise 
international law, and have held the discipline’s inherently self-deconstructive urges at 
bay.   
 
Expanding upon this central claim, the first following section provides a summary of each 
major claim that I have made over the course of this thesis.  Section II will then offer an 
exposition of what this might mean for the practices and potential of international law to 
achieve the aspirations of peoples seeking to deploy it as an instrument to resolve global 
problems.  Finally, in Section III, I will conclude this thesis by summarising my central 
                                                 
936 Kevin Liptak, ‘Exclusive: Read the Inauguration Day letter Obama left for Trump’, CNN (online), 
5 September 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/03/politics/obama-trump-letter-
inauguration-day/index.html> (last accessed on 25 July 2018). 
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story, and surmising how my story might help to reimagine international law in ways that 
could better reduce the discipline’s present maladies.   
 
I.    Clarification  
 
1.1.  Civilisation and Natural Resources 
 
In Chapter Two, I sought to engage—using Linnaeus’ preserved fish as a symbol—with 
the question of how classical international legal thought imposed a rigid human edifice 
upon an infinitely complex and variable world.  This opening substantive chapter tracked 
the emergence of a bifurcation, and categorisation, of what I called civilisation from the 
idea of nature through a number of works—written between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries—by key personalities in international legal thought.  These early works of 
classical international jurisprudence imagined nature as an unchanging and immutable 
collection of resources.  Through these works and instruments, I suggested, the 
consumption of natural resources became a fundamental part of a ‘civilised’ (European) 
identity.  I argued that this framing of nature was an antithetical reflection against which 
civilised peoples could identify themselves.  With this, I argued, the idea of an external 
nature became a constitutive feature of the sovereign state—and thus, international law—
itself.  Envisioned in this way, I demonstrated how perceptions of a savage and untamed 
state of nature also served as justification for the colonisation, extraction, and utilisation 
of non-European lands and peoples.   
 
Turning to consider the means by which these logics gained a foothold within 
international law, I engaged with some European accounts of the rapacious effects of 
reigning extractive logics and industrial practices upon what were widely regarded as 
previously unsullied lands.  Colonial outposts—particularly those located on distant 
islands—were where European botanists and colonists became most aware of their effects 
in transforming landscapes and ecosystems.  By the late-eighteenth century, 
I demonstrated, the task of finding lost paradises—which had sparked some European 
voyages to discover new worlds—seemed incompatible with the colonising mission’s 
task to exploit new lands and peoples.  Importantly, however, any apparent 
contradictions—or anomalies—seemed to find resolution through certain international 
legal-institutional innovations aimed at protecting, and managing, natural resource use.  
Specifically, I suggested that European powers turned to physiocratic philosophies and 
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techniques.  Seeking to conjoin the discipline of political economy with the natural 
sciences, physiocratic principles became encoded into international legal instruments.  
Fundamentally, I argued that this had a constitutive effect in inscribing a narrow meaning 
of nature—as a warehouse of resources that should be exercised for the purposes of 
sustaining civilised life—into the backbone of international law.  As a result, the 
reverberations of physiocracy can still be felt at law’s disciplinary heart.  
 
1.2.  Conservation and the Economy 
 
In Chapter Three, I explored international law’s role in framing nature during the two 
decades following the Second World War.  I observed how the humble tsetse fly became 
an objective, an effect, and a symbol of international law’s operation during this period.  
Nature, I argued, became a central feature in the emergence of an object that called ‘the 
economy’.  The chapter demonstrated how a key task of post-war international lawyers, 
and the newly-formed international institutions, was to conserve the supply of—and the 
sustained access of wealthy First World countries to—essential natural resources, 
including iron ore, phosphate, and oil.  In other words, this international legal construction 
of nature became a means through which powerful states and actors sought to impose a 
new geopolitics, and ordain a new global order.  This movement culminated in the 1949 
United Nations Scientific Conference on Resource Conservation and Utilization 
(‘UNSCCUR’), the organisers of which saw its role as finding methods to expand 
resource supplies for wealthy countries.   
 
Recognising downfalls in this approach, however, some resistant groups attempted to 
confront them by convening a separate conference—the International Technical 
Conference on the Protection of Nature (‘ITCPN’)—which was timed to coincide with 
the UNSCCUR.  During its ensuing discussions, most of the ITCPN’s participants 
became preoccupied with how to reduce the world’s demand for resources, and how to 
preserve areas designated as ‘natural’.  In light of impending budgetary pressures and 
threats of political exclusion, the ITCPN organisers eventually felt compelled—in the 
years after the conference—to soften what many came to consider as radical views.  
I witnessed how these so-called preservationists embraced more conservationist ideas as 
a strategy to ensure that their voices would be heard by government counterparts.  So, I 
suggested that while their efforts in convening the ITCPN were successful in garnering 
public support for nature protection, these became ultimately redirected toward 
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promoting conservationist ideologies, rather than advancing their own logics of 
‘preservation’.  Subsequently, this culminated in the establishment—through 
international legal instruments—of a number of African national wildlife parks and mega-
dam projects.  African leaders became persuaded that the projects could help to foster a 
heightened sense of national identity within their newly-decolonised nations, and propel 
them toward the ranks of advanced economies.  As we saw, however, these projects often 
had detrimental effects upon the peoples living adjacent to them.   
 
1.3.  The (Human) Environment 
 
Chapter Four provided an analysis of the 1972 Stockholm Conference.  In it, I focused 
my attentions on illuminating how ‘the environment’ emerged as a distinct object, and 
field, of international law.  Further, I investigated the interests for whom the environment 
was constructed to serve.  Comparing claims made by some First and Third World 
governments, I explained how concerns about the impacts of environmental regulations 
upon development aspirations—as understood in solely economic terms—emerged as a 
major source of friction between the conference participants.  Added to this, alternative 
claims were invoked by those seeking to critique other important issues in world affairs.  
These included renouncing imperialism, racism, human persecution, housing refugees, 
stratospheric pollution from high-altitude aircraft, as well as prohibiting ecocide and 
nuclear weapons.  I then highlighted strategies through which these struggles, and 
stalemates, between competing aspirations became neutralised.  I suggested this occurred 
through a strategic turn to techno-scientific, industrial, and financial logics, which 
became central features of the conference’s outcome document.  Such a strategic move, 
I explained, was designed to ensure the support of governments that had been reticent to 
engage in the conference process.  As such, I concluded that it was through these primary 
referents that the environment became forged as an international legal-institutional object.   
 
Alongside this, I suggested that powerful governments and non-governmental 
organisations (‘NGOs’) conspired to move some of the more contentious ‘political’ issues 
under discussion beyond—or outside—the environmental regime’s scope.  Many such 
issues became consigned to discussions in other international fora.  Meanwhile, those 
participants daring to raise ostensibly controversial issues were chastised for trying to 
subvert the international law-making process, deeds that invoked widespread 
condemnation.  As a consequence of these, I argued that the Stockholm Conference 
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ratified a specific vision of the environment, which was made to appear universal.  
Importantly, I also suggested this was achieved in a way that elevated logics destined to 
protect the political-economic interests of a number of wealthy First World countries—
particularly the United Kingdom and the United States—as well as their advanced techno-
scientific industries.  Simultaneously, this environmental sphere excluded logics that 
threatened to subvert a fragile global order.  Subsequently, I concluded that the 
environment became imagined through international law—during this foundational 
moment—in a way specially adapted to sustaining the economic privileges of a small 
group of financiers, techno-scientific industrialists, and their bureaucratic allies.  Thus, 
law’s vision of the environment became a vehicle for sustaining the structural inequalities 
of the global system.  This was despite of the concerted efforts of some Third World 
commodity exporters—during the mid to late-1970s—to use environmental issues for the 
purposes of reorienting the global order toward more adequately addressing resource 
distribution issues.   
 
1.4.  Sustainable Development 
 
With Chapter Five, my focus shifted to the construction of sustainable development as an 
international legal concept.  To this end, I explored the debates and discussions of two 
international bodies: the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(‘WCED’), and the 1992 Rio Convention.  I used the Earthrise image to highlight a 
disparity—between transcendence and grounds—embedded within the idea of 
sustainable development.  I observed that, while appearing to meld economic 
development with heightening environmental concerns, the resulting conceptual marriage 
merely obscured tensions between them.  It also reaffirmed a global order giving 
preference to the interests of wealthy nations and a minority of globalised elites.  
I concentrated on two logics that allowed this marriage to take place.  Firstly, sustainable 
development framed poverty as the principal cause and effect of environmental 
degradation.  Economic growth then became the focus, and solution, of this vision of 
poverty.  Secondly, I suggested that the commission downplayed the role of affluence in 
the lifestyles of the world’s richest nations and peoples.  It also negated the possibility of 
limits to growth.  Instead, the commission emphasised technological innovation as a 
purported means to achieve a ‘growth of limits’.   
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These logics, I demonstrated, attracted fierce criticisms from those peoples claiming to 
speak ‘from the ground’.  Yet, they were eventually side-lined through a range of tactics 
by the WCED’s Secretary-General, along with some of its commissioners.  Resorting to 
assumptions about technological optimism, and the need for financial transfers, they 
sought to neutralise radical arguments about the existence of ecological limits.  
This environmental vision became codified in the Rio Declaration.  I demonstrated—by 
discussing the dynamics of its negotiation process, as well as those of its associated 
agreements on climate change and biodiversity—how parties took great pains to ensure 
that this vision would cause no disruption to the prevailing global techno-scientific, 
industrial, financial system.  I argued that, as a result, the environment became reframed 
in a way that made it contemporaneous with the ideology of development, and hegemony 
of the pre-existing global system.  At the same time, it erased—from the image of 
contemporary international environmental law—struggles of the world’s poorest 
peoples—particularly those living with minimal impacts on pollution, deforestation, and 
climate change—suffering most acutely from the effects of these problems.   
 
1.5.  The Green Economy and Natural Capital 
 
Finally, Chapter Six sought to investigate how international legal instruments on 
environmental issues rapidly expanded after the Rio Earth Summit.  With this impetus, 
I began by recognising a heightened awareness of, and resulting endeavours to disrupt, 
dominant logics with regard to the environment.  Exploring the onset of competing, 
aberrational, and counter-hegemonic logics, I suggested that these were de-radicalised 
and integrated into the service of modified hegemonic forms.  Using the image of plastic 
waste as a framing technique, I argued the significance of this phenomenon was that it re-
established consent in reproducing pre-existing forms of subjectivity and global ordering.  
This promoted new fields of economic activity, enlarging the operation of a supposedly 
self-regulating global market.  Simultaneously, I observed in this episode international 
law’s ongoing role—chiefly through actions of lawyers, diplomats, and institutions—in 
helping to transform the conditions under which many of the dominant logic’s opponents 
ended up articulating their own demands.   
 
In all, I explained that these factors reified familiar conceptions of the environment as a 
warehouse of static, inert, and tradeable raw materials used predominantly for the benefit 
of an exclusive minority of human beings.  By the same token, law helped imagine—and 
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create—new readily-exchangeable commodities.  Problems associated with the 
environment were made to seem resolvable purely through the rigorous application of 
technologies, finance, industry, markets, and economic growth.  While this logic accepted 
the need to address problems relating to the environment, it sustained growth of the 
market as an unimpeachable objective.  Thus, in retelling this episode, I highlighted the 
ongoing constitutive role of international legal regimes in helping to open new avenues 
for moving capital, and globalising markets, as well as defusing resistance to them.  
I suggested that this reaffirmed hegemonies, while devaluing traditional knowledge and 
ecological practices.  Finally, I concluded by suggesting that international law has 
transformed our collective attitudes, and responses, toward environmental problems at 
the same time that it has reconstituted, rationalised, or sustained vital characteristics of 
the existing global order.   
 
II.   Convocation 
 
The portrait emerging from Chapters Two to Six is that of international law’s role in 
shaping perceptions about nature and the environment.  Fundamentally, this was a story 
about nature as a warehouse of raw material resources, which could be conserved—
particularly through techno-scientific and financial means—to ensure infinitely 
expanding national economies, poverty alleviation, and growing affluence.  Put simply, 
my story describes how—over a long period between 1539 and 2015—this particular 
story was imposed, and sustained, through legal doctrines and institutions.  The outcome, 
I have argued, is a vision—or story—of the environment that aligns with an industrial 
and trade-friendly, market-based global order.   
 
Moreover, my story observed how this legally-produced vision precluded alternative 
conceptions of nature.  I suggested that law’s delineation—or delimitation—of nature 
operated in ways that might be symbolised by a set of images: Linnaeus’ fish, the African 
tsetse fly, the dromedary camel, the Earthrise photograph, and the Great Pacific Garbage 
Patch.  Importantly, these images—and the episodes they represent—may help to 
demonstrate how our legal and political choices with regard to addressing problems 
associated with nature continue to be, in many ways, predetermined.  As a consequence, 
it may be possible to witness what Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer might have 
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called our ‘freedom to choose what is always the same’.937  Law appears ‘chimerical’, in 
the sense that it creates a reality that is largely an eternal, unchanging portrait of itself.   
 
With the aim of opening up those concepts for critique, however, I have also observed 
how—at various moments—struggles over nature’s meaning were fought within 
international law.  Put simply, there were competing meanings at stake.  These emerged 
from a range of anxieties.  We saw that these anxieties included, firstly, the need to protect 
the image of tropical island paradises as metaphorical sites for the Garden of Eden.  
Secondly, proposals for reducing post-World War Two demand for essential raw 
materials.  Dissensus then converged, thirdly, around issues of access to technology and 
finance.  Fourth, fears intensified with regard to the problems of poverty and limits to 
growth.  Subsequently, international law’s observed lack of effectiveness in curbing 
global environmental problems led to further anxieties, and calls for greater attention—
particularly by corporate actors—to resolve those problems under the rubric of the green 
economy and natural capital valuations.   
 
Importantly, my story has enriched views that the idea of nature—or the environment—
is not itself an inherently stable concept.  Far from being immutable, invulnerable, or 
inevitable, nature’s meanings are highly contested.  What I have repeatedly suggested, 
however, is that law responded to these competing stories and contexts.  My close study 
has brought to the surface international legal and institutional practices that have 
neutralised, co-opted, absorbed, delegitimised, or reallocated opposing claims of those 
who attempted to depart from dominant stories about nature.  Such demands were made 
by a wide range of different representatives: that is to say, government officials, civil 
society groups, indigenous peoples, and radical scholars.  Nevertheless, these rival 
preferences became occluded and ostracised through the deprivation of funding, 
malicious allegations, forced resignations, intimidation, as well as other forms of direct 
and indirect coercion to downgrade the effects of those rival claims.   
 
An effect of these strategies, I argued, was to bring about the recurring reconstruction and 
reconfiguration of meanings ascribed to the environment.  Yet, these merely occurred in 
ways that reaffirmed the continuity of dominant logics and modes of understanding it.  
The result, in other words, was to reproduce an interpellation that successively canonised 
                                                 
937 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments 
(Edmund Jephcott trans, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 136. 
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the ideas of civilisation, national economies, technology and financial transfers, 
development, trade liberalisation, as well as globalised markets.  Legal doctrines and 
institutions knitted these logics together to appear as ‘a global ethic’. 938  
This interpellation, I argued, ensured that the entire world—and all life upon it—would 
continue to function in a way that would not fundamentally disturb the continuity of 
techno-scientific, industrialist, trade-friendly, and market-based logics.  It was with 
reference to these logics that law repeatedly responded, and orientated itself, to opposing 
claims that were external to it.  Meanwhile, law helped foster a rapidly transforming world 
in which more of the poorest peoples now live in its most toxic areas, and where species 
extinctions are increasing at an unprecedented rate—among other noticeably 
transformative effects—for the purposes of sustaining a familiar global system.  It is, in 
this sense that I have argued the concept of nature both sustains— and is sustained by— 
international law.   
 
Several additional points extend from this analysis.  International law’s framing of the 
environment in the ways I have described gave rise to a specific form of violence.  
It helped to perpetuate inequities—within species, peoples, and societies—by covertly 
reifying the privileges of some over others.  As we witnessed, these were—at various 
times—contested.  Yet, lawyers, government representatives, and even fellow activists 
have deployed law in attempts to seal cracks in the global order, repair its roofing, and 
reinforce its pillars against threats.  For example, we are now able to observe that the 
promotion of ‘sustainability’ appears as a means to sustain the comfort levels of the 
world’s wealthiest peoples, without degrading the natural capital, resource base, or stable 
environmental conditions required to do so. 939  This is the objective to which law’s 
framing of the environment remains focused.  Yet, in reorienting the environment to serve 
this outcome, existing laws and institutions have significantly affected many of the 
world’s peoples and species.  Meanwhile, their benefits tend to accrue to plutocrats, 
wealthy techno-scientific industrialists, financiers, and their bureaucratic allies.   
 
Put simply, my observations about international law are more than just about the 
discipline’s efforts to arrest the exhaustion of resources, the loss of ecosystems, or the 
                                                 
938 Interestingly, this creation of a global ethic was one of the Brundtland Commission’s overarching 
objectives. See WCED (1987), p. 308. 
939 Paul Kingsnorth, Confessions of a Recovering Environmentalist (London: Faber, 2017), p. 142. For a 
similar argument, see Nick Richardson, ‘If such a thing exists’ (2016) 16(38) London Review of Books 
28. 
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transgressing of ecological limits.  My story is about how the discipline orders the world, 
partly through its framing of the environment.  In addition to its devastating social 
implications, this framing contributes to the clearing of forests, production of greenhouses 
gases, species extinctions, pollution, overfishing, and the bleaching of coral reefs.  
Perhaps a comforting prospect, however, is that the concealment of these effects is never 
complete.  Indeed, repeated invocations of the need to achieve consensus in international 
summits reveal the presence of an underlying instability.  These also disguise the fact that 
demands are always being made, political processes are always at stake, which can offer 
launching pads for repoliticising the environment.  By gaining a more acute 
understanding of the discipline’s ‘dark sides’940—and struggles against its continuity—
possibilities to achieve alternative, less violent, or less unjust practices of international 
law might become visible.   
 
My story, therefore, has been non-metaphysical in its orientation.  For this reason, I 
remain hesitant to prescribe—or overtly embrace—any explicit normative solutions to 
the problems that I have identified over the course of this thesis.  Any such attempt to 
unilinearly deduce alternative precepts of global ordering—or ‘perfect justice’941—might 
risk succumbing to—or reaffirming—the very transcendental and imperialist urges that I 
have strived to resist.  Notwithstanding this, I have—throughout this thesis—offered 
glimpses upon alternative possibilities.  It is perhaps, in this sense, that my story holds 
within it the seeds of its own alternative futures and interpretive possibilities.  Intrinsically, 
every legal doctrine or practice is partly the result of a battle over the stories that are told, 
who tells them, who is heard, and what is included within its scope.  Changing our 
stories—by unearthing old ones, breathing them back to life, while weaving new elements 
                                                 
940 I take the sense of this phrase from David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing 
International Humanitarianism (Princeton University Press, 2nd ed, 2005). 
941 Although not strictly relevant to this thesis, transcendental alternatives proposed by scholars include 
Ehrlich’s countenances of compulsory sterilisation [see Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1968), pp. 176-177]; Meadow’s ‘visioning, networking, truth-telling, learning and 
loving’ [see Meadows (1972), p. 271]; Hardin’s abandonment of the underdeveloped world [see Garret 
Hardin, Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics and Population Taboos (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993)]; Heilbroner’s monastic government combining ‘religious orientation with a military 
discipline’ [see Robert Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect: Looked at Again for the 1990s 
(New York: Norton, 1991), pp. 176-177]; Ophuls’ establishment of a governing class of ‘ecological 
mandarins’ [see William Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (San Francisco: W H Freeman, 
1977), p. 163]; Brown’s greater faith in localized citizen action, as well as a stronger United Nations [see 
Lester R Brown, Christopher Flavin and Sandra Postel, Saving the Planet: How to Shape an 
Environmentally Sustainable Global Economy (London: Earthscan, 1992), p. 179]; and Westra, Taylor 
and Michelot’s ‘ecointegrity’ approach to policy-making [see Laura Westra, Prue Taylor, Agnès 
Michelot, Confronting Ecological and Economic Collapse: Ecological Integrity for Law, Policy and 
Human Rights (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013)]. 
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into them—is foundational to effecting changes in the world.  These alternative stories 
represent forms of dissensus.  They hold the possibility of rupturing what might otherwise 
appear to be a pacified and neutered global order.  In doing so, they demand that the world 
could, and should, be ordered in alternative ways.   
 
Consequently, I have drawn attention to the fact that the required solutions—rather than 
having not yet been launched or invented—are actually already present within the world.  
An achievable goal, therefore, may be to open up pathways to amplifying the power, 
reach, and inclusion of these existing options.  Making law’s exclusions publicly visible 
through story-telling are the necessary first steps toward realising this outcome.  While 
‘amnesia produces despair’, theologian Walter Brueggemann notes, our grounds for hope 
reside in the records and recollections of the past. 942   Importantly, this is not a 
perfectionist or reductionist move.  Its orientation is emancipatory and subject to 
continual revision.  Through this process, what is now tolerated as a part of the law might 
eventually come to be regarded as intolerable.  Equally, what was once excluded by law 
might eventually become included within it.   
 
An opposing force to that of ‘sustaining’ is perhaps one of disruption.  With this in mind, 
reviving latent stories—those that reside beyond the existing boundaries of positive law—
may help to disrupt the present, opening new possibilities for what might be achievable.  
International law is itself a discipline with apparently global scope and applicability, and 
is therefore perhaps uniquely positioned to enact, and enliven, alternative stories about 
nature.  Proceeding from this understanding, I have tried to tell a history that seeks to 
bring out, and better harness, law’s critical potential.  This history has sought to better 
integrate alternative languages and logics, particularly those drawing attention to life’s 
complex diversity, contingency, and dynamism.  Such an approach opposes quests for 
fixed or static universal referents.  I hope that such an understanding might help to 
emancipate law’s critical potential insofar as it can make our world seemingly more 
contingent, open, and unstable than it would otherwise appear to be.  The story presented 
in this thesis might thus help to awaken alternative legal possibilities for creating natural 
                                                 
942 Quoted in Rebecca Solnit, ‘“Hope is an embrace of the unknown”: Rebecca Solnit on living in dark 
times’. The Guardian (online), 15 July 2016, available at: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jul/15/rebecca-solnit-hope-in-the-dark-new-essay-embrace-
unknown> (last accessed on 31 July 2018).  
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environments, beyond those that merely adhere to preconceived outcomes dictated by 
power, capital, techno-science, markets, and imperialism.   
 
III.  Coda 
 
People across the world continue to invest much hope and effort in finding international 
legal solutions to the world’s many injustices.  The terms ‘nature’ and ‘the environment’ 
represent foundations upon which some such claims are made.  They are words that 
continue to mobilise much thought and action.  For example, a simple Google search of 
the word ‘environment’ brings up more than 2.3 billion internet pages.  The latest major 
iteration of international efforts to address environmental issues has been that of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’) and the Paris Climate Agreement.  
These processes marshalled immense political engagement and resources.  The resulting 
outcomes sparked jubilant celebrations.  It has not been my objective to negate those 
efforts, or to claim that their underlying motivations are incorrect.  My research has, 
however, demonstrated that there is still a type of blindness on the part of many lawyers 
and policymakers.  It appears that, perhaps, they remain in a fantasy world still.   
 
This has become a reality about the dominance, and privilege, of a minority over all other 
life on the planet.  It is about ever-expanding control by wealthy techno-scientific 
industrialists.  It affirms the perpetual growth of trade and market-friendly, industrialised 
national economies.  It is a fantasy in which these economies are supposedly capable of 
conjuring technological means to surpass all ecological limits.  Clearly, this story has had 
real, transformative, and disastrous consequences.  Nonetheless, most actors continue to 
rehearse the provisions of this global order, which include a panoply of concepts that 
constrain how we think about nature.  Led by these inherited structures of thought, many 
of those tasked with resolving our most pressing (environmental) issues continue to fiddle 
while Rome burns, both metaphorically and literally.   
 
This thesis has strived to bring one of these strands into view.  It has called our perceptions 
and actions into question at a deeper level.  This is my back-story to a front-story which 
is often told about the proliferation of treaties, acrimonious debates between the First and 
Third Worlds, and the progressivist march toward a supposedly optimal rule of law with 
regard to the environment.  The result has been not only an academic discussion, but also 
an inescapably public one.  Indeed, I have sought to connect a number of theoretical 
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strands with the work of contemporary dissidents to show how the stories we tell about 
nature and the environment are in fact contingent.  Far from being atavistic or backward, 
some of these dissidents were in fact far-sighted.  They are those with the least culpability 
for problems like climate change, species extinctions, and pollution, but who suffer 
inordinately from them: these are the indigenous peoples, subsistence farmers, women, 
endangered animals, and other marginalised lives across the world.  It is these dissidents 
that have perhaps been the most rational of all, more so than those progressive modernists 
who continue to peddle familiar, but ultimately destructive, fantasies.   
 
In this story, I have also suggested that law responded to this dissensus in specific ways.  
Oppositional struggles altered—but fundamentally retained—a dominant, hegemonic 
vision of nature.  This enabled the preservation of preferences, priorities, and interests of 
some species and peoples over others.  Put simply, these changes in the environment’s 
meaning have helped sustain a particular formation of global ordering.  This has been the 
lynchpin of my argument.  While there is a huge amount of attention on achieving 
‘sustainability’, and much is now made to appear ‘sustainable’, other scholarship to date 
has not adequately explored what is in fact sustained when we talk about the environment 
in international law.   
 
Some contemporary writers—like Naomi Klein and George Monbiot943—have made 
significant efforts to investigate how neoliberal practices impede our ability to resolve 
environmental problems, such as climate change.  Yet, these authors have not explicitly 
examined international law’s role in reproducing these problems.  They have also not 
ventured to trace how law’s visions—or stories—about the environment have shifted in 
response to dissensus.  As a consequence, it is one thing to argue—as many celebrated 
scholars continue to do—that we should reduce oil production, embrace renewable 
energy, ban carbon markets, or rapidly transition toward becoming steady-state 
economies.  In focusing attention on these solutions, however, scholars have tended to 
ignore how law—and its framing of the environment—actually prevents us from 
achieving these outcomes.   
 
The result of this conceptual history, therefore, is to show how we have arrived at where 
we are in the present.  It illustrates how law has had an effect in both shaping—and been 
                                                 
943 See generally, Klein (2014); George Monbiot, Feral: Rewilding the Land, the Sea, and Human Life 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).  
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shaped by—current debates about the environment.  My story is a questioning of received 
verities, and an attempt to grapple with these from a historical perspective.  It helps to 
explain how critics speaking ‘from below’944—such as the Bolivian community leaders 
at Paris in 2015—have remained so much on the back foot, struggling to have their voices 
heard within the hallowed halls in which international law is written.  At the same time, 
my story accounts for the construction, and sustaining, of dominant narratives.  
These included civilisation, the national economy, conservation, the human environment, 
sustainable development, the green economy, and natural capital.  As I have repeatedly 
suggested, the benefits of such stories tend to accrue to a small minority of the world’s 
people.  
 
Yet, multiple stress fractures remain.  History, in other words, is not a monolith.  We are 
able to tell different stories about nature, and embrace different forms of ordering.  I have, 
in this sense, endeavoured to tell an alternative, ruptural story about international law and 
its vision of the environment.  This acknowledges that international law’s existing stories 
about the environment might prove too limiting—and be encumbered by too much 
historical baggage—to be used solely as a basis for effective political action.  
Consequently, my story has sought to reclaim—rather than reinforce—the existing legal-
political and global order.  We might thus represent this story as the performance of a 
‘politics for the environment’.945   
 
In pursuing this aim, my story has sought more broadly to unveil, and contest, exclusions.  
It has brought the structures of domination, and subjectivities, of established orders to the 
surface with a view to reconfiguring them.  In openly recognising the conflictual plurality 
of different social-ecological orders—and renewing spaces in which these can clash—
such an approach might help to more fully array the legal-political choices before us—
like a constellation imagined out of the infinite lights of the night sky—to offer citizens 
                                                 
944 The phrase ‘from below’ is taken from Rajagopal (2003). Baxi describes this as the ‘sites and subjects 
that have traditionally been positioned as the “others of international law”’. Upendra Baxi, Human Rights 
in a Posthuman World Critical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 2. He also observes 
that ‘there is no such thing as an international environmental law from below’. See also Upendra Baxi, 
‘Late Holocene Environmental Law and Jurisprudence’, YouTube (online), 18 July 2017, Lccture given at 
NALSAR University of Law, available at: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tot4x9f9c9w&index=6&list=PLzwRRj2rg8VO5VKYh70FyX6QJv
V0ZFAQY&t=906s> (last accessed on 6 June 2018).  
945 Emulating Baxi’s distinction with regard to human rights, such a politics for the environment is 
distinguishable from what we might call a ‘politics of the environment’, the conduct of which takes place 
merely within the existing parameters of dominant views toward the environment. Baxi (2008), pp. 40-
41. 
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the hope of making more consciously-informed choices between a whole set of possible 
future orders.  Consequently, this mode of story-telling has perhaps opened new 
interpretations of the past that might help those engaged in the task of crafting less unjust 
futures.   
 
Ultimately, there are always new stories to uncover, environments to fashion, orders to 
be challenged, and suffering to alleviate.  International law is not fixed.  It has a history, 
which is capable of being retold in different ways.  Our conceptual understanding of 
nature was made, and can therefore be changed.  This thesis has nourished itself on the 
possibility of such reappraisals and reinterpretations.  Its critique has reinforced the 
necessity of reviving a set of different approaches to not only the natural environment, 
but also to international law.  It is, therefore, my fervent hope that this thesis—and the 
stories it enlivens—may afford some modest foundation for reinvigorating the discipline, 
and that this long-suppressed (emancipatory) soul of international law may again find 
renewed utterance.   
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